

A world that works for everyone

Background

The fundamental values of freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility were endorsed by world leaders in the UN Millennium Declaration, together with a broad agenda for action to address critical global issues (1). They resolved to strengthen respect for the rule of law in international affairs, make the UN more effective and redouble efforts to solve global problems. Nevertheless, the current structure of global decision-making means progress is often slow and has indeed reversed in some areas.

This proposal builds on these positive commitments and current progress towards a model for global governance that works for all. We've called it the World Community Council.

The current system of World Government is conducted through more than seven thousand (2) international agencies. The UN system is the largest group, but countless agencies run by governments, business and civil society also play a significant role. They are not centralised or controlled by a single executive, but are directed by thousands of bodies accountable to myriad government departments, businesses and civil society groups.

This system of global governance is complicated, uncoordinated and expensive. It struggles to cope with countless challenges and potentially catastrophic or existential risks (3), including risks arising from artificial intelligence (4), molecular manufacturing (5) and biotechnologies (6).

Why is global governance difficult?

Global governance must reconcile the conflicting pressures of people wanting sovereignty over their own affairs with the need for global rules to manage humanity's shared concerns. Tension between local autonomy and wider political structures can be profound, sometimes leading to war. But in a world increasingly interconnected through trade, the internet and shared existential risks, global rules and structures are vital for humanity to survive and flourish.

Most of the largest nation states resolve these tensions by distributing power through a federal structure, in which as much authority as possible is devolved to local or state level and federal government deals with overarching issues.

This proposal draws on lessons from history and principles of good governance to create a world community in which it is possible to be

emotionally attached to your village, city, province, country, region and the planet at the same time.

Principles of Good Governance

We start with principles of good governance recognised by the UN (7), the Worldwide Governance Indicators programme (8) and other studies (9):

These are: participation and voice; rule of law; consensus-oriented; equity and inclusiveness; effectiveness and efficiency; good regulation; accountability; transparency; responsiveness; non-violence; and division of competences.

This model is also informed by the principle of subsidiarity, Responsibility to Protect and newer methods and tools, including crowdsourcing, facilitative accountability (see section 3.5), solution-focus, systems thinking, randomised controlled trials, enterprise and innovation.


Phased progression to a World Community Council

Realistically, wholesale reform of global governance is unlikely without a major crisis, such as nuclear war or some other global catastrophe. We therefore propose a dynamic model to strengthen global decision-making in four phases:

- 1 - Accelerated Global Actions, preparing the way for:
- 2 - Building Equitable Effective Frameworks: institutional changes which can be implemented swiftly
- 3 - Evolutionary steps towards a new global architecture
- 4 - Final model is achieved – the World Community Council.

A graphic summary of these four phases is shown in Figure 1 below.

Four phases to effective, legitimate decision making Figure 1



PHASE ONE: ACCELERATED GLOBAL ACTION (AGA)

1.1: Introduction

Most innovations in global governance were pioneered by independent actors or small groups of states and agencies responding to need – such as the Red Cross (1863), the UN (1945) and the Sustainable Development Goals (2015).

A wide range of official and unofficial initiatives have helped humanity make progress on difficult global issues over the past century. These include: coalitions of civil society; corporate initiatives and codes of conduct; special Rapporteurs or ‘representatives’; High Level Panels (HLPs); open working groups; “coalitions of the willing”; Contact Groups of states and agencies; and Track 2, or ‘Citizen diplomacy’.

More recently we have seen innovative deliberative processes, crowdsourcing and social media engage diverse stakeholders in developing solutions and building consensus for change.

We propose that these processes should be formally recognised as Accelerated Global Actions driving progress within a general model for global decision-making, based on firm principles and flexible guidelines, outlined below.

1.2: Use instruments of Accelerated Global Action (AGA)

Global decision-making structures need to harness the many positive initiatives for change by providing recognition, support and guidelines to ensure legitimacy and build consent. Any individual, agency or state can initiate action to tackle a critical issue, often in the face of opposition, such as campaigns on smoking, apartheid or landmines. Over time they gain support and lead to changes in international policy or law. To ensure that they are legitimate as well as effective, we propose that they must follow certain principles and guidelines.

Principles

Initiatives to tackle global issues should be transparent; consider evidence from all sides and impartial sources; seek to build trust and mutual understanding; be solution-focused, seeking mutual benefit and win-win solutions; keep stakeholders informed and engaged; and uphold the principles of the United Nations, human rights and the rule of law.

Guidelines

To make the most of global initiatives, we propose that:

Firstly, the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) keeps a public register of initiatives by topic and keep the UN Secretary General (UNSG), GA and member governments informed;

Secondly, the UNSG, GA and other UN bodies has both the right of initiative, and the authority to support for accelerated global action on critical issues within their area of competence;

Finally, initiatives work towards a global consensus on priorities and a plan of action and aim to be endorsed by a recognised world conference;

By supporting Accelerated Global Actions, the international community can harness people's commitment to solve problems better and faster.

In the first phase of our model, we propose Accelerated Global Actions to be taken in at least nine areas, outlined below.

1.3:Creating a global consciousness

Humanity has evolved through groups of people cooperating amongst themselves and competing with others. In today's world, violent competition with others can be catastrophic and a shared human identity is essential not only for survival but for a just and prosperous world for all. Public understanding of, and support for, global cooperation are therefore fundamental for global decision-making to be effective.

There are many initiatives in this area, which could be harnessed through three strands of action:

Knowledge and Skills Sharing

The UN recognises knowledge as a strategic asset, and has a strategic vision and recommendations for action (10), many of which have not yet been implemented. The development of the internet is greatly improving equitable access to knowledge, but Accelerated Global Action is needed to

Strengthen cooperation between knowledge centres in the UN system, universities, governments, business, internet companies and civil society and ensure that the internet is accessible, secure and trustworthy;

Increase capacity for all countries to take part in global governance and provide leaders and staff with the necessary abilities and qualities;

Create equal access to knowledge, particularly in developing countries;

Connect global knowledge platforms to every government and parliamentary website to give policy-makers, politicians and citizens direct access to global knowledge through their own governance portals;

Promote information in ways that enable citizens and decision-makers to find and use this knowledge effectively.

Education and awareness

UN member states have pledged to promote education for human rights and global understanding (11), UNESCO and many other agencies seek to 'nurture our common humanity and help learners become active global citizens'. But most of the world gets no education or information about human rights, global issues or the role of global institutions.

Accelerated Global Action is needed to ensure that:

Every child worldwide is taught human rights, global issues and the role of global institutions, relevant to their context;

Schools across the world are linked online to share experiences of global issues and foster a sense of shared humanity;

Every member of the world's political assemblies understands the role of global institutions in tackling global issues to protect local interests.

Civic Engagement

Accelerated Global Action is needed to deepen civic engagement in global issues and the SDGs within and between countries and build on the Civic Charter's global framework for people's participation (12).

These three strands of knowledge, education and civic engagement should be brought together in a new kind of networked global agency, the 'People's Knowledge Agency', described below.

1.4: Institutional building blocks for a World Community Council

Accelerated Global Action is also needed to create consensus for institutional reform to address other critical issues, particularly:

Peace and security; global economic, social and environmental stability (ECOSOC); funding of global public goods; accountability of global governance; the rule of law, and sectoral and cross-sectoral challenges.

This creates the basis for Phase 2 of our WCC model.

PHASE TWO: BUILDING EQUITABLE EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORKS (BEEF)

By taking Accelerated Global Action in the areas outlined above, the international community should create foundations for 11 new institutional frameworks in Phase 2.

2.1: People's Knowledge Agency

A networked international agency to coordinate and promote impartial knowledge-sharing, education and civic engagement in global issues, so that every community, education institution and government agency throughout the world can use their experience and intelligence to help solve global problems.

2.2: Enhanced Peace-Keeping Council (EPKC)

As a first step to reforming the Security Council, we propose an "Enhanced Peace-Keeping Council" (EPKC, pronounced Epic), reporting to the SecCo. It would consist of 24 members with regional representatives based on existing defence pacts e.g. NATO, Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), Australia, New Zealand and the US (ANZUS), plus China and regional representatives.

The EPKC would be responsible for: strategic oversight of global security and peace-keeping; preventing and resolving violent conflicts between and within countries; negotiating mutual defence treaties and peace-pacts between countries and security defence organisations; advising the SecCo on action needed to maintain international peace and security; advising the General Assembly and UNSG; and convening deliberative conferences of key stakeholders in peace and security

2.3: Security Council Reform

The SecCo is currently the global decision-making body for peace and security. Many attempts have been made to reform the number of members and the terms of membership, with limited success (13).

To address this impasse we propose that the UNSG should appoint another High Level Panel (HLP) to address the membership of both the SecCo and ECOSOC. This panel should be invited to make a single proposal for adoption by the General Assembly. They should review various recent proposals on this subject, including the notion that appointment to the SecCo for the more permanent members are linked to the assumption of certain responsibilities such as contribution to budget and peace-keeping forces (14).

Further reform is proposed in Phase 3.

2.4:Global economic, social and environmental stability ECOSOC

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) needs equal status alongside the SecCo, dealing with all matters other than peace and security. The same issues of effectiveness and legitimacy apply to the design of both the ECOSOC and the SecCo. The HLP appointed to review the SecCo membership should therefore propose a comparable membership for ECOSOC.

2.5:Global Stewardship Council (GSC)

The rapid pace of global change means many people feel that the world is out of control and that they, and what they value, are losing out. We therefore propose a Global Stewardship Council, drawn from all national representative assemblies, to speak for all sections of their communities in the exercise of global governance.

The council should have the power to: make existing institutions of global governance more accountable; represent the world's people in all their diversity; act as a bridge between global governance and national assemblies or parliaments, and between regions of the world.

We propose the following model:

Accountability and scrutiny

The Global Stewardship Council's first task would be to scrutinise the work of institutions of global governance. They must ensure their priorities, purpose, systems, staffing and funding are fit for purpose, and provide reform proposals as appropriate.

Powers

The Council needs power to: set up Standing Commissions on key areas of global governance; set up Special Commissions to conduct cross-cutting inquiries into issues of public concern; report to the UNSG, the GA and national parliaments.

Standing and Special Commissions

Each Commission should have 26 members, drawn from the UN Regions roughly in proportion to population with at least 30% women (rising later) and 20% under the age of 30, to ensure a more balanced representation.

Representation

The world's people need to consider the GSC legitimate and broadly representative. We propose to achieve this by giving the recognised national assemblies of each country the power to elect one or more of their number to the GSC, in proportion to population.

Members of the GSC should serve one nine-year term, with a third replaced every three years, to create continuity and a longer-term perspective than is

possible for most national governments, while bringing in current concerns and younger members through the three-year cycle.

Members will meet regularly in person and through an online conference platform to: review the work of Commissions; make recommendations to international agencies, national governments or others; revise a rolling programme of areas for investigation; elect Commission members; identify global priorities; and report to the UNSG, the GA and national parliaments.

Responsibilities

Members of the GSC will have a dual responsibility of both representing the interests, views and priorities of people from their nation and region in global governance and also representing the collective concerns and priorities of the rest of their world to their own people.

2.6:Sectoral reforms

Several sectoral changes to global governance are urgently needed. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is tasked with both fostering the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and strictly controlling development of dangerous nuclear technology. In addition to greater support for existing institutions with such a dual mandate, we propose establishing new global agencies to address the major risks arising from new technology. In each case there is the need to encourage positive developments whilst exercising strict control over dangerous behaviour.

To tackle emerging technologies we propose the establishment of a Global Artificial Intelligence Agency (GAIA) (15) (16) and the establishment of a Global Molecular Manufacturing Agency (GMMA) (17).

In addition, we propose to strengthen existing institutions e.g. establishing within the WHO a centre with dual responsibilities pathogen related development (18), and also a strengthening of the IAEA (19).

2.7:Catastrophic and existential risk reduction

The UN Agency for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) currently focuses on natural disasters. There are however potential man-made disasters, resulting for instance from the technologies described above. We proposed to draw upon the existing institutional processes, contacts and structures of UNISDR and expand its scope to include existential risk (20). The unit's role would be global coordination, ensuring that technological risk is managed effectively throughout the world. It could, in due course, become a stand-alone agency.

2.8:Future Generations

We propose to create a High Commissioner for Future Generations (HCFG) (21). Whilst all decision makers should be giving due consideration currently, too little heed is paid to future generations. Experience can be learned from

certain national HCFGs; the High Commissioner would be charged with developing a suitable strategy and implementing it.

2.9:Global Commons

The Trusteeship Council, following a slight adjustment to its charter, should take over responsibility for the global commons including the atmosphere, the oceans, Antarctica and space (22). Whilst all four commons are currently managed by different treaties, there are challenges with integration in a fragmented treaty system. Linkages will emerge and the Council should oversee these commons, pointing out gaps and synergies among the various international instruments and acting as a permanent HLP. Over the longer-term treaties will need updating as new challenges emerge.

2.10:Financing of global public goods: Global Public Goods Authority (GPGA)

Global public goods (GPGs) include aid, disaster relief, protection of global commons (biodiversity, climate, oceans, space etc), financial stability, governance and other matters affecting large portion of humanity that require collective action.

GPGs are financed through many mechanisms, from assessed budget contributions to private donations. Governments find it difficult to allocate taxes for international purposes, so GPGs are under-financed and under-provided. As a result, problems in many critical areas get worse and often more expensive to deal with in the longer term.

We propose an independent **Global Public Goods Authority** (GPGA) (23) (24) (25) (26), drawn from experts in the UN system, Bretton Woods institutions, the UN Board of Auditors and research community, and overseen by nine Commissioners drawn from each region of the world. This GPGA would: assess annual priorities for spending for different areas and agencies; publish an annual assessment of spending on GPGs by countries, companies, foundations, private donations and fees or other sources; and recommend potential contributions from different sources.

The GPGA will give every country an impartial assessment of costs and benefits of spending on specific GPGs, with recommendations for how to raise the funds.

Methodology and expertise will take time to develop, but it will become an essential reference for annual spending negotiations between international agencies and member countries, as well as accountability to citizens. In due course, it will provide the basis for reliable annual contributions and revenue-raising for GPGs.

2.11:Rule of Law – a World Supreme Court (WSC)

A rule-governed system based on consent of the people offers the best opportunity for lasting prosperity (27), peace and justice, as well as the strongest protection against arbitrary power of one group over others (28) (29) (30).

The world has made a great deal of progress towards such a system, but adherence to the rules and implementation of judgements by international judicial bodies is often uneven, so that consent is not universal and often contested, giving rise to conflict or stalemate. This puts the international rule of law into disrepute.

We propose, a two-step process of accelerated action. First, a World Supreme Court should be established to resolve differences under existing international law, acting as a final court of appeal once a case has been heard by an international court or tribunal. This would be limited initially to cases where both parties accept the jurisdiction of the WSC.

The WSC would consist of 15 judges, appointed in a similar way to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and would have three pillars:

-Access to Justice Tribunal (AJT) would conduct preliminary hearings from anyone with legal standing in the dispute, to establish that there is a case to answer;

-Chamber for Arbitration and Mediation would aim to resolve a dispute through mediation and arbitration;

-Hearings in Chambers (a panel of 3 – 5 judges) or as a full bench, depending on the case, aimed at reaching a binding decision, and deciding penalties.

Unlike the ICJ, access to the WSC should be open to individuals, corporations, parts of a federal state, NGOs, UN organs and self-determination groups with a legal standing (*locus standi*) accepted by the AJT.

A second step in the process is outlined in Section 4.2..

2.12:Strengthening of personnel effectiveness

The effectiveness of all these proposed changes depends very largely on the quality and motivation of the international civil service administering them. We propose a set of personnel policy changes, with less reliance on contract staff and a greater emphasis on countries putting forward their best people.

Through effective and impartial recruitment procedures, staff recruited should be capable of serving the world community and developing, in the governance models that we propose, a culture of service to the broader community.

PHASE THREE: Steps Towards A Long Term Architecture (SALTA)

3.1: Introduction

Phase 3 embraces evolving themes from Phase 2 and builds on existing institutions to develop three new strands in our model namely Mutual Defence, Regional Groupings and Facilitative Accountability.

3.2: Evolving themes from Phases 1 and 2

All the new and reformed institutions proposed in Phase 2 will continue to evolve during Phase 3. Further changes to some of these institutions are proposed:

Financing of global public goods

The GPGA proposed in 2.10 should become an international treasury, determining the broad financial needs, revenue sources and contributions from national governments and others. We anticipate that the costs of neglecting GPGs and *ad hoc* funding arrangements will become increasingly unacceptable. In time governments will agree to provide funds on a more systematic and sustainable basis.

The Rule of Law

Once membership of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has widened sufficiently, gross negligence in relation to existential risks should be considered as a Crime Against Humanity under the terms of the ICC (31).

The Global Stewardship Council: a Parliamentary Assembly

In due course, it is envisaged that the process by which Members are appointed (Section 2.5) could evolve to the point where Members are elected by the local people within the province / state and that candidates may also be citizens rather than national Assembly members. Thus the GSC can evolve more and more into a body that focuses entirely on the interests of the world as a whole, and provide the basis for a Global Parliamentary Assembly.

Even though the UN Charter is framed in the name of the world's peoples, the people have been largely absent from international governance as currently practised. Our governance changes are designed to serve the people more directly.

Security Council Reform

A key criticism of the SecCo is the existence of the veto held by five states, which they have been understandably reluctant to relinquish. The vetoes have in the past resulted in SecCo frequently being incapable of taking appropriate action due to a permanent member exercising his veto.

At some point before Phase 4, permanent members may be prepared to countenance movement on this issue (32). One option is to replace the SecCo voting system (with its veto powers) with a system of weighted votes.

The weights must be transparent and could simply be in proportion to population. Whilst apparently equitable, this provides little compensation for the states that would be giving up their veto power – and this approach also gives an incentive to population growth at a time of excess population. An approach involving 50/50 Population / GDP would go some way to answer these concerns.

At a suitable juncture, when there are other potentially compensating initiatives (33), an HLP should be appointed to make a proposal along these lines.

3.3: Mutual defence

Serious consideration was given in the 1990s to inviting Russia to join NATO (34), echoing Winston Churchill's 1946 speech in Zurich when he called upon the nations of war-stricken Europe to unite, starting with France and Germany.

The Soviet Union and NATO had used the very existence of the other to justify their own militarisation. With the fall of the Soviet Union, an opportunity opened for a new relationship of mutual defence, each party committing to defend the other in case of attack. But that opportunity was not seized and a more belligerent Russia emerged.

This concept should be revisited and applied more widely. Nations that wage aggressive war (35) have become outcasts (36). The potential of alliances between major blocs such as NATO, CSTO, ANZUS and China could be explored. Such an alliance could emerge from the greater contact between Security Alliances brought about by working together as members of the EPKC.

Over time, the regional alliances could be brought together, with a shared goal and common principles under a global mutual defence treaty, whereby all countries of the world commit to mutual defence (similar to NATO Article 5), subject only to Responsibility to Protect (which applies throughout this proposal). Against this background, a global arms reduction treaty could be negotiated, in parallel with the progressive establishment of an enforcement capability in the form of a Global Peace Force, freeing up resources to support failed states (37) and meet other priorities.

3.4: Regional groupings

After World War II, there was a major move to come together at the global level and indeed the concept of create a world federal government was explored (38). At the same time, a movement towards the formation of regional groupings was also launched with Europe the first to go down this path.

Other regional groupings have also been forming. Ten countries within South East Asia have grouped together to create the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN); in South America nations came together to form Mercosur, whilst in Africa, all the nations of the continent have come together to create the African Union.

Within Europe, there has been resistance in recent years to the power exercised at the level of the EU (39). Whilst these forces may have slowed the integration process, they have also sharpened pro-European thinking and the EU remains the largest unified market and political force in the world.

ASEAN has evolved in “the ASEAN way” with great economic success (40). It is exploring ASEAN + 3 (including China, Japan, and South Korea) and now even ASEAN +6 (adding India, Australia and New Zealand) as further ways of developing.

Regional groupings should be encouraged to: embrace the rule of law; grow economic unity; launch joint action towards protecting the environment; and find a means by which the richness of human diversity is brought to address the global commons.

This trend towards strong regional groupings (41) is both beneficial to the countries within those groupings (42), but also to global governance (43). It is proposed that early in Phase 3, a Council of World Regions should be established. Initially, the Council would be given very specific tasks to address by the GA, SecCo and the UNSG. Membership is envisaged as being a pragmatic combination of organically developed Regional Groupings, UN regions and certain key nations.

3.5:Facilitative accountability

The accountability of states vis-a-vis the promises they have made individually and collectively in international agreements needs to be strengthened. This would strengthen the rule of international law and adherence to international norms more broadly. The only norm proposed here is that all international norms, legally or morally binding, should be taken as seriously as domestic policies and laws for the benefit of the planet and humankind. This is no small challenge and would constitute a societal change of significant proportions.

This strengthening of accountability also needs to include stakeholders and actors from the private sector and civil society as States need their full support for adhering to their global commitments. This implies that these actors also see themselves as bound by these moral and legal commitments: they develop appropriate strategies and measures to limit themselves to products, services, trade and activities that support global sustainable development, peace and universal human rights.

This strengthening of accountability can be appreciated by applying an appropriate theory of change (44) and considering what characteristics of structure, actors, relationships and culture, are needed for strengthened accountability in global governance. A set of parallel and mutually reinforcing

efforts in all four areas is required, which step by step can evolve into something that may have the quality of radical change (45).

Facilitative accountability is about encouraging and praising other states' conducts and learning from best practices. It is thus NOT naming and shaming or infringing on national sovereignty.

Behaviours proposed to strengthen accountability include:

Structure: Openness to involvement of non-state actors and their information and knowledge – and clear and fair procedural rules.

Individual actors – people and states: wider loyalty to humanity; detachment from sovereignty; truthfulness and courage' respect and kindness.

Relationships: accountability relationships should be based on equality rather than domination

Building accountability cultures: there is the need to develop culture(s) that support facilitative accountability, explicit narrative and implicit ones that articulate what is desirable and what is not. Nation states need to lead by example and demonstrate desired values and principles in their own behaviours, of individual representatives as well as institutionally

We propose that 'soft' facilitative accountability processes and mechanisms should be used as tools to bring about a cultural change and build the capacities that eventually make strong, truly supranational institutions acceptable for all states, including those (by then hopefully very few) states who are currently reluctant to comply. Such institutions would be able to deploy hard punitive accountability with tangible consequences when it is necessary and thereby achieve the level of rule of law that we are familiar with in domestic contexts.

PHASE FOUR: Effective Global Governance

4.1: The point of transition

Building upon the first three phases, we envisage that a point will be reached (46) when it is considered desirable to go further (47). Whether this stage requires a devastating global trauma, or whether it can be achieved by the processes in the three previous phases (48) remains to be seen.

With any shape of cooperation, there is a risk of totalitarianism and the WCC is not immune to such a risk. The system described contains suitable checks and balances however and the risks of totalitarianism are likely to be dwarfed by the risk reduction brought about by this new shape of cooperation.

The changes envisaged are set out in Section 4.2 below. A key issue will also be the division of competences, reflecting the global priorities at the time. The process by which these changes might come about is set out in Section 4.3, whilst the emerging World Community Council is summarised in Section 4.4.

4.2: Elements of the transformation

The structural changes envisaged at this stage are as follows:

Legislature: We propose that the key decision-making bodies within the proposed World Community Council should employ qualified majority voting and consist of:

Lower House: The elected **Global Stewardship Council** would take over from the GA as the lower house.

Upper House: The executive **Council of World Regions** would take over from the Security Council.

Deliberative body: The **General Assembly** would be a deliberative body of nation states.

World Supreme Court

Over time, and as a result with the other changes proposed in Phase 4, the WSC's ability to enforce its rulings will be enhanced. At this point, it is proposed that: the jurisdiction of the WSC should be extended to become universal; the rulings of the WSC should become enforceable at the WSC level; an **Office of Enforcement** (OE) would be established as a fourth pillar of the WSC. This would ensure that parties meet their obligations arising from a WSC ruling, with powers to require national governments to freeze bank accounts, arrest individuals, confiscate goods or impose restrictions, with escalating penalties for non-compliance.

Executive

Executive: Led by WCC Secretary-General appointed having been proposed by the Council of World Regions, following a transparent selection process and the approved by the Global Stewardship Council.

The executive, working through the Chief Executives Board for Coordination, would include the additional positions established in Phase 2, together with the head of the World Peace Force.

Security

Against the background of a negotiated global mutual defence treaty, a World Peace Force is progressively established, reporting to the WCC Secretary General. A global arms reduction treaty could be negotiated. Institutions include a reformed **Security Council**, and **Enhanced Peace-Keeping Council**.

4.3:Process

The final transformation needs to be, and be seen to be, legitimate (49). The final process will depend somewhat on the nature of evolution during Phase 3, and the issues discussed in Section 4.1 but the following approach could be adopted:

World Convention: A World Convention should be established with the consent of a majority of 5/6th of the GA, representing 5/6th of the global population and including each of the main regions.

Design criteria: The design criteria should follow the principles set out in Section C.

Task: The Convention would be charged with drafting a new constitution for the World Community Council (50), using the above design criteria and reflecting to the extent they consider appropriate the changes outlined in Section 4.2 above.

Ratification: The conclusions of the Convention could then require the support of the same percentages as (a) above


Amendments: Subsequent amendments to the Constitution arising from this Convention shall require a two-thirds majority in the Council of World Regions and the Global Stewardship Council.

4.4:Conclusion: Delivering for humanity and making global governance work for all

With the completion of the process outlined in Section 4.3 above, the world will have established a World Community Council (see Figure 2 below) ushering in a new era for humanity; finally, a world that works for everyone.

World Community Council Architecture

Figure 2



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