By Michael Hammer

On the 22^nd of July the International Court of Justice (ICJ) came down with its advisory opinion on the question put to it in October 2008 by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA): “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”.

The Court concludes by ten votes to four that it is of the opinion that the declaration of independence of Kosovo adopted on 17 February 2008 did not violate international law. The majority vote bases its view on four main pillars. First it is held that the rights to self-determination (Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and of remedy against violations of guaranteed freedoms under international law “by […] competent authorities provided for by the legal system of the state […]” (ICCPR, Art. 1 and 2) is not constrained by norms of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, unless it was pursued by use of force, and that many previous acts of unilateral declarations of independence have been accepted under international law. Second the opinion confirms that the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo is part of international law as it is internationally mandated. Third, the Court sees the spirit of the declaration of independence as not contradicting the UN’s line of policy of increasing autonomy and self-government of Kosovo. Fourth, while the institutions of self-government of Kosovo were instituted by the UN Security Council, the Court suggests that this did not make the validity of their political and legal expressions contingent on formal approval or ratification by the UN Security Council, nor in fact meant that they could not speak separately on behalf of the Kosovar people and set their own agenda independently of the UN Security Council as the body which created them.

The fact that four Judges (Bennouna, Koroma, Skotnikov, and Tomka) did not concur with the overall conclusion shows how difficult the Court found it to balance different aspects in its advisory opinion, on many of which it remained split. With whom rests the authority to make, interpret, and enforce international law? Does it primarily sit with international institutions, or does it arise from and requires the necessary assent to such laws by concerned nation states, including to their interpretation and enforcement. What role do non-state entities play in the development of international law and UN practice of work? Should the concept of sovereignty support primarily the rights of existing states to their integrity, or does it focus on the rights of citizens to choose their form and scope of government. Do democratic rights to self determination by ethnic, linguistic or religious groups as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) continue to be applicable outside the decolonization process which informed their original framing? Common to the dissenting opinions is also a concern about preservation of the legal nature of the Court’s work, and the need to avoid getting involved in politics, for instance by interpreting the line of policy of the Security Council and the UN institutions in Kosovo as part of arriving at its opinion. Several dissenting judges therefore challenge the wisdom of the Court giving an advisory opinion on this question at all.

In addition to dissenting views, several judges have made separate statements. Judge Simma, while agreeing with the majority opinion, raises concerns about the advisory opinion’s lack to make a more discerning difference between the absence of a prohibitive rule, and explicit permission for an act such as the declaration of independence.  Judge Keith, also concurs with the overall findings, but raises concerns about the locus standing of the General Assembly in approaching the Court on this issue as the GA had only marginally engaged with the issue of Kosovo. Judge Sepúlveda Amor explains his concerns about the competence of the authors of the declaration of independence to act separately from the UN, a point also supported by Judge Yusuf. In an extensive separate statement, Judge Cançado Trindade arrives at the same substantive result as the majority opinion, but expands on the changing and increasing role of non-state actors in both the practice of the UN’s work, and the evolution of international law. Finally, Judge Yusuf would have wished for a greater exploration of the question how to deal with rights to self-determination in the post colonial context, and how to square the recognition of this right with the general discouragement in international law of state fragmentation.

While the discussion of the above concerns by the judges in dissenting and some of the separate statements has its merits, the Court’s majority opinion overall has to be considered the most pragmatic of all statements, and appears in tune with principles of subsidiarity in decision making, which remain essential to retain buy-in by citizens for the international rule of law and the work of global institutions more widely. This is why both the recognition by the authors of the declaration of independence of their regret to see all attempts to reach a mutual agreement with Serbia on the status of Kosovo to have failed, and the importance attached to giving the Kosovo people clarity about their future, are given a central space in the majority opinion. If one were to follow some of arguments put forward by dissenting judges, and some other separate statements, the Kosovo people would remain forever dependent on the agreement by the Security Council about their future, and potentially be subject to a long political stalemate, which in turn would effectively violate other fundamental and inalienable rights they hold under international law, such as to self-determination, non-discrimination, and access to remedy. The Court could also be seen to have had no choice other than to accept the legality of the declaration of independence at risk of a deterioration of anyway very fragile faith of common citizens in international law, and the global institutions that affect their lives.

Despite some questions about the locus of power in determining and interpreting international law on balance the advisory opinion therefore can be seen to support the international rule of law more than it damages it. The Court, like all international organisations, has an inherent responsibility to ensure that its work and international law remains meaningful to world citizens, and evolves, appoint reflected in the changing attitudes put forward regarding the role of non-state entities. To do this it has to make choices about which accountability relationships in the necessarily complex web of multiple stakeholders in international law deserve greater attention in each case under its jurisdiction. It has to be commended for having chosen to emphasise accountability to people and their local democratic institutions over the interests of a nation state, and the problematic interpretations of the concept of state sovereignty which would have further disempowered the citizens that are most dependent on the fulfilment of their rights and the delivery of global institutions and frameworks to address their needs.

Tags: Citizens, Human Rights, International Court of Justice, peace and security, self-determination

By Jonathan Butcher

Scientists at the University of East Anglia’s Climatic Research Unit (CRU) were cleared this week of the serious accusations that threatened to crush their credibility, but were firmly criticised for failing to uphold an adequate level of transparency.

Accusations mounted following the public disclosure last November of thousands of personal email communications between CRU staff and other leading climate researchers, believed to have been obtained by anonymous hackers.  It was claimed that the emails showed evidence of the CRU suppressing dissenting voices and manipulating data.  The affair, predictably dubbed ‘climategate’ by many in the press, cast doubt on the validity of climate change research and it has been suggested that it harmed talks at last years Copenhagen conference on climate change and significantly impacted upon public opinion.

In the biggest inquiry into the saga to date led by senior UK civil servant Sir Muir Russell, it was concluded that there was no evidence of serious scientific misconduct relating to data fraud and dissent suppression.  But the findings did cast a light on some of the CRU’s shortfalls and failings, labelling them “unhelpful and defensive” and concluding amongst other things that “there has been a consistent pattern of failing to display the proper degree of openness”.

In raising key questions of issues in the openness of data and the accountability of researchers, the findings of the Russell Report should reverberate around the entire research and scientific community, especially those involved in research holding the potential to become politicised.  Gone are the days when science is unquestioned by those outside the traditional academic establishment.  As science becomes ever more intertwined with politics it is becoming increasingly necessary for raw data to be made available for independent inspection.

The leaked CRU emails affair itself raises the question of ‘who are scientists accountable to?’ In the past scientific debate was largely confined to a closed scientific community whereby scientists were essentially accountable to each other. The advent of new communication technologies and the desire for a more open society have contributed to a formation of complex knowledge networks that have begun to bridge the gap between formal institutions of research and civil society. After the exposure of the CRU’s emails, it was apparent that much criticism arose from the blogosphere and other informal networks.  The scientific community may view these as nothing more than disruptive ‘rabble rousers’ but it is likely that they will have to find new ways of developing accountability mechanisms that address their relationship with civil society.  Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the scientific and research community is that of building effective systems to regulate scientific discourse.  The closed nature of the traditional peer review system has yet again been shown to be not without its problems.  The argument that peer review is unaccountable, holding the potential to suppress viewpoints and allow for bias are likely to continue unless the issue is addressed.

It is unlikely that this report will draw the saga completely to a close: it is in no way an exoneration of the CRU and somewhat inevitably anthropogenic climate change sceptics will view it as something of a white wash.  For climate scientists, it is important that they begin to address some of these issues head-on in order for them to get on with producing research of the highest validity into an area of utmost significance for policymakers and indeed for humanity itself.

Tags: Access to knowledge, Accountability, APRO, Climate Change, Power, research accountability, science

By Davina Rai

The Reputation Institute (RI) for the first time included charities in their reputation index this year, who achieved scores that far exceeded RI corporate clients and broke all records. The index measures reputation by gauging public opinion and it is widely acknowledged that there is more public trust in charities than private companies. This is good news for charities so that they can carry on doing valuable work and offering vital public services largely on the backs of dedicated volunteers and public generosity. The reputation index as well as our own assessment of accountability capabilities in the corporate, NGO and intergovernmental sectors through the Global Accountability Report indicates that the corporate sector needs to be more responsive and accountable to society interests as well as their own in order to boost public opinion.

As public donations are the major source of funding it is not surprising that upholding a positive image in the eyes of the public is vital to charities. Especially for those such as the Royal National Lifeboat Institute that came top of the reputation index, and receives no state funding. Therefore the not for profit sector has more incentives to be accountable to all its internal and external stakeholders and keep a credible reputation as it is directly related to their purpose and they must maintain financial assistance and public support. Whereas companies main and sometimes sole purpose is for private gain for its staff and shareholders, but they still have direct impacts on society, the economy and the environment.

Results from the One World Trust Global Accountability report (GAR) showed that throughout the 2006, 2007 and 2008 assessments the corporate sector scored lowest in integrating accountability principles into their policies and management systems. Whereas International NGOs demonstrated strong commitment to participation receiving the highest score, but fell short behind intergovernmental organisations in transparency and evaluation. Incongruous to the fact that monitoring and evaluating performance and projects were processes developed by the for-profit sector and later adopted by the not for profit sector, the corporate sector overall have struggled most at achieving a high standard of accountability capabilities. They only seem to address them on an ad hoc basis, which sends negative messages to the public about their commitment to corporate responsibility and has cast a shadow on the sectors reputation.

It is important that corporations create a compromising arrangement that can fulfill its private needs, and consider and monitor its impacts on the public. Also charities need to work on maintaining their reputation and the public’s trust, but can not only rely precariously on their normative image as agents of social justice, ethical practice and positive change. It is imperative that they remain proactive in strengthening and enhancing their governance systems throughout all their departments, and across the different dimensions of accountability.

Tags: advocacy, NGO accountability; accountability;self-regulation

By Michael Hammer

The oil spill in the Mexican Gulf is raising difficult accountability challenges which go far beyond the question of who exactly may be to blame, and how much should be paid by whom.  The case is showing how important it is to understand the power dynamics that underpin any accountability equation and which can turn good theory to ashes when the tide of power flows against a formally existing or theoretically legitimate accountability demands and associated mechanisms.

Quantifying the damage, including in monetary terms, is an important element in the inevitable negotiations, and commitments like BP feeding huge sums into a compensation fund are more than a fiscal achievement: they generate at least some confidence in the ability of society to regain control of the flow of to whom accountability is due.

In many ways this is quite opposite to what we saw with the big banking industry bailouts. There, arguably, good money was being thrown after bad, and now entire countries are enduring a decline of their creditworthiness while in fact they only put it at stake to prevent a crash of private institutions. The model the American President seems to pursue is to draw in capital from the private institution which is arguably most responsible for the crisis, ahead of the risk of the state having to bail out tens of thousands of citizens affected with state guarantees, and hence of being drawn into further fiscal calamities. Indeed, the US$20 million fund may not be the end of what BP may be asked to pay.  

The timing of this demand, and the agreement of the company to pay up, is telling. Obama’s strategy, despite the environmental damage already being caused, seeks to first limit the decline in creditworthiness  to those who, at least on the surface, have caused the problem in the first place, regulatory failures notwithstanding. In addition, however, he appears to want to break out of the dilemma of ex-post wrangling over compensation by securing resources ahead of claims to come, and effectively getting, as a politician back into the driver’s seat. For the first time a major corporation working in the extractive industries may thus be deprived of the privilege of using its corporate clout to fend of legal challenges against inevitably weaker individual opponents in the shape of for instance fishermen and tourism industry dependent families, well after the event, and often over decades. Rather it will have to make a case for the damage done to it to be limited while it is pinned down by contract and public opinion. Even if the fragility of the US budget may also be  a driver, there is something positive in this which goes beyond the national interest.

While some at BP may argue that the President is taking the company hostage, arguably the practice of many environmentally risky undertakings is holding global society to ransom. It is in this light that Obama’s comments have to be seen about the Gulf oil spill changing the way society, at least American society, may look at environmental risks, in the same way that the terror attacks of the 11th of September 2001 changed America’s perception of risk and security in the domain of public safety and immediate vulnerability of individual lives. The protest by some relatives of the victims of the 2001 attacks that the two events cannot be compared is maybe understandable from a personal point of view, but it misses the point: the imminent impact of the lethal violence brought to bear on around 3000 people in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania in 2001 caused an unseen level of public expenditure on domestic and international action to keep America safe.

No commitment to such spending is visible when it comes to mitigating, compensating for, or even preventing further occurrence of the impact of environmental damage: because it is slow, remote, and not always directly attributable to one cause: intangible to those whose planning and risk management is measured in periods of one to five years. Obama’s greatest impact, if he carries on with this line (and it’ll be a job to ensure that), may be to change the way societies are willing to understand environmental risk, and invest in its prevention in the long term: creating a chance for accountability to be established for individual actions and governance response that affect the future and touch on at any given point to some degree necessarily intangible, but nevertheless real risks. It will be interesting to see whether this has any impact on the global energy and climate change governance debates in the years to come.

It is to be hoped.

Tags: Citizens, global governance, government accountability

By Christina Laybourn

Andrew Mitchell, the new Secretary of State for International Development, has begun his latest appointment by committing to improving the effectiveness of British aid. In a recent speech to Oxfam and Policy Exchange at the Royal Society in London Mr Mitchell reaffirmed the U.K. coalition government’s commitment to international development, but warned that he wants to ‘squeeze every last ounce of value’ from the tax-payers money that funds such work.

Mr Mitchell’s statement is also to be welcomed for reasserting the new government’s commitment to international development, and the promise to spend 0.7% of GNI on overseas aid from 2013, particularly. In this time of global financial crisis, where budgets everywhere are being squeezed: both the Canadian and New Zealand governments have recently slashed the amount of funding that they provide for international development. It is also understandable that, when UK taxpayers (and voters) are feeling the pinch, the money going to overseas projects is justified by a commitment to use it wisely, and where it can do the most good.

However, Mr Mitchell’s preoccupation with demonstrating the effectiveness of aid raises some worrying issues. More accountability is not the same as good accountability. He announced the formation of an independent aid watchdog which will monitor all projects that receive U.K. money: irrelevant or poor performing projects will have their funding cut, whilst “effective” projects will be supported. Although this is a commendable idea, measuring the results of development or humanitarian work is notoriously difficult. Some projects have results that can be easily quantified, for example, a healthcare project provides children with measles vaccinations, and the rate of measles decreases by a certain, recordable, amount. However, a community theatre project produces a play which raises awareness of domestic violence: that project may have a considerable impact on the attitudes of the community, but it is very difficult to measure and record this change, particularly since it may take effect across many years, in combination with other projects, and general social developments. Furthermore, merely relaying numbers does not necessarily indicate the quality or effectiveness of aid: you can count how many people now receive electricity and clean water, but this doesn’t tell us whether they are the most deserving recipients; you can count the number of anti-malaria bednets supplied, but this doesn’t tell us whether they were used to protect sleeping children from mosquito bites, or as fishing nets.

There are also issues about how the numbers are used. As argued above, some things cannot easily have a quantifiable value put on them. There is therefore a real risk that projects which can neatly demonstrate their results will be privileged over those that produce less tangible, or less immediate effects – such as governance or capacity development projects. And yet such projects are vital to improvement of accountability. Some countries are more problematic than others, and the success of development projects riskier: and yet aid to these countries should not be de-prioritised.

. Even if some way is found of measuring the effectiveness of a project such as the community theatre group above, it is problematic to compare it with the effectiveness of the vaccine programme, because they are so different. Funding decisions made on this basis are therefore likely to favour of projects that produce specific types of results (cheap per capita, widespread, short term), rather than projects which respond to evidenced need, but which work towards social development, and may require long term investment.
Funding should not be allocated to aid projects on the basis of whether their results can neatly demonstrate impact, but on whether the project is needed, whether it can be successfully implemented, and whether it will make a real difference to people who need it most.

Most worryingly, however, the focus on results which Mr Mitchell advocates may create perverse incentives for the data collection by development actors on the ground. Identifying specific results skews projects to achieve these results, as opposed to others: a much reviewed example from the domestic scene in the UK shows this: setting a target maximum waiting time for patients in an A&E ward risks that ambulances stand outside the A&E ward with their patients, until queues go down. These problems are particularly difficult in aid environments, which typically are characterised by an asymmetry in information between the implementers of the projects and the donors. When dealing with projects around the world, in some very remote areas, Mr Mitchell’s independent watchdog will rely on the projects collecting and submitting results about their performance themselves: there will be a substantial information deficit between the funders and the projects. When the future of a project, and the jobs of those employed by the project, are contingent on demonstrating its success, there will be a strong motivation to enhance, or even fake results. The system will favour those who submit false results, since they will be able to claim a level of success that is, in reality, unachievable. This also means that those projects which initially try to be honest about their effectiveness will become squeezed out of the market. The only possible way of countering the information deficit is to have an independent surveillance of all the funded projects, but this will be enormously expensive, to such an extent that it will undermine any financial gains made by ensuring effectiveness.

Whilst delivered to an audience of aid professionals, Mr Mitchell’s speech was aimed clearly at the average voter, and failed to consider the complexity and difficulty of the policies he was advocating. We should strive to make aid more effective: too often in the past British money has funded unnecessary, unhelpful, or even damaging, work overseas. However, more accountability is not necessarily good accountability. We owe it to both the U.K. taxpayer, and the people we are trying to help, to use our wealth in the best way possible, but inappropriate accountability mechanisms relying too much on measuring impact will do more harm than good.. But Mr Mitchell’s Effectiveness Watchdog may not be the way to achieve this.

Tags: Accountability, Development aid, monitoring and evaluation, NGO accountability; accountability;self-regulation

By Michael Hammer

The One World Trust is currently recruiting an Administrative Assistant (part time). We are looking for a motivated and organised individual to support our small team of researchers and the Director, organising all aspects of administration and communications to ensure the smooth running of the organisation. You will act as first contact point for inquiries about our work, callers and visitors, manage office logistics and processes, provide direct assistance to the Director, maintain our databases and filing, and keep our website up to date and manage our monthly e-newsletter to high standard.

More information about the One World Trust and this job is available on our web site www.oneworldtrust.org and the  full job information pack itself. For further inquiries about the job, please contact Syed Alam or Michael Hammer at +44 (0) 20 7713 6790. Closing date is 21 June 2010, 9 am.

Tags: Accountability

By Jonathan Butcher

The new coalition government has sent out a positive, if a little ambiguous, message concerning the UK’s future international aid budget.  Last week’s coalition plan for government encouragingly declared that a commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI (Gross National Income) on overseas aid is to be enshrined into law.  At the 2010 State Opening of Parliament this week – a time where the new administration announced its plans for the next 18 months – the government reiterated its verbal pledge but stopped short of proposing legislation.

The target of 0.7 per cent of GNI for Official Development Assistance was first proposed around 40 years ago in a World Bank report and later adopted by the UN General Assembly.  Since then, despite substantial advancements in Northern living standards this target figure has remained constant.  At the 2005 Gleneagles Summit G8 countries reiterated an obligation to this figure in a measure designed to secure financial commitment to the Millennium Development Goals.  Sadly, the 2005 Summit also reveals the extent to which Northern countries have consistently avoided being held to account to international agreements on aid levels.  With the exception of a handful of European countries, the most recent figures show that even wealthy economies such as the USA and Japan still fall woefully short of the mark. In recent years, Italy has even drastically reduced aid spending.

In general, the last decade has seen an increase in aid commitments.  The UK, along with numerous others such as France and Canada, has been proactive in steadily edging closer to the magic figure of 0.7%.  But the ease at which countries are able to avoid committing aid without reprimand demonstrates that aid continues to be supplied de facto on philanthropic terms rather than as a legal accountability requirement.  Enshrining the commitment into UK national law will provide a means of holding its government to account at the national level.  Although this week’s commitment is to be welcomed by the development community it is still somewhat left wondering when words will be translated into actions.

Tags: Accountability, development, Development aid, global governance, public funding

By Christina Laybourn

172 NGOs working in Afghanistan have had their operating licenses revoked, amid claims that they are not accountable; a move which has been met with concern from many commentators in the West.

President Hamid Karzai has recently come under pressure to fulfil his election promise to deal with endemic corruption in Afghanistan. However, as yet, there has been little evidence of any efforts, beyond accusing NGOs, contractors and donor countries of mismanaging millions of dollars of aid money. The recent crackdown on NGOs is therefore viewed with scepticism by many as an attempt to scapegoat the NGO sector, whilst avoiding the more challenging problem of corruption within the state.

However, representatives from several NGO umbrella groups in Afghanistan have argued that revoking the licenses was necessary, and fair. The decision was made by The NGOs Clearance and Annulment Commission, which included representatives from several NGOs. Many of the affected NGOs were felt to have poor standards, and had failed to submit bi-annual reports to the Ministry of Economics, which is a legal requirement.

The incident raises several interesting issues about the role of the state in monitoring NGO standards. There are over 1,200 national, and 300 international NGOs currently working in Afghanistan, and undoubtedly there is variation in the quality and effectiveness of the assistance that they are providing. The sanctity of ‘good deeds’ is no longer sufficient to assure governments, or donors, that all charitable work is good work: a recent slew of books on the subject, from Damisa Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’ to Linda Polmon’s ‘War Games’, have highlighted just how much damage mismanaged aid can do. Perhaps the Afghan government is right to act now to regulate and monitor an unwieldy industry.

However the scepticism that this development met with many in the West also demonstrates the lack of confidence in this kind of state intervention. Many other Southern countries require NGOs to register with the government in order to operate. Such regulations can be part of a policy to increase government control and restrict civil society, accompanied by similar attempts to limit free-speech and political debate. Seen in this context, using the law on registration to prevent NGOs operating is a worrying development in Afghanistan. Furthermore, since corruption within the Afghan state remains unaddressed, the NGO sector seems to have been victimized whilst Karzai turns a blind eye to a lack of credibility in his own government.

The debate over the rights and wrongs of the move to dissolve the non-compliant NGOs suggests the importance that civil society organisations can themselves play through self-regulation. The One World Trust has already identified over 350 CSO self-regulatory initiatives around the world. Many of these have formed in response to increasing government pressure, and seek to demonstrate the credibility of their members to states, donors and beneficiaries. By demanding the commitment of their members to a range of good practise principles, the SRIs also have a role in raising standards across the NGO sector. Whilst membership of such an initiative may be a requirement to operate or receive funding within a country, the independence of SRIs from the government protects them from accusations of state interference.

In Afghanistan, The Code of Conduct for NGOs Engaged in Humanitarian Action, Reconstruction and Development in Afghanistan in one such initiative. It was written by local NGOs with the help of the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees in response to criticisms of NGO conduct in post-war Afghanistan. Member organisations commit to transparency, accountability, good governance, and non-discriminatory practices based on gender or religion. They also commit to building Afghan capacity.

Rather than resort to unnecessary government intervention in civil society, Karzai’s government would perhaps be better supporting such self-regulatory initiatives within the Afghan NGO sector. This would help tackle the problem of poor quality or corrupt NGOs, demonstrate the government’s commitment to freedom and transparency, and avoid further condemnation from Western commentators. Self-regulation could make a considerable difference to the standard of aid provided in Afghanistan.

By Jonathan Butcher

The burgeoning role of technological and scientific innovation in global health will be a central issue of concern for the 63rd World Health Assembly, taking place in Geneva this week (17th – 21st May).  Amongst the challenges faced by delegates are the complex issues of research and development and intellectual property rights: issues entwined in a discourse of social and economic rights and of transparency.

The role of technological and scientific research in addressing the world’s most pressing health issues has risen rapidly in recent years thanks to increased resources and participation from a wide group of actors.  International Governance Organisations (IGOs) such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the World Bank provide global leadership whilst funding bodies such as the Global Fund have been created as vehicles for channelling both aid and private finance from actors such as the Gates’ Foundation into health-related projects.  Furthermore, we have also seen a proliferation of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO) engaging in advocacy and in some cases, such as the Malaria Vaccine Initiative and the TB Alliance, conducting and managing medical research and innovation.

In reality, however, the medical and pharmaceutical industries – based and controlled predominantly from the global ‘North’ – still hold a commanding position in driving global medical research. The top five global pharmaceutical industries have a combined annual turnover of over $240billion and are based in either Europe or the USA. Furthermore, statistics from the Global Forum for Health Research show that the North accounts for 97% of medical research and development spending. There is a strong claim that this system has historically neglected health issues primarily afflicting global South. Simply put, diseases such as TB and Malaria are diseases of poverty. The absence of sufferers’ ability to afford treatment does not create an attractive market to entice private sector investment. Where new drugs have been developed, patent laws continue to compound this situation despite recent attempts to address the implications it poses to health.

Under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) intellectual property rights are protected under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement.  The 2001 Doha Declaration attempted to build flexibility into TRIPs by stating that it should not prevent states from dealing with public health crises, allowing developing countries to circumvent patent laws in response to public health crises.  Prior to this, TRIPs allowed drugs to be legally priced well out of the reach of the poor.  Since this declaration, there has been some suggestion that the aims of the 2001 agreement are not being realised.  Countries in the global South have not been fully utilising the flexibility of TRIPS primarily, it seems, because of the legal complexities surrounding the law and there has also been some suggestion that Northern interests have shown some acts of resistance to it.

Given the problems associated with the history of intellectual property rights and patent law, it seems that through more freely accessible knowledge and information can the South begin to play a more prominent role in research and technological innovation and begin to break from their reliance on the North.  Two years ago, the 61^st World Health Assembly adopted the final version of the Global strategy on public health, innovation and intellectual property which intends to address the inadequacies of medical research. The strategy aims to stimulate transnational cooperation by facilitating the dissemination and transparency of information, knowledge and technology from the North to the South and between Southern parties.

Two years on, this week’s Assembly will discuss the strategy and assess its progress. Given the important role of research and development in global health, campaigners for both accountability and global health equity should have an eye on proceedings and ensure that accountability of research is better aligned to the needs of the poor.

Tags: Access to knowledge, Accountability, APRO, global governance, research accountability, science, WHO

By Michael Hammer

Sparked by government delays in producing unredacted documents pertaining to the treatment of Afghan detainees, Parliament in Canada has since March 2010 begun an interesting journey to reassert its power. The government under Prime Minister Harper proved vulnerable on a number of fronts: first, as a minority government it faces a serious threat from a vote of no confidence should it continue to comply with requests that parliament has the constitutional power to issue. Second, Speaker Peter Miliken issued a formal ruling on this issue on 27 April, describing the role of Parliament as the ‘grand inquest of the nation’  and asking all parties to find a solution that would fulfil the legitimate powers of Parliament to produce these (and in principle other) documents. This constituted not only a call to order for the government, but more importantly also to the MPs of the party that supports it to come back to their role which is to control government (despite also supporting it). Third, the documents in question have already been disclosed in unredacted form to a wider circle of government officials, and hence the government’s refusal to make them available to parliamentarians whose task it is to scrutinise government work, could be seen as unjustified under judicial review. As Noemi Gal- Or suggests through Speaker Milikens’  ruling arguments of national security are coming back in the democratic equation.

While a full final agreement is still outstanding, things have progressed though: just within the deadline set by the Speaker, parties have agreed to a special arbitration panel to make decisions on disclosure in which would sit with some likelihood government, opposition and external, independent people possibly from the judiciary. In so far, the mini revolt in parliament has clearly paid off, although as David Eaves states, it does not address the problems of a government which with its only grudging move in the face of those who CAN force it to be accountable, in his view shows a deplorable disregard by government of its accountability duties to citizens who have far less direct bargaining power in their interactions with it.

But beyond resolving this particular issue, longer term concerns persist around the role that Parliament should and will play as a controller of government. John Ibbitson of the Globe and Mail for instance fears that in view of historical experiences Parliament might very well return to a supine existence in circumstances of majority governments.

Worries are also visible concerning the power of the Prime Minister to set the date for the prorogation of Parliament, which effectively allows him or her to cut short or even completely end parliamentary debates and processes on developments that are politically uncomfortable, including but not limited to votes of no confidence. The Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) is currently looking at this issue but no statements have emerged yet.

Finally, the question is beginning to resurface whether the parliamentary power to withdraw confidence form a government, and thus effectively pressurising it to resign and call new elections, is too blunt a tool. With reference to the situation in Germany where a vote of no confidence has to be mandatorily combined with the support for a new head of government (as so called ‘constructive vote of no confidence’), long standing parliamentarian Brian Topp suggested to the PROC that rules should be reviewed to include such a provision, effectively making it possible for Parliament to redress abuses of power by government in a hard way during a Parliament without subjecting the electorate every time to a call to the ballot box, a process which has been occurring a bit too frequently in Mr. Topp’s view.

Whether or not real procedural or even constitutional changes will result from this recent stand off, the events clearly underline that ensuring government accountability to citizens takes a multiplicity of initiatives, and that importantly a culture of seeking to enforce such accountability has to be at the heart of the understanding of parliamentarians of their own role, so that it is not buried as soon as political power relationships in the chamber change in favour of the executive.

Tags: Citizens, democracy, parliamentary oversight, peace and security