By Miriam Vincken

China formally signed the Copenhagen Accord on 9 March as one of the last big CO2 emitters (Russia is the one big CO2 emitter that has yet to sign). With this, China is following other emerging economies, such as India (which also signed this week), Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico and Brazil. This shows that emerging economies, even though with hesitation, see the need in an international agreement on climate change and are starting to act on this.

So what does China’s association mean for the prospects of reaching a more binding and ambitious agreement at the next UNFCCC COP in Mexico? Will the increasing level of sign up also by emerging economies increase chances for greater accountability to citizens by the COP for reaching a deal which makes a real difference?

While China signing up is a huge step forward, it has to be borne in mind that none of the agreements in the Copenhagen Accord are legally binding, and despite signing up, China does not legally commit itself to cut its emissions. Yet with China coming on board the political consensus is strengthened, which is an important signal at a time when important forces are seeking to damage the credibility of the scientific evidence basis that supports joined up global action on climate change. The peer pressure that will increasingly arise from a commonly agreed political document may thus also pave the way for a legally binding agreement ideally to be achieved in Mexico. Ity can thus only be hoped that the force field of accountability is slowly turning from being pointed at those with the greatest private economic interests, towards citizens most affected by climate change.

That said, hopes for a legally binding agreement inMexico may still be dashed. First, the US continues to have trouble with finally agreeing a relevant climate bill, and second much will depend on who follows Yvo de Boer when he leaves his post in July. Negotiations may get harder. Eventually, achieving accountability of the global climate change governance process to citizens will depend both on decisive leadership by the UNFCCC and members states on change, and the ability to put in place binding agreements that can be effectively monitored and enforced. China’s  association with the Copenhagen Accord is a promising step – but not enough to do the job yet.

Tags: Citizens, Climate Change, global governance

By Jeannet Lingan

A new NGO Transparency Bill passed by the Israeli Cabinet Law Committee to the Knesset in Israel last week has triggered a controversy, as voices have been raised both in favour and against this initiative. Supporters of the bill claim that this will bring more transparency to the activities of organisations that some see controversial. In fact, who could be against an NGO transparency bill? Isn’t transparency one of the fundamental dimensions of accountability? If NGOs are so secure about their legality, transparency and accountability they shouldn’t be afraid of opening their books.

The issue here is not so simple . The bill has been passed in a context of tensions between human rights advocacy groups who have been very critical about how the Israeli government has managed alleged human rights abuses in Gaza, and conservative groups claiming that human rights organizations are interest groups funded and politically motivated by foreign countries.

However, some initiatives from the sector have been trying to build more transparency for non-profit organisations towards the wider public. Only last year, a Guidestar information service was launched by JDC Israel and the Rothchild Foundation in coordination with the Israeli Ministry of Justice. The service aims to provide free online information of all registered charities in Israel. I wonder if this initiative could have been further supported to strengthen sector accountability? In any case, it is very possible that the government is using the accountability agenda to reassure its power and bully the sector.

This situation looks very similar to cases like Russia and Peru (and many other examples abound) where the government attempted to pass NGO laws in a moment of increasing tensions with advocacy groups critical of government’s policies or actions. These governments’ actions could express not only a lack of commitment to strengthen the role of civil society but also might delay serious and determined reflections on how non-profit organisations will be more accountable of their work. On the other hand, non-profit organisations have a responsibility to prove their own value by providing a signal of transparency from the sector, raising the standards and basing their campaigning and advocacy activities on evidence that can stand public scrutiny. This is the way in which they will get wider support from the community.

Tags: NGO accountability; accountability;self-regulation

By Brendan Whitty

Recently there has been a couple of very different incidents where the world of the scientist has run abruptly into that of the lawyer. The Court of Appeal has just finished hearing an appeal to decide whether Simon Singh’s article in the Guardian, which stated that the British Chiropractor Association peddles “bogus” treatments, is libellous. In an earlier case (judgement reproduced here), Singh was held to have libelled the BCA. Further afield, in India, the government technical body in charge of regulating GM crops has proposed to criminalise those who mislead the public without scientific evidence on the dangers of GM crops.

Claims for scientific validity made in public debate can bolster an argument. But what if the claims are unjustified? And how far should people be able to claim a scientific basis for a proposition, even if this might harm others’ business or livelihoods? The principle of freedom of expression would argue that we should flip the question: unless there is a very good reason to impose a restriction, speech should be free and without legal consequence.

The question therefore becomes whether it is ever appropriate for the law to hold people to account for statements purported to be based on evidence? The English and Indian examples show quite different approaches.

In India, the use of criminal law goes too far. It cannot be appropriate to smother debate by putting in jail people who disagree with the use of a technique, even if they do so in the most baseless and unjustified manner. It raises questions of the politico-economic reasons behind the law, and might in the long-run act to increase public distrust of the crops. Politicised technologies must make their case in the political realm, as much as the scientific.

Libel law in England is quite different. Firstly, it is founded in civil law, and allows for people to claim damages for harm to reputation caused by published statements which are not true. It marks the intersection of two conflicting principles. If you harm someone through careless, self-interested or downright malicious arguments, which claim to have an evidence-basis or scientific validity, then you should make compensation for that harm. Conversely, scientific debate is important to a healthy society, and should not be restricted. Sadly, many now argue that English law labours under the unfortunate characteristics of being both far too expensive and far too unpredictable. Only experts can be sure which side of the rather blurred line they are walking. If the rules were clear then scientists could tailor their statements more carefully. If the costs were less extreme, regardless of whether your case is strong or not, they might be bolder. As it is, scientific criticism and debate is stifled. Both faults are rectifiable. There is an urgent need for reform.

By Robert Lloyd

There seem to be some contradictory views coming out of the conservative party at the moment around the extent to which they support the campaigning role of charities.  In a speech to NCVO, Greg Clark, the Conservative spokesman on energy and climate change and former shadow charities minister, said that charities should feel free to campaign and “make life uncomfortable for government”. But, at NCVO’s campaigning conference last month, Oliver Letwin, the author of the Conservatives’ forthcoming election manifesto, said he regretted that “so much of the effort of some parties in the voluntary sector is devoted to campaigning” and that what he treasures “about the sector isn’t its campaigning role. Its special contribution is to do something to change things and solve problems.”  All a little confusing!

The big question will be the extent to which any new government, Conservative, Labour, or Liberal Democrat, will be willing to continue providing charities with public funds to campaign – essentially funding charities to advocate for improvements on behalf of their constituents, and lobby government for change?  With budget cuts on the way, this does seem to be an easy area to start slashing.  But if charities were to have public funds cut it could be to the detriment of democratic debate. Charities provide a conduit for marginalised voices; they raise concerns of groups that struggle to access formal decision making channels.   As my colleague Brendan argued in a post last week: “the removal of public funding would be like removing legal aid from those in court unable to afford their own lawyer.”

Tags: Accountability, advocacy

By Miriam Vincken

Yvo de Boer resigned his post as Executive Secretary of the United Nations Climate Change Secretariat on 18 February. What does this mean for accountability and transparency in the governance process of climate change? In our Briefing Paper “Coping with uncertainty” (December 2009), we highlighted key issues which should be addressed in order to strengthen accountability. One area mentioned was that many citizens are asking for both a firmer leadership on climate change issues and greater transparency about on what basis decisions are taken. Despite the disappointing outcome in Copenhagen, De Boer is seen by many as dedicated to mitigating climate change. De Boer’s disillusion and departure may therefore lead to the impression that there is no hope for an international agreement on climate change.

At the same time many may also see De Boer’s resignation as an opportunity to restart and make the governance process of climate change more transparent. The German Sueddeutsche Zeitung describes the events over the last few months as catastrophic for the international process – allegations of suppression of scientific documents, bitter arguments over difficult to independently verify predictions concerning melting of Himalayan glaciers, and a very weak outcome at Copenhagen.

The newspaper believes that in consequence of the recent attacks on the probity of its climate work, its bodies and the scientific basis of their work, the United Nations (UN) may seek to reorganise the climate change governance process in order for it to become more trustworthy again. It is not De Boer’s fault that the Copenhagen negotiations ended in disappointment: he depended significantly on the consent of nation states for any achievement.

For the future this may mean, however, that the position of Executive Secretary of the UN Climate Change could benefit from being more independent of the Conference of Parties (COP) and should have more executive powers to advance proposals for an international agreement on climate change. Such an increase in power and influence vis-à-vis the COP could be complemented and balanced by stronger direct accountability of the UNFCCC and its Executive Secretary to citizens, in the shape of relationships to parliamentary committees tasked with overseeing their governments, NGOs, and individual citizens. The UN and its member states, represented by governments, do not only owe citizens an explanation for their work, but also a platform and mechanisms through which citizens can hold the COP to account for progress and failings in its work. A first step could be to publish the proceedings of the negotiations that happened behind closed doors, to allow a review of individual governments’ behaviours and positions in the endgame of Copenhagen.

Tags: Accountability, Citizens, Climate Change

By Michael Hammer

Following an official announcement in mid October 2009 that the International Criminal Court (ICC) would examine the large scale killings and acts of sexual violence against women committed by members of the Guinean armed forces on 28 September 2009 in Conakry, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Guinea promptly visited the Court to reassure it that Guinea could and would investigate and deal with any crimes committed. The ICC chose to form its own opinion. At the end of her February 2010 visit to Conakry ICC Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda concluded that in her view crimes against humanity are likely to have been committed, and that the ICCc  would remain on the case.  She remained however unclear whether any prosecutions would be taken forward by the ICC, but it is clear that the capacity and political will of Guinea to prosecute such crimes, and hold those responsible to account, is a central element in such a decision. Given Guinea’s state of governance and its consecutive governments’ track record of violating human rights points towards an ongoing involvement of the ICC in the case.

The positive side of the story as it unfolds is that the ICC begins more and more to live up to its mandate of investigating and prosecuting those most responsible for the gravest crimes under international law. Importantly, it is doing so now, towards the end of its first decade of existence, out of its own powers, acting “proprio motu”. This helps the Court to overcome accusations of just following cases referred to it, for, as some may claim, purely strategic reasons, by member countries or the Security Council, undermining both the legitimacy of the ICC and that of the UN Security Council. Particularly the referral of its first case ever, that of the leaders of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) for crimes against people in Northern Uganda by the President of the country Yoweri Museveni, and that of Darfur (by the Security Council), have led to considerable alienation of some of the key stakeholders of the Court. Without the buy-in of African Heads of State and governments, the ICC may not be able to develop its deterrent, let alone its full judicial accountability potential.

On the problematic side, Guinea is again a case in Africa, like all other cases and situations currently publicly handled by the Court including the Office of the Prosecutor. As the Court itself states, the majority of all the 8000 + communications that have reached from individuals in 132 countries it are from United States of America, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia and France. From a purely judicial perspective, the regional balance of cases treated should not matter. For the ICC to be accountable to the world (including but not limited to its member states) the crime itself should be at the centre of concern. Yet political considerations that impact on legitimacy show themselves to work in a different way, and the forthcoming Assembly of State Party Review Conference of the Rome Statute in May and June 2010 in Kampala may very well face calls for a greater, and not lesser political control over prosecutions, including in the context of a review of Article 124.

This would be a step into the wrong directions. Whether cases in Africa are the only ones that deserve investigating and prosecuting by the ICC is a moot point, yet if pursued it will lead to the ICC potentially becoming just another part of a intergovernmental system of institutions whose performance and ability to deliver against their mission is severely impaired by the political constraints under which they work, and from whose rules states can opt out when inconvenient.

While it is unlikely that the powers granted to the UN Security Council in Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC to suspend investigations, prosecutions and trials will be diminished, the ICC’s legitimacy will eventually have to rely on its ability to demonstrate its accountability through the integrity of its own work, processes, the policies that support these and open evaluation of its performance against these. The Assembly of State Parties therefore has a special responsibility to protect the ICC against political interference and pick and choose approaches, while making sure that it is not only its judicial procedures which are exemplary, but also the frameworks that support it as a global governance institution that serves citizens and not political interests, whether defined in the global north or the global south.

Tags: Accountability, africa, global governance, International Criminal Court, Responsibility to Protect

By Elodie Aba

A recent article  in the French newspaper Le Monde highlights the issue of transparency of the French Constitutional Court (Conseil constitutionnel) and therefore raises the question of the state’s accountability vis-à-vis its citizens.

The Conseil constitutionnel  was created by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in 1958.  It is a unique and hybrid institution. It is competent for judicial review (election results and Bills) and also has consultative powers. Through the years, this institution has been criticised for lacking transparency in its decisions. Legal arguments on the discussion are available to the public via the Internet and published in the Journal Officiel. However, there are no other traces of the discussion. Is this sufficient to accuse this institution of being opaque? Other French institutions that are older such as the Conseil d’Etat - the highest administrative jurisdiction – and the Cour de cassation do not make their notes available to the public. Nevertheless as decisions of these institutions are sovereign it is legitimate to ask whether citizens should be entitled to know more on the decision making-process within?

The credibility of the Conseil constitutionnel was also put to a severe test due to its membership – often seen as political. Its members are appointed by the President of the Republic and by the Presidents of the two Chambers of the Parliament.

In order to overcome shortcomings and become closer to other Constitutional Courts in the EU, a reform of institutions was adopted on 21 July 2008.  This is welcome, and it means a greater accountability for the Conseil constitutionnel towards citizens. A new Article 61-1 of the French Constitution enables a citizen to challenge the constitutional validity of a law during a trial via the Conseil d’Etat or the Cour de cassation. Moreover, its legitimity could be reinforced by a change in the appointment of its members. Relevant parliamentary commissions will examine the candidates and release a public report.

The way France’s contribution to global governance can be made more accountable has been explored in this One World Trust briefing paper: ‘Un Président irresponsable? – Prospects for democratic oversight of foreign policy in France under the constitutional changes proposed by the Balladur Commission’.

We are waiting for your comments on the practice of Constitutional Courts in other countries.

By Robert Lloyd

There’s an interesting discussion going on at the International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) at the moment on the intersection of the human rights and NGO accountability debates. In particular, “what does the human rights framework contribute to governance and management of NGOs?”  Just a few thoughts on the issue…

I think linking the two debates is very important because it keeps the debate and practices of NGO accountability grounded in an appreciation of power.  As accountability moves up the NGO agenda a growing number of organisations are putting in place new mechanisms, policies and procedures to improve their accountability such as complaints procedures, transparency policies, stakeholder councils etc.  While important steps, these are quite technical responses to a rather political challenge: empowering stakeholders to influence and affect organisations that impact and shape their lives.  The value of such mechanisms therefore needs to be based on the extent to which they strengthen the ability of stakeholders, particularly the communities that NGOs work on behalf of, to claim their rights: their right to information on activities that affect them, their right to participate in the projects that impact their community etc.   We can’t let the accountability debate lose sight of this.  Using a human rights framework can help.

Also, as an aside point – one of the posts in the ICHRP Forum brings up the issue of NGO self-regulation and the role this plays in improving NGO accountability.  It states:

“…an exclusive reliance on voluntary or self-regulation is unlikely to be effective in weeding out examples of malfeasance, or politically feasible in contexts where governments must be seen to exercise their powers of oversight consistently across all institutions in society”

A fair point, which I think raises the important point of the design of self-regulation.  Much of the research that has been conducted on the effectiveness of codes of conduct and certification initiatives both in the NGO and corporate sectors suggests that in the absence of monitoring or sanctioning mechanisms (approaches for checking up on organisations to see if they are meeting agreed standards and then ultimately kicking them out if they don’t) the ability of self-regulation to change the practices of organisations is at best limited.

Self regulation represents an important component of the NGO sector’s approach to improving accountability, but if all this amounts to is a piece of paper which sits on the shelf of organisations’ offices, what’s the point? This is not going to address fraudulent NGOs or drive up performance, and will in turn have limited impact on stakeholder’s confidence and trust in the sector.    If NGOs are to use self-regulation as a means of improving practices and increasing accountability, they need to think through what are the most appropriate systems for monitor and ensuring compliance. Of course context matters here and factors such as available resources, relationship with the state, extent of collaboration and trust within the sector etc are important factors.  But our research has shown that there is a surprisingly wide range of interesting and innovative approaches being used to monitor compliance.  We will be showcasing these in a forthcoming paper on CSO self-regulation which explores the different systems being used by NGOs to ensure compliance. In the meantime check outour online database of CSO self-regulatory initiatives worldwide.  Its got over 340 initiatives so far!!

Also, do have a look at the ICHRP blog and contribute!

Tags: NGO accountability; accountability;self-regulation

By Brendan Whitty

What is the role of the non-profit sector in conducting advocacy? The Public Administration Select Committee in the very first paragraph of their 2009 report on lobbying noted that lobbying is “a legitimate and necessary part of the democratic process” and that the government “needs access to the knowledge and views that lobbying can bring”.

We believe that it is important for non-profit advocacy organisations to contribute to policy processes, and appropriate that public funds are available for evidence-based advocacy. The absence of these organisations from the debate will leave it impoverished, with important view points neglected and interest groups unable to argue their case. In fact, only the sections of society who have funds will be able to pay lobbyists, risking the formulation of policies which benefit existing power-groups within society. This state of affairs would threaten a polarisation of wealth and power in the United Kingdom. Democracy is not simply about the ability to vote – it is about the ability to participate and to articulate the best argument for your case in the policy process. The removal of public funding would be like removing legal aid from those in court unable to afford their own lawyer.

A balanced debate where all groups within society can engage on a level ground is vital for social justice. It is, however, subject to an important caveat. As the leader of the opposition David Cameron MP noted, that lobbying must be accountable: “It’s not just big business that gets involved in lobbying. Charities and other organisations, including trade unions, do it too. What’s more, when it’s open and transparent, when people know who is meeting who, for what reason and with what outcome, lobbying is perfectly reasonable.” There are serious gaps at present in the accountability of lobbying. Unfortunately the government shelved the PASC’s central recommendation for a statutory register of lobbying activities and failed to provide a timetable for industry self-regulation, essentially leaving accountability in the lobbyists’ hands – an approach that has notably failed to work in the past.

This provides the third sector an opportunity, however. If the third sector is to show that it takes its role seriously and is deserving of public funding, it must be prepared to lead the way on lobbying standards. It can play an important role in showing, through its own example, what high standards of accountable and transparent lobbying look like. While perhaps requiring short term changes from the third sector, in the long term this approach will both protect its vital role in policy, and it will improve the democratic processes in the UK across the board.

Tags: advocacy, lobbying accountability, public funding, third sector

By Brendan Whitty

The furore over the proponents of man-made climate change is, we are told, weakening the public’s trust in ‘science’ and in ‘scientists‘. Important claims are called into question, and founded on questionable data. In the emails stolen from the University of East Anglia, scientists have been interpreted as trying to conceal the fact that temperatures have stopped rising. With a certain inevitability, the papers have wheeled out the tired suffix again to produce what may be the ugliest compound yet – ‘climate-gate’. Political parties, we are informed, are ‘recalibrating their message’ in the view of this change in public perceptions.

Of course scientists are responsible for not misrepresenting their data – a responsibility which becomes more urgent and important the more intensely politicised an area has become. In an area of research as important as climate change, an area with such profound economic and human consequences, their claims must be rock solid. That both Michael Mann and Wei-­Chyung Wang (two central actors) have been cleared of any wrongdoing by their university ethics boards is beside the point: there only needs to be one point of weakness for the whole lot to be discredited by a good lobbyist or PR professional. And there are several points of weakness – claims made on the rates of disappearance of the Himalayan glaciers have undermined the credibility of the IPCC further.

The more useful question to ask is how to improve the accountability mechanisms that are in place to regulate discourse on scientific issues. The refusal by scientists involved to accept Freedom of Information requests is an unacceptable breach of the transparency principle, and shows a degree of naivete about the political implications and importance of their work – and their need to be accountable. The peer review system is creaking. Increasingly, science is trans- and multi-disciplinary and is therefore difficult to review. Researchers use sophisticated technologies to generate and crunch data, which they pull from a myriad of sources. In a recent study, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in the US observed that “[d]igital technologies have fostered a new world of research characterized by immense datasets, unprecedented levels of openness among researchers, and new connections among researchers, policy makers, and the public.”

How can the scientific community’s accountability and quality-control mechanisms keep up with these advances? The NAS report, published in 2009, identifies three principles – integrity, accessibility and stewardship – and calls for the articulation of precise standards and mechanisms to hold researchers and ‘data professionals’ (a new and increasingly important set of actors) to account for these standards. Addressing these areas through instituting mechanisms to hold organisations conducting high-level and policy relevant research to account for respecting them, would go a long way to rebuild public trust. However, to this must be added an awakening amongst scientists involved in politically contentious fields to the importance of relations with the public.

Tags: APRO, Climate Change, IPCC, research accountability, science