INTRODUCTION

When some of my former colleagues suggested I should write an account of how the world was saved from war, I was at first reluctant to do so, feeling that recent events must be well known to everyone. Then I realised that so much has happened in the past fourteen years, our whole view of the world has changed so much, that many of the younger generation can have little idea how things appeared in the age of fear.

There is a tendency these days to take world peace for granted, to criticise the World Peace Authority—either for doing too little or for doing too much—and to forget what a miracle it was that it ever came into being at all. A number of excellent factual booklets about the Authority are available from the bookshops, and no doubt in due course the historians will produce much more detailed and erudite works. What is lacking, it seems, is a simple but informed account of how the Authority came into existence, and why it was designed in the way it was.

As one of "the Architects", I have strictly observed our agreement to remain anonymous and silent; The original reasons for this decision have however now diminished and this book is written with the approval of all my surviving former colleagues. I am grateful for their comments on my draft, and for their permission to quote from some of the papers submitted to us and from the Minutes of our meetings. Although my colleagues still feel that it is best that they should continue to remain unknown, we all agree that it makes sense, if unjustified criticism of the Authority is to be avoided, for people to be reminded of the logic that lay behind its creation. Some aspects only make sense if there is understanding
of the complex problems that had to be solved before nuclear weapons could be brought under international control.

It is a sign of the new spirit of belonging to one world that so many countries have voluntarily adopted the new World Calendar. In keeping with this spirit I have given recent dates according to the new calendar. A new era indeed started on January 1, World Year 1, when the Peace Authority came into existence. Nevertheless, for the convenience of most readers, who if they are like me still think of the old dates in the old way and find minus years bothersome, I have used minus years only for the five years immediately prior to, the Great Peace (with the usual convention that there is no Year zero, so that December 31, World Year m. is 1, is the day before January 1, World Year 1). Thus the minus years can be seen as representing the countdown to the launch of the World Peace Authority, the gestation period between its conception and its birth.

For all dates before the Architects started work I have used the old Gregorian calendar.

Writing in the autumn of Year 9, when at last there are no nuclear weapons left anywhere on earth, one is conscious that the young may all too easily forget how close the earth came to total destruction. For this reason I have followed the convention that I have noticed in some school text books of always referring to THE DANGER in capital letters. If we are to continue, to value the World Peace Authority it is essential that we should always recognise that without it the human race might no longer exist.

If I have laid particular emphasis on the work of the Architects it is merely because that is where I had personal experience, not because I think we deserve any special praise. Indeed I should make it plain that I employ the name "the Architects," only because it is now widely used, and because it makes for easier reading; I do not thereby imply any eulogy. We were, very ordinary people applying our minds in a rational way. It was our privilege and good fortune to have been asked to undertake that task at that time. The real credit must go to the statesmen who set us to work, encouraged us on our way, and implemented our proposals; to all the millions of people throughout the world who supported them in their decisions and who wore the sign as a silent symbol of that support; to the military commanders who built up the Peace Force with such efficiency; and to the Trustees, past and present, who have exercised their power with wisdom and discretion; there are so many that to name any would be invidious.

Yet above all respect is due to those members of the Peace Force who have died in active service, and especially to the nine Peace Inspectors each of whom has given her life that the world shall be saved. To them this book is dedicated.
Chapter One

THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE

The need for an all-powerful but impartial authority to keep world peace now seems so obvious that it is difficult to believe that in the age of fear it was not even under consideration anywhere in the world. At that time it seemed impossible that the hostile nations of the world could ever agree to live in peace.

Now the move towards world unity can be seen as the culmination of a process that has gone on throughout the ages. At an early stage of human evolution the family stuck together to guard and teach the children. Families coalesced into tribes for mutual protection. Tribes fought each other until they joined together to form a local kingdom or state. The local states fought each other until they formed a single nation. The English fought the Welsh and the Scots until they became one nation. So also in other parts of the world. Unity created peace inside the nation yet, as war was eliminated between the smaller groups, the wars between the nations became larger and bloodier.

From time to time great empires were created. They too brought peace to all within their bounds yet, being built on conquest not consent, each in turn collapsed. So the nation state continued to grow in size and strength.

Eventually the process of amalgamation reached the stage that there were three great superpowers, the ancient nation of China, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In Europe the move towards unity took the form of the Economic Community, with the declared aim of making impossible another war between France and Germany. Yet while each superpower brought peace within its own borders, the risk of war between them created THE DANGER that the whole world would be destroyed.

At each stage of amalgamation the smaller states or nations were reluctant to hand over their power to a new unknown and untried central government. In the end, however, the desire for peace and order, the exhaustion of war or the fear of another war between France and Germany. Yet while the ancient power of the human intellect prevailed.

The philosophers long ago recognised this trend towards unity. For example; the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, writing in 1651, suggested that the original state of nature was each man for himself, a war of all against all. When men lived "without a common Power to keep them all in awe" life tended to be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. To make it less nasty, men combined into communities and in each community a sovereign body was created to provide order. Yet although peace might be created within nations, "Kings, and persons of Sovereign authority, because of their Indepency, are in continued jealousies ... having the ir weapons pointing on one another ... and their Forts, Garrisons and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdoms." Thus it remained for some three hundred years, with nuclear missiles replacing the guns.

The creation of the World Peace Authority was predicted by many philosophers and statesmen. One of the first was the writer, Emeric Cruce, who, in 1623, proposed an association of all the States in the world, with a standing assembly of ambassadors at
Venice, taking decisions by majority vote and combining their armed forces to deal with any state that misbehaved. Other similar schemes were devised by William Penn, the Quaker who became the first Governor of Pennsylvania, and by the Abbe de Saint Pierre in his "Project de Paix Perpetuelle," published in 1712. It was however Immanuel Kant who produced the most comprehensive plan for preventing war. A modest professor of logic at the University of Konigsberg (now Kaliningrad in the Soviet Union), Kant is recognised as one of the world's greatest philosophers. Until recently his reputation has rested on his "Critique of Pure Reason", but his contribution to world peace should be more fully recognised. In "Perpetual Peace", published in 1795, he pointed out that logically the only way to create peace while preserving the variety of individual nations was for them all to sign a covenant of peace. All nations, he suggested, should disband their armies and forsake any resort to war. Every nation would remain fully independent except that it would renounce any temptation to interfere in the affairs of other countries. It is on these principles that the League of Nations, the United Nations, and now the World Peace Authority have been founded.

Throughout the ages, human society has been based on the principle of allowing the central authority - the local chieftain or lord, the monarch, president, parliament, government, or whatever - a monopoly in the use of force. One of the main functions of a national government has always been to preserve order and prevent violence. In any civilised country private or regional armies are prohibited, and so is the possession of offensive weapons. Murder is a rare and serious crime; no person is allowed to attack or harm their neighbour. The task of enforcing these rules and of maintaining order is entrusted to a police force which is expected to act within the law with the minimum use of force. By giving the State the task of maintaining order, citizens can go about their business in safety without having to provide their own self-defence. This does not diminish their independence or individuality. Just the opposite: they are enabled to live fuller and richer lives.

By the late-twentieth century these civilised conditions extended to almost every country in the world. While there were some obvious and regrettable exceptions, by and large the rule of law and the prohibition of violence were taken for granted. But between one nation and another, although relationships were usually harmonious, it was ultimately still the law of the jungle; each had to rely on its own self-defence; each growled at, threatened, and occasionally fought, the other beasts in the forest. Acts of terrorism were followed by primitive acts of revenge. Only now, when the World Peace Authority has been given the sole right to use force, and when the Peace Force can act as policeman for the world, do the same civilised conditions exist between nations as have so long been taken for granted within nations.

The creation of the Peace Authority was a case of "third time lucky". The first two attempts had met with no success.

The first attempt to create an international organisation to preserve world peace was the League of Nations. At Versailles, in June 1919, forty-two nations signed a solemn Covenant "not to resort to war." They recognised, in Article 8 of the Covenant, that "the maintenance of peace required the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

All Member nations agreed that any dispute between them should be settled by arbitration or by international law, or, failing that, by the Council of the League. If any Member breached this rule and resorted to war, it was to be regarded as "an act of war against all other Members of the League." The Council of the League was given the duty "to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air forces the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League." 2

The League, however, proved too weak to keep the world at peace, and twenty years later another world war had begun. During the course of this second world war the allied leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, drew up plans for a new organisation, the United Nations. It was designed to be strong where the League had been weak: to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" 3 by means of its own international military force, which would be powerful enough to prevent any act of aggression.

The original purpose of the United Nations was exactly the same as the purpose of the World Peace Authority: to keep the peace by force. Since nowadays this may seem surprising, it is worth recalling some of the statements made in April 1945, when the representatives of fifty nations met in the Opera House at San Francisco to finalise the plans for the new organisation. President Truman opened the proceedings (as it happened, on the day that
Roosevelt died and the day that he, Truman, first learnt that the United States possessed an atomic bomb). His speech included these words:

With ever-increasing brutality and destruction, modern warfare, if unchecked, would ultimately crush all civilization. We still have a choice between the alternatives: the continuation of international chaos - or the establishment of a world organization for the enforcement of peace. This conference will devote its energies and its labors exclusively to the single problem of setting up the essential organization to keep the peace. We must make certain, by your work here, that war will be impossible. 6

Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister and veteran of the communist revolution, replied in equally stirring tones:

The Soviet Government are a sincere firm champion of the establishment of a strong international organization of security. This organization must have the necessary means for military protection of the security of nations.

Only if conditions are created such as will guarantee that no violation of the peace or the threat of such a violation shall go unpunished, and the adoption of necessary punitive measures is not too late, will the organization of security be able to discharge its responsibility for the cause of peace, ... Our peaceful people, the Soviet Government, the Red Army, and our great Marshal Stalin are inflexibly supporting this great cause. 5

The United Nations Charter confirmed that the prime aim of the organization was to maintain world peace - if necessary by force. Article 1 stated that its first purpose was: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace."

The intention was that the United Nations, as well as providing machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations through debate and conciliation and international law, should also have available a strong military force. In order that swift and decisive military action could be taken, responsibility for "the maintenance of international peace and security" was placed with a small executive committee, the Security Council. This had five permanent members: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France - and six (later ten) other member countries which were elected by the United Nations General Assembly to represent the rest of the world. Every member nation undertook to provide armed forces and air-force contingents "for combined international enforcement action." A Military Staff Committee was set up to be responsible for the strategic direction of the joint United Nations forces. 6

The hope that the United Nations would use firm military action to prevent any threat to world peace came to naught. The only time the United Nations tried to exert its military authority was in Korea from 1950 to 1953. The war fought there was described as being "under the United Nations flag," although in fact the various national contingents were placed under American command. The operation was never-considered legitimate by the Soviet Union.

The United Nations did attempt a number of other peace-keeping actions: in Egypt from 1956-67 following the Suez debacle; in the Congo (Zaire) from 1960-64 sorting out the chaos that followed the end of Belgian colonial rule; in Cyprus, Sinai and Lebanon. Yet all these operations were, by today's standards, incredibly make-shift and pathetically weak. A motley collection of ill-equipped contingents from diverse countries was assembled in haste and dispatched without proper training, with inadequate instructions and an uncertain chain of command. They were capable, with a good deal of improvisation and on occasions bravery, of supervising an armistice or patrolling a border, but they never had the power, the authority, or indeed the will, to enforce peace.

Thus, although the United Nations had many achievements to its credit in other ways, it failed in its main purpose, to prevent war. Between 1945 and the late 1980's there were over 140 wars, in which it is estimated that more than 25 million people died. In Vietnam, Angola, Bangladesh, Uganda, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Afghanistan; Nicaragua, El Salvador, in Iran and Iraq, in the Falklands, and in Libya the United Nations proved impotent.

Moreover it was obvious that there was no way in which the United Nations could prevent a war between America and the Soviet Union. This crucial failing was foreseen by Josef Stalin at the Yalta conference in February 1945: "All of us want to secure peace for at least fifty years. The greatest danger is conflict among ourselves, because if we remain united the German menace is not very important. Therefore we must now think how to secure our unity in the future, and how to guarantee that the three Great Powers (and, possibly China and France) will maintain a united front. Some system must be elaborated to prevent conflict between the
main Great Powers.67

Such a system was bound to require an international body strong enough to keep the peace. This was recognised by Winston Churchill in 1949 when he spoke of the perils that faced the world and the already evident failure of the United Nations: "There remains however a key of deliverance. It is the same key which was searched for by those who laboured to set up the World Court at The Hague in the early years of the century. It is the same conception which animated President Wilson and his colleagues at Versailles, namely the creation of a world instrument capable of giving all its members security against aggression.68

The fulfilment of Stalin's wish and the finding of Churchill's "key of deliverance" has had to await the creation of the World Peace Authority. Only when the great powers were eventually prepared to disarm and rely for their protection on a powerful international force could conflict between them be prevented.

The United Nations, like the League of Nations before it, utterly failed to achieve disarmament. During the period 1946 to 1962 there were a number of important negotiations which at times came close to agreement on plans for bringing nuclear weapons under international control. If these plans (which I describe in the next chapter) had succeeded, the United Nations would have been able to take up its rightful role as guardian of world peace. But they failed, and the prestige of the United Nations declined.

By the early 1960's the Soviet Union had caught up with the American lead in nuclear weapons. From then on an alarming arms race developed between the superpowers, aped on a smaller scale by many other countries. These were the years now described as the age of fear, the years when there was THE DANGER that the whole of human civilisation, perhaps all human life, would be extinguished.

The period certainly justified its description. Distrust between East and West meant a constant risk that a third world war would break out. The arms race impoverished both rich and poor nations alike. A mountain of disarmament negotiations produced mouse-like results. As fear grew, so did pessimism. The people of the world seemed resigned to their fate. The idealism and hope that had led to the formation of the League of Nations and the United Nations were forgotten. The idea of total disarmament, or of an international force to keep the peace, appeared nowhere on the political agenda.

The arms race; and the highly profitable arms trade, led to a proliferation of weapons throughout the world, and to an increase in the number of acts of international terrorism. With the reputation of the United Nations at a low ebb, the stronger nations of the world, for example the Soviet Union in Afghanistan or the Americans in their attack on Libya, tended to take the law into their own hands. Violence bred violence, and each local conflict added to anxiety that a full-scale nuclear war might break out.

It had taken all the carnage of the first world war to persuade nations to join the League; it had taken all the horror of the second world war to bring the United Nations into existence. And it seemed it would require another world war before the survivors, if any, resolved to create a more effective international body to outlaw nuclear weapons.

To quote Winston Churchill again: "After each of the fearful wars which have ravaged the lives and homes of mankind, the hopes of humanity have centred upon the creation of an instrument of world government capable at least of maintaining peace and law among men.69 In the age of fear, however, there were few statesmen with Churchill's vision, and any proposals for "world government" were treated with derision.

Although THE DANGER was great, progress towards peace was nil. The 1970's were proclaimed the United Nations Disarmament Decade. No disarmament was achieved. In 1978 the United Nations summoned a Special Session to discuss disarmament. Every country in the world agreed on the vital need to stop the arms race. Hopes were raised that the United Nations might play a central role in this process, but these hopes were dashed when a second Special Session on Disarmament was held in 1982. The main nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union together with Britain and France, made it plain that they were not prepared to accept any interference by the rest of the world in their gamble for nuclear life and death. "Danger," they said, "Keep Out."

Hopes rose and fell every few months throughout the 1980's as President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev alternated between protestations of friendship and the introduction of new deadly weapons; between pious hopes for arms control and threats to tear up existing agreements. In Geneva they chatted amicably, but agreed nothing. In Reykjavik they discussed whether to get rid of all, or most, nuclear missiles, but agreed
nothing.

Even when some arms cuts were eventually negotiated the only benefit was to enable each side to save some money. Both sides kept enough weapons to obliterate the other. And all the time the scientists beavered away to make the missiles more accurate. Each year the balance of terror became more unstable. Each year the risk of war grew greater.

The Governments outside the nuclear weapon "club" grew more alarmed that their very existence was under threat, and more frustrated that they had no say in the matter. The Commonwealth leaders, meeting in Goa in 1983, had appealed to the superpowers to "summon up a political vision of a world in which their nations can live at peace" and drew attention to the "urgent need to consider what practical steps can be taken to strengthen the United Nations system and to improve its capacity to fulfil the objectives of the Charter." Similarly in 1985, the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Spain and Sweden, in the Five Continent Initiative, called on the nuclear weapon states to "join us in the search for a new direction" to include the elimination of all nuclear weapons and a strengthening of the United Nations.

The fears of the rest of the world were further increased by the scientific predictions that a nuclear war between the superpowers would create a dust cloud around the globe, blotting out the sunlight and causing a temporary drop in temperature that would lead to widespread crop failures and starvation. The accidental explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power station gave a practical demonstration, albeit on a tiny scale compared to war, that radiation knew no national boundaries. Neutrality or non-alignment gave no safety.

The Non-Aligned Movement, with 101 member nations, meeting in Harare in September 1986 urged the superpowers to stop the arms race.

Eventually these strands came together, and that was where my personal involvement began.

Partly under the auspices of the United Nations, and partly as a result of initiatives by statesmen and scientists around the world, a Commission was set up to investigate "the means by which world peace and disarmament can be promoted by international action." Although its formal title was the Commission on World Peace, its members have become known as "the Architects". As I have said, for the sake of easier reading I will use this name throughout this book, although we did nothing that others could not have done equally well.

There were in fact sixteen of us, from a wide variety of nations, and a variety of professions. It was made clear to us that we were not appointed in order to represent our own country, but to work together as a team. Our purpose was not to negotiate - it was recognised that any negotiation between East and West would only proceed inch by suspicious inch - but to discuss and devise the best possible plan for promoting a lasting peace.

Most of our meetings were held in London. The Royal Institute of International Affairs provided us with facilities - including use of their excellent library - at Chatham House in St. James's Square, a house that took its name from a previous owner, the Prime Minister William Pitt, first Earl of Chatham.

All the Architects and I believe it was one of the criteria by which people were selected for this task, spoke English. This had the advantage that we had no need for interpreters, and could conduct our discussions informally, at all hours of the day and sometimes long into the night.

Before we began, it was decided that all our meetings should be conducted in private, and that we should remain, so far as the outside world was concerned, totally anonymous. And one of our first decisions was that no record of our discussions would be published - only our eventual proposals. These decisions were, I believe, crucial. They meant that our deliberations took place, not in the glare of publicity, but with all the frankness of being able to admit doubt and try out new ideas without necessarily being committed to them. We could talk freely without feeling a need always to support the official policy of our respective nations. No-one had to strike a political attitude or make political speeches in order to reassure their government or to protect their reputation. No-one had to refer back to their government for permission to consider a new idea. If anyone started to feel pompous we soon teased them out of it. So we became, not a collection of political opponents, but a multinational group of friends sharing a common purpose.

When we had completed our task and came to present our recommissionings to the United Nations, we decided to continue to remain unknown: it was better that our plan should be judged on its merits without the issues being confused by personalities. Most of us were reasonably well known people one way or another. Some,
perhaps, did not wish to become associated with a plan which, at first, seemed to hold little chance of success. Some were politicians and we realised that, if their involvement became known, that alone would have been sufficient reason for their political opponents to view our proposals critically. Nor did we wish to embarrass our governments or to put them in the position of having to distance themselves publicly from our proposals. If we had become known, if we had all given press and television interviews, attention might well have focused on small differences of emphasis, not on the large area of agreement. There was no need for us to become evangelists: if our proposals were sound they would prosper by their own merit.

Those of us who had the honour to be chosen for this task realised from the beginning the responsibility that had been placed upon us. We knew we had perhaps the last chance to save the world from nuclear destruction. There was a common desire to produce realistic proposals which would somehow catch the imagination of people throughout the world, and which would shake governments out of the lethargy, complacency and pessimism which was permitting the world to drift towards war.

There was also, from the beginning, a determination to produce proposals which stood a practical chance of acceptance by all nations, both East and West. We were not in the business of devising an unrealistic utopia. On one occasion I took my colleagues to visit the British Houses of Parliament, and on the floor of the ancient Westminster Hall we noted a brass plate inscribed:

"In this hall
Sir Thomas More
Author of Utopia
was condemned to death
1 July 1535"

If we produced an unrealistic plan we would, perhaps, be condemning ourselves and all the world to death. Our proposals had to be practicable. What was best often had to be sacrificed for what was achievable. When today some aspects of the World Peace Authority seem less than perfect this may have been our fault—were by no means infallible—but it may have been caused by the need to design our proposals to reassure anxieties or to circumvent blockages which were all too real in the age of fear. If this book reminds readers of what those anxieties and those blockages were, it will serve its purpose in explaining why the World Peace Authority has its present shape and constitution.

My colleagues still wish to remain anonymous, and, since I do not intend to reveal their identities, I will have to give them fictitious names. Without going through the full sixteen, it may give some idea of the character of our group if I say that it included a retired U.S. Air Force General, Ed, the only one of us who had actually held responsibility for nuclear weapons; Igor, a physicist from the Siberian science city of Akademgorodok; and Yang, a senior government official from Peking. From India there was a formidable young lady, Lata, a professor of international affairs at Agra University; from France, Marcel, author, journalist and former Cabinet Minister; and from Brazil, Osvaldo, a business man.

Why was I selected, I have often asked myself. As so often in Britain I suppose it was partly the old boy network. I was a personal friend of the Foreign Secretary, and had worked closely with him in his previous Ministerial and Opposition posts. I had had some experience in political research, and was a member of the Christian Council on Approaches to Defence and Disarmament, a body that brought together bishops, diplomats and senior military officers. To by cynical, perhaps the most important qualifications were negative ones: I was not in the Foreign Office, not steeped in all the reasons why nothing could be done, and not in a position where my membership of the group, if it had become known, might have embarrassed Her Majesty’s Government.

Although coming from such different backgrounds, we worked well together. Our shared sense of purpose and the long hours we spent together over nearly two years gave us a great sense of comradeship. Whatever our private views on the merits of communism or capitalism, we kept them to ourselves. Osvaldo kept reminding us of the South American proverb: “before crossing the river it is unwise to curse the alligator’s mother!” We knew that if we wanted to get our plans accepted by both East and West we could not afford the luxury of criticising either. Although both Ed and Igor left us in no doubt about the policies and attitudes of their own governments, they took with enthusiasm to the spirit of attempting to create a completely new framework that both sides might accept. One result of this conciliatory approach was that, when our proposals were published, there were inevitably many
protagonists on one side or the other, the inveterate cold war warriors, who denounced them as too bland, too lacking in ideological principles.

At the start of our proceedings, Marcel, on behalf of the French Government, presented each of us with a copy of "Perpetual Peace" by Immanuel Kant and, as we progressed, it amused us to see that many of our conclusions coincided with what he had written 200 years ago. Indeed it became something of a competition between us to see who could find an apposite quote from Kant. The one that struck us as most prophetic was:

War is only our wretched expedient of asserting a right by force, an expedient adopted in the state of nature, where no coun of justice exists which could settle the matter in dispute. In circumstances like these, neither of the two parties can be called an unjust enemy, because this form of speech presupposes a legal decision: the issue of the conflict on which side right is. Between states, however, no punitive war is thinkable, because between them a relation of superior and inferior does not exist.

Whence it follows that a war of extermination, where the process of annihilation would strike both parties at once and all right as well, would bring about perpetual peace only in the great graveyard of the human race. Such a war then, and there also the use of all means which lead to it, must be absolutely forbidden. 10

To forbid the means of war, that seemed exactly to summarise our purpose.

How we reached our decisions, and how our proposals were implemented, is the subject matter for the rest of this book. It may, however, be convenient at this stage to set out a brief chronology.

February Year Minus 5 Architects hold first meeting.
January Year Minus 2 Preliminary parts of Treaty come into effect.
January Year 1 World Peace Authority set up.
December Year 4 Peace Force achieves military superiority.
September Year 9 Abolition of nuclear weapons completed.

That absence of Year zero in the new calendar (a decision I have always disliked) tends to make one forget how quickly events have unfolded. Thus at the time of writing, in the autumn of Year 9, it is still less than nine years since the World Peace Authority was set up, and less than fourteen since the Architects first met.

Total disarmament is not due until December, Year 10, yet we can already claim that the World Peace Authority has saved the world from nuclear destruction. The establishment of a strong international military force has given every country confidence that it will be protected against attack. That security has enabled disarmament to proceed rapidly. The Peace Force now has the strength to ensure that no country maintains illegal weapons. It can defeat any attempt at aggression. It has achieved what the League of Nations and the United Nations were intended, but failed, to do.

For the first time in history, war is prohibited. For the first time there is the Peace Force to act as policeman for the world. For the first time we can claim that the world is fully civilised. For the first time we, and our children, and our grandchildren, can look forward to a world at peace.
At the first meeting of the Architects Lata took the chair. She opened the proceedings by defining our task. "We are here to find a way to save the world from nuclear destruction. If a world-wide nuclear war were to take place it would exterminate most of the human race. Some scientists have forecast that no-one would be left alive anywhere.

"We cannot tell if or when this disaster will occur. Obviously it is unlikely this year, and I hope not next year. But the further one looks into the future, the greater the probability becomes. Many people I talk to in India believe that, if we go on as we are, there will be a world war sometime in the next fifty or a hundred years. And the opinion polls show that people in other countries share that belief.

"Our task is to work together to devise a plan to ensure that such a disaster can never happen."

Marcel spoke next. "I agree, sooner or later there will be another war. That will destroy everything, tout le monde. Surely there must be another way. Surely we cannot just despair. This world—even London in the rain—is too good a place, too full of beauty and laughter and love, for us just to carry on in this hopeless way. Our task must be to change the course of history. The lives of our families, all the things we hold dear, depend on us. The human mind has achieved so much; it cannot be beyond our power to devise a way of preventing war."

We spent most of that first meeting, it lasted for three days, discussing the state of international affairs. Inevitably our talk jumped about from one aspect to another, and it took time for us to get to know each other. But we found ourselves pretty much in agreement on the dangers which faced the world (on the lines I describe in Chapter 8).

At that time public debate centred on three strategies for avoiding war: the nuclear deterrent, disarmament negotiations and unilateral disarmament. We looked at each, and found each insufficient.

On the deterrent, I remember Yang's view. "It's just wishful thinking to say that because there has not been a world war for the past forty years there cannot be one in the future. It is like an old man saying 'I'm not dead yet: so I must be immortal!' Nor is it logical to say that nuclear weapons will prevent war for ever. War did not stop when gunpowder was invented and when guns replaced bows and arrows. Nor did it stop when machine guns, tanks and aircraft were introduced. The slaughter merely got worse."

Most of us were pessimistic about the prospects for arms control. Osvaldo summed up our feelings: "These talks have gone on for years and got nowhere. Don't let us get bogged down in the same morass. It is obvious why no progress is ever made. It's because the Americans and the Russians are terrified, neither wants to risk giving the other even a tiny advantage. Real disarmament will only happen if countries feel they are safe from attack."

Those who were more hopeful suggested that success in agreeing on arms control would create a new feeling of goodwill between the superpowers, and that this would reduce the risk of war. Yet, as Marcel pointed out: "That warm glow of satisfaction won't last for long. After a year or two old jealousies, old hatreds, old fears will all reappear. Some new international crisis will boil up and put peace at risk."

"No. Our task must surely be to design a long-term system for world security, a constitutional framework for peace. If we can do that, if we can have a plan ready, then we can use any temporary period of goodwill, any gap in the clouds of gloom, to implement our plan. If America and Russia embrace and kiss, we must have priest and the ring ready!"

The need for some permanent system of security was also made by Ed in relation to unilateral disarmament. "The Peace Movement have got their hearts in the right place. Of course we'd all like to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons; we'd all like it if we could get rid of them altogether. But the United States is never going to chicken out. We are not prepared to invite the communists
to take over at the White House! If there's going to be disarmament, there's got to be some way to protect our American way of life."

As for my own contribution, I remember at one point drawing attention to the portrait of Lord Chatham. In one of his most famous speeches he had admonished the British politicians and public to forget their fraction and to "be one people." That, I suggested, might be the clue we sought.

By the end of those first three days we had reached agreement on a number of what we called "provisional propositions": (i) that there would be no lasting peace without extensive disarmament; (ii) that disarmament would be unlikely to proceed far until each country had confidence that its safety and independence would be assured; and (iii) that this would require some form of international force to keep the peace and to protect nations against attack.

To explore these provisional propositions we devoted a good deal of time at subsequent meetings, with the aid of our research staff, to examining what had gone wrong with the League of Nations and with the United Nations, and why they had not achieved their original purpose of providing what Molotov had called "the necessary means for military protection of the security of nations." We also found ourselves analysing what had gone wrong with the various negotiations that had taken place between 1946 and 1962 to bring nuclear weapons under international control. Although those events may now seem ancient history, they are important if one is to understand how the idea of the World Peace Authority was originally conceived.

Looking at the League of Nations we reckoned that there were three reasons why it failed. One was lack of support. Although President Woodrow Wilson had been a leading proponent, the United States Congress decided against joining. The Soviet Union, with its new communist government suspicious of any capitalist organisation, also at first stayed outside.

Another reason was the failure to secure disarmament. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's many conferences and negotiations on this subject were held, but all without success. The nearest point to agreement came in 1932, when a plan for extensive reductions in armaments was presented, with American and Soviet support, to the League of Nations Disarmament Conference. Yet by then Hitler's power was growing and the talks petered out. As the prospect of war loomed, each nation was more concerned to look to its own security.

The third, and main, weakness of the League was that no provision was made for any joint military force to keep the peace: Like the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, by which sixty-three nations agreed to renounce war, it was all based on an assumption that goodwill would be sufficient. When President Wilson presented the proposals for the League to the 1920 Peace Conference, he asserted that "throughout this instrument we are dependent primarily and chiefly upon one great force, and that is the moral force of the public opinion of the world." 1 But, as events were to prove, public opinion stopped no tanks.

The Covenant of the League averted to make an international law to forbid war, but there was no policeman to see that the law was kept. Soon after the first world war, the French government had proposed that the League should have its own military staff, charged with the establishment of a permanent force. This was opposed by both Britain and the United States, with President Wilson saying that "the United States would never ratify any treaty which put the force of the United States at the disposal of such a group or body." 2 So, when faced with war between Japan and China, with the Italian attack on Abyssinia (now Ethiopia), and with the moves by Nazi Germany into the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia, the League proved impotent. None of the members was prepared to back the Covenant with military force until it was too late to prevent war.

Turning to the United Nations, we saw at once that the simple reason it had failed was that the Nations were not United. The whole organisation had been built on the assumption that the great powers which had been allies during the second world war would continue to work together. When Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met at the Teheran conference in December 1943, President Roosevelt had suggested that the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and China should act as "the four policemen" to enforce order in the post-war world. This assumption of great power unanimity was carried forward into the United Nations Charter. When the assumption proved false, the whole construction collapsed.

We asked ourselves, therefore, in the fight of experience, what mistakes were made in the Charter? If we were to start again how should it have been done differently? The fundamental errors seemed to be the veto, the concept of collective security and the lack of any
commitment to disarmament.

The veto- the rule that the Security Council could only act when all five Permanent members were unanimous- had arisen from the assumption that "the four policemen" (increased to five by the inclusion of France) would act together to stop war. The unanimity rule, instead of the more usual arrangement of reaching decisions by a majority, had been inserted into the Charter at Roosevelt's suggestion to overcome the hesitation of the wartime leaders. Each had his own reasons for caution. Churchill was afraid that the United States and the Soviet Union might gang up to use the United Nations to dismantle the British Empire. Stalin was suspicious that the United Nations might be used as an offensive alliance to attempt to roll back the frontiers of communism or to suppress the emergence of communist regimes elsewhere in the world. Roosevelt saw the veto as essential to reassure the American people that their troops would not become entangled in foreign wars without the consent of the United States government. As Secretary of State Cordell Hull told a group of Senators in 1943, "we should not forget that this veto power is chiefly for the benefit of the United States in the light of the world situation and of our own public opinion. We cannot move any faster than an alert public opinion in perfecting a permanent peace organisation."

The Soviet Union, as Igor firmly reminded us, had always seen the veto as absolutely essential. They were not prepared to place the future destiny of their country, or of other communist countries, in the hands of a non-communist majority. In the first twenty years or so, the Soviet Union regarded the United Nations as dominated by the West, and used the veto frequently. From the 1960's onwards, as membership of the United Nations expanded to include many newly independent countries in Africa and Asia, it tended to be the United States, with Britain and France, who used the veto most often. Either way the effect was disastrous. Since in almost every conflict around the world the United States and the Soviet Union lined up on opposite sides, the effect of the veto was to destroy the ability of the United Nations to keep the peace. Only in a limited number of cases, where all five great powers were agreed, was a United Nations peace-keeping action possible.

At the time of the war in Korea, when it looked as if the Soviet Union would impose its veto, the General Assembly passed a resolution, the "uniting for peace resolution", under which it could itself authorise peace-keeping operations. Although this resolution avoided the veto, all action, whether in supplying military units for a peace-keeping force or in allowing them to enter a country, had to be on a voluntary basis. It did not enable the United Nations to become an effective force for peace.

When we examined this problem in depth, we realised that the original purpose of the veto was perfectly valid. It was right that the Charter should have included some provision to prevent a majority using the United Nations to create an offensive alliance against the minority. It was right to prevent the United Nations using its forces to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. And it was right that it should not be allowed to suppress genuine popular desire for political change. All that was wrong was that those who drafted the Charter made the power of veto too wide.

Our task therefore was to devise a new structure which would, as envisaged in the United Nations Charter, include a strong military force to stop any acts of aggression; which would, as envisaged in the Charter, contain a veto on any unauthorised use of that force; but which had no veto on legitimate peace-keeping. In particular, we would need to reassure the Soviet Union that any international force could not be used to restrict the natural development of communism.

The next fatal flaw was the concept of collective security. If the nations, or at any rate all the great powers, had stayed "United", then the idea that each of them would provide a contingent of troops to make up an international military force might have sufficed. If the problem had been, as it was in the 1930's, that one nation—such as Germany or Japan—acting aggressively, then it was just conceivable that a collection of national contingents might have been able to deter it, or if necessary defeat it. But while the world was divided into two camps, East and West, collective security became meaningless.

When the United Nations Charter was being drafted, the concept of a permanent United Nations force was seriously considered. For example the Soviet Union proposed that an international air force should be created under the command of the Security Council. Later on, Winston Churchill, in his speech at Fulton, Missouri on 5 March 1946, returned to this idea, "I have a definite and practical proposal to make for action. Courts and magistrates may be set up but they cannot function without sheriffs and constables. The United Nations Organisation must immediately begin to be equipped with an international armed forces."
force. I propose that each of the Powers and States should be invited to delegate a certain number of air squadrons to the service of the world organisation. . . . They would not be required to act against their own nation, but in other respects they would be directed by the world organisation. This might be started on a modest scale and would grow as confidence grew. I wished to see this done after the first world war, and I devoutly trust it may be done forthwith.5

During the years 1946-47, the Military Staff Committee attempted to fulfil its task of advising on how to establish and use a powerful United Nations force. Various estimates were submitted on the size and composition of the joint force; for example the United States suggested that the United Nations force might require 3,800 aircraft, 84 destroyers and 90 submarines. But, as a result of the growing divide between East and West, it proved impossible to reach agreement. The Military Staff Committee found itself redundant. From then on, the sight of high ranking military officers in full uniform attending regular meetings year after year, with nothing on the agenda, demonstrated that collective security had become not a force, but a farce.

The Architects recognised that good work had been done by the United Nations in preventing some small wars. But we did not believe that this was a sufficient purpose for an international peace-keeping force. If the world was to be saved from nuclear destruction, a force had to be created which could somehow keep the peace between East and West. Only if the Soviet Union and the United States, Britain, France, and China could be assured that they would be protected against attack would they agree to abandon their own nuclear weapons.

The only way an international authority could guarantee to protect any nation would be if it had a military force larger than that of any other single nation, or of any alliance. This either meant a huge force, which would have been impossibly expensive, or, as we decided, it meant that every country should agree to reduce and eventually abolish its own military forces. The object in creating a strong international force was not to fight wars but to prevent them: Only if overwhelming power was available would the international community be able to exert its authority. Only if it was obvious that in any possible conflict the Peace Force would win, would it be possible to deter the nations from war.

Those who designed the United Nations Charter envisaged that the collective security forces would be larger than the forces of a single small nation - and thus able to deter small conflicts - but not that they would be larger than the forces of one of the great powers. The veto symbolised and expressed the fact that the United Nations could not enforce decisions against one of the great powers without starting the third world war. When each of the great powers was armed to the teeth, and reluctant to part with any vestige of its independence, that was entirely realistic.

If an international force was to be created capable of keeping the peace between East and West, extensive disarmament would be necessary. The superpowers would have to accept that to some extent they would become subservient to a supra-national body. They would lose a small part of their sovereignty. But if all that they lost was the freedom to make war, the loss would in fact be no loss.

We realised that any move in this direction would require a change in the attitude of the Soviet Government. They had consistently opposed any suggestion that the veto should be weakened, and for example in 1960 had strongly opposed attempts by the then Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, to act independently. Yet Igor explained to us that this Soviet attitude derived from the particular situation in the post-war years; from a feeling of military inferiority when the Americans had a monopoly of nuclear weapons; from the knowledge that the communist countries were then in a minority in the General Assembly and in the Security Council; and from the circumstances of the use of United Nations forces in Korea and in the Congo. It seemed reasonable to believe that, given a new approach in new circumstances, Moscow might take a less hostile view.

In our examination of where the United Nations had failed, we turned next to disarmament. The nations which signed the Charter made no pledge to disarm. This amazing omission was again traceable to the idea of “the four policemen”, the assumption that the great powers would act in unison to see that the rest of the world behaved. In 1945, when the Charter was drafted, few other countries had any significant forces. So disarmament appeared irrelevant. Moreover, there was a general reluctance to repeat what had been such a notable failure of the League of Nations. Virtually the only mention in the Charter was the requirement that the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, should formulate plans “for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.”6
Although over the following years many plans for arms control were discussed, either in the Security Council or elsewhere, few were implemented. Yet without disarmament there was no way in which the United Nations forces could ever be strong enough to keep the world at peace.

This elementary, crucial and disastrous mistake was soon realised. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the American Bar Association in 1953: "The United Nations Charter now reflects serious inadequacies. One inadequacy sprang from ignorance. When we were in San Francisco in the Spring of 1945, none of us knew of the atomic bomb which was to fall on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. The Charter is thus a pre-Atomic Age Charter. In this sense it was obsolete before it actually came into force."

"As one who was at San Francisco, I can say with confidence that if the delegates there had known that the mysterious and immeasurable power of the atom would be available as a means of mass destruction, the provisions of the Charter dealing with disarmament and the regulation of armaments would have been far more emphatic and realistic."[7]

If the Charter had been worked out a few months later it might well have contained some form of international agreement to ban the bomb. Indeed, immediate efforts were made to remedy this deficiency, and to reach agreement that all nuclear weapons should be placed under international control. These negotiations, which ran from 1946 to 1949, were followed by further negotiations during the 1950's and early 1960's which were even more ambitious; aiming for total abolition of nuclear and conventional weapons. The aim was to give the United Nations the power to keep order in a totally disarmed world.

We, the Architects, soon realised that these negotiations were crucial to our hopes of finding a way forward. Their aim was the same as our aim. Our analysis of these issues that had emerged during these disarmament talks was the foundation on which we built the Peace Treaty.

If the World Peace Authority is to be seen in the proper perspective of history, it is necessary to go back to the very first meeting of the United Nations, held in the Methodist Central Hall London, in January 1946. Nuclear weapons were the urgent priority. The first resolution, passed unanimously by all the fifty-one member nations, established an Atomic Energy Commission and gave it the task of producing a plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

In due course both the United States and the Soviet Union put forward proposals. Both were in agreement on two basic points: first, that no nation should be permitted to possess any nuclear weapons; second, that this prohibition should be policed by the United Nations.

The American plan was produced at a meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission at Hunter College, New York on 14 June 1946. It was presented by Bernard Baruch, a 75 year old financial wizard who had started life as a Wall Street office boy, had risen to become a millionaire, had served during the first world war as Chairman of the War Industries Board, and had accompanied President Wilson to the 1920 Paris Peace Conference.

"Science," Baruch said, "has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. The terror created by weapons has never stopped man from playing them." The Baruch plan was that a new international body should be set up to hold all atomic weapons and to undertake all atomic energy activities that might be dangerous to world security. It would have the power to control and inspect all other atomic activities to ensure that they were only for peaceful purposes. In exercising this control it would not be subject to the veto. Moreover, it alone would be allowed to undertake future atomic research and development.[8]

The Soviet proposal was tabled five days later by the young Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, who as Soviet Ambassador to Washington had been closely involved in the drafting of the United Nations Charter, and who was to remain at the centre of Soviet foreign diplomacy for many years, becoming Soviet Vice-Premier in 1985. He suggested that all nations should sign a convention "prohibiting the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy." All existing atomic weapons (which were then of course held only by the United States) would be destroyed within three months from the time the convention was signed. Gromyko proposed that a body to monitor this convention should come into existence after the United States had destroyed her weapons. It would be responsible to the Security Council, and its actions would be subject to the veto. All nations that signed the convention would pass legislation making the production of atomic weapons subject to severe punishment as "a crime against..."
Unfortunately distrust between East and West prevented a bridging of the gap between these two plans. Already Winston Churchill was warning that an "iron curtain" was beginning to divide Europe. Only a few days after Baruch and Gromyko had put forward their plans, the United States exploded an atomic bomb—the first such explosion since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This explosion took place on the Pacific island of Bikini. Like the garments which now bear this name, but less pleasingly, it revealed a great deal. It revealed that the United States placed more importance on improving its own atomic weapons than on submitting them to international control.

The negotiations continued for three years, but in a climate of increasing international tension. Throughout the period, the Soviet Union had been urgently and secretly developing their own atomic weapons, and tested the first one, code-named Tykwa—the pumpkin—on 29 August, 1949. The exploding pumpkin finally squashed any hope of agreeing some compromise between the Baruch and the Gromyko plans.

The idea of bringing all nuclear weapons under international control was not, however, abandoned. In 1950 the Stockholm Appeal to ban all atomic weapons attracted millions of signatures from all over the world. The Soviet Union in 1951 proposed a world conference "to consider the question of a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also the question of practical measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control over the observance of such prohibition." Similarly, President Eisenhower, speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington in April 1953, said that the United States would welcome agreement on "international control of atomic energy, to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons" with "a practical system of inspection under the United Nations."

Again, in September 1953, a call to the United Nations was made by Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviet Foreign Minister. "It is essential for the General Assembly to declare itself in favour of an unconditional prohibition of the atomic, hydrogen, and other types of weapons for the mass destruction of human beings. The Soviet Union, which has mastered the secret of the production of the atomic and hydrogen weapons, continues to strive for agreement with other States on the unconditional prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction, a substantial reduction of armaments, and the institution of strict international control over the observance of such decisions."

These aspirations came together in 1954. France and Britain (as we were to do many years later) put forward a carefully worked out compromise between the American and Soviet proposals. They suggested the prohibition of all nuclear weapons, with a ban on their manufacture to be followed by a progressive reduction in the number of weapons held by each side. This was to be matched stage by stage by increasingly strict inspection. Moscow agreed to these proposals, and so in due course did Washington. A further advance was made when the Soviet Union accepted the placing of control posts within their country. By the spring of 1955 hopes were rising that last agreement was in sight. An optimistic report on the progress of negotiations was made to the House of Commons by the Minister of Defence, Harold Macmillan (later Lord Stockton). For the only time before the Great Peace, it looked possible that all nuclear weapons would be banned.

But in August 1955 the United States cancelled their side of the deal, and drew back from the brink of peace. The main reason was that there was not sufficient public support for the proposals. American public opinion was not ready to accept a plan which would have given the United Nations the power in the last resort to tell the United States what to do.

Nevertheless the idea was kept alive in the British Government's Defence White Paper of 1958, which stated: "The ultimate aim must be comprehensive disarmament by all nations, coupled with comprehensive inspection and control by an international organ with world authority. Nothing less than this makes sense." This was followed by a speech by the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, on September 17, 1959 to the United Nations General Assembly, in which he presented an updated version of the 1954 plan. The United Kingdom, he said, wished "to move forward by balanced stages towards the abolition of all nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. He went on to suggest that consideration should be given to "the nature and functions of the international control organ which will not only have to control disarmament measures, but also will have increasing responsibilities within the framework of the United Nations to preserve world peace as purely national armaments diminish."

The following day the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, spoke
to the General Assembly, and put forward an even more dramatic plan:

What does the Soviet Government propose? The essence of our proposals is that, over a period of four years, all States should carry out complete disarmament and should divest themselves of the means of waging war.

The result of this is that land armies, naval fleets and air forces will cease to exist, that general staffs and war ministries will be abolished, and that military training establishments will close down. Tens of millions of people will return to peaceful, constructive work. Military bases in foreign territories will be done away with. All atomic and hydrogen bombs at the disposal of States will be destroyed, and all further production of such bombs will cease.

States should be allowed to retain only strictly limited police (militia) contingents - of a strength agreed upon for each country - equipped with light firearms and intended solely for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the citizens' personal safety.

In order that no one may violate his undertakings, we propose the creation of an international control organ in which all States would participate. There should be established, for the control of disarmament measures, a system which would be set up and operated in conformity with the stages in which disarmament was carried out.

If disarmament is general and complete, then once it is accomplished, control will also be general and complete. States will have nothing to hide from each other; none of them will have a weapon to raise against another; and the controllers will then be able to display their zeal to the maximum.15

Yet once again negotiations to put these ideas into practice came to naught.

A final attempt was made in 1961, this time in a bilateral negotiation between the Soviet Union and the United States. On the Soviet side, the chief negotiator was their Deputy Foreign Minister, Valerian Zorin, who had been closely involved in the earlier Baruch-Gromyko negotiations. Representing America was John J. McCloy, who, as Assistant Secretary for War, had also been involved in the same negotiations, and who subsequently had been President of the World Bank, U.S. High Commissioner in Germany and Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank. The talks proceeded amicably. On one occasion McCloy took his family to Moscow, where his daughter persuaded Khrushchev to autograph the plaster cast on her leg.

McCloy and Zorin reached a remarkable agreement. The full text is given at the end of this book (page 152), but it can be summarised as follows:

- The Soviet Union and the United States agree that the goal for disarmament negotiations is that all nations will:
  - eliminate all nuclear weapons, disband their armed forces, stop producing arms and liquidate all existing armaments
  - stop all military training, and cut military expenditure
  - implement this programme by stages, within fixed time limits
  - set up an international organisation within the framework of the United Nations to control disarmament
  - give inspectors appointed by this organisation unrestricted access, without veto, to all places
  - retain only such national forces as are necessary to maintain internal order
  - provide manpower for an international peace force
  - ensure that this peace force can deter or suppress any act of aggression.

These aims were agreed, not just by McCloy and Zorin, but by the government of the United States and by the government of the Soviet Union. Earlier, in March, a similar statement of aims had been announced by the leaders of the British Commonwealth, including Prime Ministers Diefenbaker (Canada), Macmillan (Britain), Menzies (Australia), Holyoake (New Zealand), Nehru (India) and Verwoerd (South Africa). The McCloy-Zorin agreement was commended to the United Nations by President Kennedy16 and approved unanimously by the General Assembly.

For the Architects, the McCloy-Zorin agreement provided vital encouragement. We felt that, if it had been possible in the past for Moscow and Washington and so many other countries to agree on such principles, there must be at least a reasonable hope that they might agree to new similar proposals. We asked our research staff to analyse, carefully the issues that arose in the McCloy-Zorin negotiations, along with the issues that rose in the earlier negotiations to bring nuclear weapons under international control. This analysis (see pages 000--000) enabled us to devise a formula for the World Peace Treaty that had the best chance of proving acceptable.

The success achieved during the past nine years by the World Peace Authority amply justifies and fulfils the hopes and intentions of McClo_y and Zorin. Indeed, looking back in the longer
perspective of history, their agreement can be seen as a milestone on the road to world peace. In 1961, however, the McCloy-Zorin agreement made little impact. Like the autograph on the plastercast it was soon discarded and almost forgotten. Their talks had taken place against a background of—once again—worsening relations between East and West. There was a fatal similarity to the growing distrust which destroyed the Baruch—Gromyko negotiations. This time it was not an "iron curtain" that epitomised the division of Europe but the Berlin Wall. Construction of the wall started in August 1961, at the height of the crisis over the future of Berlin, a crisis which looked as if it might lead to war. This time it was not an American decision to explode an atomic bomb which soured the atmosphere, but decisions by the Russians and then the Americans to resume the testing of nuclear weapons (after a period of years in which by mutual agreement no nuclear weapons had been tested). In the atmosphere of abuse, hostility and fear, the announcement of the McCloy-Zorin agreement later that month appeared to hold little possibility that its fine principles would be translated into practice.

Negotiations on complete and general disarmament did continue, and at the beginning of 1962 both superpowers put forward draft treaties setting out in considerable detail, and with not enormous differences, how progress might be made towards a disarmed world. In October 1962, however, the world came close to war with the crisis over the Soviet missiles installed in Cuba. It was apparent that the United Nations, like the League of Nations, was powerless to create peace.

From 1962 onwards all thoughts of total disarmament, all thoughts of international control of nuclear weapons, all thoughts of giving the United Nations a real peace-keeping role, were abandoned. Disarmament negotiations concentrated on more modest but more achievable aims, such as the ban on nuclear tests, the agreement on non-proliferation, and attempts to limit the number of missiles. Although these discussions went on year after year in immense technical detail there is no need to describe them here: they had little influence on the thinking of the Architects.

By the 1980's, so great was the disappointment with the failure to achieve disarmament that it had become the fashion to dismiss all the post-war negotiations as over-ambitious. It was suggested that there had never been any real intention to disarm; that all along both East and West were determined to increase their nuclear strength; that the failure of Baruch and Gromyko to agree had been sadly inevitable; and that all the talk about complete and general disarmament had been mere propaganda. This view was taken by many distinguished academic experts and by many disillusioned diplomats.117

It was certainly true of the negotiations after 1962. Alva Myrdal, the Swedish author and Cabinet Minister, in her 1977 book "The Game of Disarmament", described her own "feeling of near-despair after twelve years of participating in multilateral disarmament negotiations. There the superpowers have indulged in subterfuges and half truths, with their closest and usually most dependent allies following suit or keeping silent. On balance, there has been no real advance towards limitation of armaments. The competitive race between the two superpowers has steadily escalated, and the militarization of the economy and national life of almost all countries has intensified. Only with the passing of years did I come to realize how hollow was the rhetoric about 'The will to disarm'."19

While these pessimistic views may have been valid for the years after 1962, the McCloy-Zorin negotiations were not considered unrealistic at the time. For example, the Secretary General of the United Nations, U. Thant, wrote, "'responsible people in and out of authority, statesmen as well as serious students, have come increasingly to envisage a warless world—a world which has voluntarily divested itself of weapons of mass destruction—as being not only a necessity, but even a realistic goal."20

The Architects felt that the cynical view reflected too much of the pessimism of the age of fear. Of course there had always been competition between the superpowers to score propaganda points by suggesting ambitious disarmament initiatives; but the fact that it was good propaganda only went to show how strongly the people of the world wanted to move in that direction. It was true also that governments had always planned their own defences on the assumption that the negotiations might fail; that was prudent but not necessarily cynical. Our colleague, Yang, reminded us that the 1959 Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament had been a cause of a deep rift between Moscow and Peking: that did not seem to us consistent with the view that the proposals were never intended seriously. Certainly the arguments that took place during the 1946—62 negotiations were sufficiently serious to provide us with valuable guidance as to the various barbed wire
entanglements which lay in our path and through which we had to find a way.

Resurrecting an idea after an interval of a whole generation had some advantage. It had a new and novel appeal, and with the lapse of time some of the barbed wire had rusted away. We recognised our debt to Baruch and Gromyko, to McCloy and Zorin, and to all the others who had laboured at the disarmament negotiations between 1946 and 1962. If we were the architects, they were the pioneers.

We fully realised that our proposals would be criticised as over-ambitious. We were reassured, however, by the thought that we were going back to the original purpose of the United Nations. We were reassured also by the knowledge that the concept of international control of nuclear weapons leading to total disarmament had been supported by Molotov, Vyshinsky, Khrushchev and Gromyko; by Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy; and by Churchill and Macmillan. They, we believed, were not men who indulged in empty propaganda, but men of vision; and where there was no vision it seemed only too probable that the people would perish.

Chapter Three

TOWARDS THE TREATY

The examination of what had gone wrong with the United Nations and the analysis of the 1946-62 disarmament negotiations were central to the way the Architects, thinking developed. They enabled us to confirm and extend our provisional propositions.

We decided that the first essential for lasting world peace was a strong international peace-keeping force. This would need to be a permanent military force, directly recruite and directly financed. It would not be satisfactory to rely on the system of contingents supplied haphazardly by various countries.

The task of the international force would be to resist aggression wherever it might occur, to protect any nation from attack or from outside interference, and to bring all nuclear weapons under international control.

Our initial thought was that this force should be responsible to the Security Council. In many ways it would only be fulfilling the original purpose of the United Nations. Only comparatively minor amendments to the United Nations Charter would have been required; and the Charter included provisions for its own reform. On reflection, however, we decided in favour of proposing a new international body. The advantages of doing so were largely presentational. It made a clean break with the disillusion and dissatisfaction that then existed with the United Nations. It emphasised that a new start was being made, and that the new body would have a new role, thus enabling public support and enthusiasm for the idea to be mobilised throughout the world.

The name for the new body caused us some difficulty, as each word such as "Security" or "Peace" was overworked, and each had
political overtones. We considered "International Disarmament Organisation", as used in the McCloy-Zorin agreement, but that seemed uninspiring. We also thought of reverting to the title "World Union", which had been suggested in 1944 by Gromyko as the name for the body which became the United Nations, but that seemed to imply too great a move towards a centralised world government. In the end we chose "World Peace Authority" as best describing the purpose we had in mind.

The military force became known as the Peace Force. Igor informed us that in Russian, the same word, "Mir", means both peace and world: "Our language already says it all. If the world is one it must be at peace. If there is a world force it must be a peace force. One world one word."

The World Peace Authority, we decided, could not keep the peace between the superpowers if any one of them were able to use a veto to prevent it from taking necessary action. Nevertheless we were very much aware of the anxiety of the United States and the Soviet Union that any abolition of the veto might allow the new international body to damage their vital interests. We resolved, therefore, that there could be no veto on peace-keeping, but that there must be a total veto on everything else. The constitution of the World Peace Authority would need to prevent it:

a) interfering in any way in the internal affairs of any nation;
b) attempting to alter any existing national boundaries; or
c) suppressing any popular demand for political change - either towards communism or towards capitalism - in any country.

It was important to emphasise that the purpose was in no way to impose uniformity. As Lata pointed out, "In peace, diversity can flourish. Each nation, each culture, each religion can be valued for its own sake. There is no benefit in attempting to impose any kind of uniformity. In our Hindu theology there are many gods, and each represents a different face of the ultimate reality. The richness of our earth consists in its variety, not only in the infinite variety of nature, but in the diversity of mankind: in the charm of human character, in the variation of social custom, in the breadth of religious belief, in the difference of political institutions. All this diversity is to be treasured, a d the purpose of international peace-keeping must be to allow it to flourish."

We recognised that the creation of the World Peace Authority was a step towards world government, but we were determined that it should only be a very small step, no more than was necessary to prevent war. The power of the new body would be strictly confined by the Treaty. There would be no "world parliament" and no power to make new laws.

If the Peace Force was to be effective in protecting nations against attack, it would have to be stronger than the military force of any nation, or of any group of nations. Indeed only if it had an overwhelming superiority could the new peace-keeping body expect to be able to exert its authority and prevent war without the need to fight.

That, we decided, could best be achieved by total disarmament of all nations. Once nations had placed their trust in the Peace Authority they would have no need for national armies, navies or air forces.

These conclusions, which nowadays seem so obvious, at that time seemed revolutionary. But the more we discussed them, the more we became convinced that they provided the only real long term solution. Having reached agreement on the broad aims, it took us the best part of a year to work out all the details. I will come back to the detail in subsequent chapters, but first it may be useful to remind readers how events unfolded.

Our conclusions were never in fact published. We decided against producing the usual type of report. There had been so many instances where reports had been produced, and where the recommendations had been widely welcomed, and widely ignored. Instead the Architects produced only a short formal report attached to the draft World Peace Treaty.

We submitted the draft Treaty to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to the various statesmen who had called us together. Our work was done, and we then disbanded. It was not our task to campaign on behalf of our ideas, to seek to persuade the people of the world to agree with us. Nor was it our task at a later stage to help implement them, although, as it happened, both Igor and I have continued to be closely involved.

At first some newspapers were inclined to regard the draft Treaty with scepticism. The New York Journal, for example, described the draft Treaty as "Science fiction dressed up as real life", and went on to comment: "Fantasy is usually harmless, but if a mirage of a world without war were to make the West relax its defences, this fantasy would be dangerous."
The London Daily Telecom was equally critical:

The dream of a world without war has a certain similarity to the South Sea island whose inhabitants detested 'war as a very brutal thing'. But the inhabitants of that island, which was called Utopia, were at least trained 'to defend themselves against any unjust aggressors'. Indeed, as Sir Thomas More told us, they devised and invented 'engines for war wondrous wittily'. The inhabitants of Utopia also had the good sense to realise that 'leagues are u less things' and that 'kindness and good nature unite men more effectively and with greater strength than any agr ements whatsoever'. The authors oft this ridiculous Peace Treaty would be wise to learn a lesson from these simple, if imaginary, islanders. To secure peace, it is necessary first to establish goodwill between nations; without goodwill no flimsy piece of paper can heal the gulf between East and West.

In other newspapers, however, and in other parts of the world, our plans received a warmer welcome. The Stockholm Post pointed out that goodwill was not sufficient: there needed to be proper rules of behaviour. Given proper rules, the goodwill would follow.

In Sweden we used to drive on the left: now we drive on the right. But imagine the situation if there was no such rule. Chaos would reign on the roads, and the risk of death would be far higher even than at present. Those who wished to drive on the left would abuse those who tried to drive on the right, and vice versa. That is a fair analogy with the present state of international relations.

In that chaotic mess few people would believe that a solution could be found, and many would argue that goodwill had to be created between the left-hand drivers and the right-hand drivers before any regulation would be obeyed. Yet all it needs is for everyone to agree to drive on one side or the other, it doesn't matter which, and miraculously order is created out of chaos, and the risk of death dramatically diminished. A similar opportunity to prevent the chaos and death of nuclear war is now presented to the world in the proposed World Peace Treaty.

In a number of countries public opinion polls showed substantial support for our proposals, and this message was not lost on the politicians. Although many still had their doubts, most felt it wise to pay lip-service to the concept of a more united world.

The draft Peace Treaty was presented to the United Nations twelve years ago, on November 14, World Year minus 4. It was debated by the General Assembly and approved by a large majority. Only Bulgaria, East Germany, France and Israel voted against. The Soviet Union and the United States abstained. That, however, was only approval in principle: the Treaty still had to be signed. We ad written in a provision that the Treaty would not come into force until it had been signed by nations representing over 75 per cent of the world population.

It was - wisely I think - decided not to allow negotiation about the wording of the Treaty. Each country had to decide whether to sign it or not, take it or leave it. So in fact the Great Charter we have today is word for word, the same as the draft produced by the Architects.

A number of traditionally neutral and peace-loving countries - India, Sweden, Canada, Austria and Ireland- signed immediately. So did Thailand, led by its Buddhist prime minister. Japan, still remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki, soon followed, and so did most of the countries in South America and in Africa (but not the beleaguered Boer state of Transvaal). At this stage the whole thing was still widely regarded as merely a theoretical exercise, another form of peace demonstration.

The pattern changed, however, when China decided to sign. Addressing the National People's Congress, the Chinese leader said:

Whenever China was divided against itself under the war-lords there was no peace, and the people suffered terrible deprivation. Only when we were united have we had peace. It is time the outside world learnt the same lesson.

We have never sought to attack other nations. Ever since the Emperor Shih Huang Ti unified China and built the Great Wall we have only been concerned to defend ourselves. No one can say that the Wall was an offensive weapon! But today the Wall provides no defence, and nor is there any other way we can defend ourselves.

The Soviet missiles with their nuclear warheads arrayed along our northern border threaten the life of every Chinese man, woman and child. We are under the same threat from the United States. Even if the mad dogs of Moscow and Washington set on each other, we would still suffer. The Chinese people would be lacerated by invisible radiation and starved by the climatic changes that would follow a nuclear war.

We are proud that our representative helped to produce the Peace Treaty. The Treaty follows exactly the Five Principles of diplomacy that were introduced by our late Premier Zhou En-lai in 1954: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equal and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.

Moreover, the Treaty follows the suggestion that China made in our first
contribution to the United Nations in November 1971. We said then that 'The Chinese Government has consistently stood for the convening of a world conference to ... push forward the struggle of the peace-loving people of the world for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons'......  
It will also be recognised that the Treaty implements the proposals made by our Foreign Minister Huang Hua in his speech to the General Assembly, in June 1982: ‘The use or threat of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any state should be strictly prohibited’. He added that there must be both nuclear and conventional disarmament, with strict international verification, and with sanctions to be applied in the event of any violation.

These aims have now been achieved. The People’s Republic of China will sign the Peace Treaty. It is the only way to save the human race.

If Karl Marx were living today he would not be denouncing the capitalists - their power has been tamed - he would be denouncing the war-mongers. Today the capitalist competitive pressures have appeared in a new guise. It is the competitive pressures between the military/industrial complexes in various states to produce ever larger and more dangerous weapons.

This deadly game of competition in war power is not confined to the old capitalist nations. The bear is playing as well as the eagle. There is a growing concentration of power in the hands of the war-mongers, the new war-lords. It was predicted that capitalism would collapse as a result of its own contradictions. Now it seems more likely that the new competitive military system will ultimately destroy itself, and in doing so will destroy us all.

We call on all countries throughout the world to sign the Peace Treaty. Let all people unite in a revolution against war. In the Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx wrote ‘The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries unite.’

Today we say, ‘The ordinary people of the world have nothing to lose but their fear. They have the world to save. All people of all countries unite’.

China’s move was followed by a number of other countries: by Australia and New Zealand where the anti-nuclear movement was strong; by Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal which followed the example of India; by the non-aligned nations of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines which disliked the arrogant super-power monopoly of force; and by South Korea and Taiwan. The accession of Spain and Yugoslavia was in keeping with their long established reluctance to become linked to either Naro or the Warsaw Pact. Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed in the hope of bringing commercial prosperity to the war-wrecked Middle East, and Iran and Iraq were persuaded to join to give them both security against a recurrence of conflict.

By then over two-thirds of the world’s population had signed on, and the prospect that the World Peace Authority would actually come into existence became real. Great pressure was put on the remaining nations to sign and gradually the figure rose to 74 per cent. In all the Western European countries vigorous debate took place whether to sign or to stay in the Nato alliance with the United States. In Britain the issue was taken to a memorable debate in the House of Commons. I had the good fortune to be in the gallery. The Government declared a free vote so that all Members could make their own decision regardless of Party. It was widely expected that the resolution would be defeated, partly because Britain’s unhappy experience with the European Community had hardened attitudes against any sort of supra-national body. Two days before the debate, however, the Prime Minister of Hungary, in a broadcast from Budapest, had made the surprise statement that if Britain signed the Treaty so would Hungary. In the debate several Members said that this had caused them to change their minds in favour of signing. As Big Ben struck 10.00 pm on July 25, World Year minus 3, the Speaker called the traditional ‘Division. Ayes to the right, Noes to the left.’ A few minutes later the result was declared: “Ayes 331, Noes 319, the Ayes have it.”

On Nov-ember 11- the dated deliberately chosen to carry forward the tradition of Armistice Day which had been commemorated since the end of the first World War- the British and Hungarian Governments both signed the Treaty. The Hungarian decision was strongly influenced by the Roman Catholic church, although the Soviet Government made no secret of its disapproval. Both Britain and Hungary announced that they would remain members of their alliances, Nato and the Warsaw Pact respectively, until such time as the Peace Treaty came into full effect.

As a result of these two additional signatures, the magic figure of 75 per cent of the world’s population was passed. On January 1, World Year minus 2, the preliminary parts of the Treaty came into operation. We, the Architects, had deliberately written into the Treaty a two year “warming-up period” in order to allow the necessary preparations to be made. A shadow headquarters staff was appointed for the World Peace Authority. Arrangements were made for the appointment or election of the first Trustees. Detailed
plans were drawn up for disarmament. The first thousand women were recruited and trained as Peace Inspectors.

The warming-up period had an added advantage in that it provided an opportunity for other countries to sign the Treaty. The Architects had envisaged the World Peace Authority as a kind of club, which new members were free to join so long as they kept the rules and paid the proper subscription.

It was predictable that it would be the two great antagonists of the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union, which would be among the last to join. Although between them, and with the countries then in Naro and in the Warsaw Pact, they had under a quarter of the world population, they accounted for three quarters of total world military expenditure. If the Peace Force had come into existence at that stage, if all the countries that had signed the Treaty had amalgamated their forces, there would have been a danger that the world would have been divided into three blocs - East, West and the rest.

This possibility had been foreseen by the Architects. We naturally wished to avoid a situation arising similar to that supposed by George Orwell in his novel 1984 where the three continents, "Eurasia, Eastasia and Oceania," were always at war with one another. We had debated long and earnestly whether to make the point at which the Treaty would become effective not 75 per cent but 90 or 95 per cent. That would have ensured that nothing happened until almost all countries were in agreement, but it would have lessened the chance of success and would have made the whole exercise seem somewhat unreal. We also considered inserting a requirement that both the United States and the Soviet Union would have signed before the Treaty would become effective. But we were reluctant to give them the power to veto the desire of the rest of the world for peace.

If the United States and the Soviet Union had persisted in staying outside, we reckoned that the rest of the world could make a success even of a limited Peace Authority. There could have been substantial disarmament, substantial cuts in military spending, an improvement in wealth-and-well-being, not to mention an end to dozens of local wars. This would have set an example to the two blood-minded belligerents. If the Peace Inspectors and the Peace Force could have been shown in practice to operate efficiently and impartially, and if the benefits of abolishing war could have been demonstrated, there would have been a reasonable chance that one, and then the other, of the superpowers would change their minds. They would see that the club was worth joining.

Meanwhile, in their usual secrecy, the Soviet leaders had been considering their position. The military hierarchy was adamant against signing. What, they asked, would become of the glorious traditions of the Red Army? What would become of their own jobs? How would the Soviet Union be able to prevent the satellite countries of Eastern Europe eventually going their own way and breaking their economic ties to the Soviet Union. Might not the rot spread to parts of the Soviet Union itself such as the southern, mainly Muslim, republics? Admittedly a large police force with small arms could be retained but how, they asked, could a police force succeed when fully armed troops could not crush the rebels in Afghanistan?

The contrary pressures on the Soviet leadership were strong. The other countries of Eastern Europe were considering following the example of Hungary, and Moscow did not relish the prospect of military intervention against the concept of world peace. It ranked to see China playing a leading role in the new organisation, and the temptation was to outwit the United States by putting the Soviet Union at the head of the angels.

The economic arguments proved the most compelling. The Kremlin experts calculated that when the Treaty-signing nations completed the amalgamation of all their military forces they would have over 10 million men under arms - three times as many as the total armed forces of the Soviet Union. While the rest of the world could safely start cutting back on their military spending, the Soviet Union would not be able to do so. The effect of trying to keep pace with America in the arms race was already putting a severe strain on the Soviet economy: military expenditure was taking 11 per cent of the Soviet national income (compared with the richer United States, which spent 6½ per cent, and yet still stayed ahead). The decline in the birthrate meant that there were fewer young men available for military service, and put an additional strain on the economy. It has been suggested, although never confirmed, that the Soviet leaders reckoned that it was worth signing the Treaty while leaving open the possibility of abrogating it before they were required to surrender their nuclear weapons.

These calculations were reinforced by a deep-seated fear of war, not only among the leaders, but also among the ordinary Soviet people. The sense of impending doom had been built up over many
years by the press and television, which constantly referred to the warlike intentions of Washington and the reckless deployment of Naro missiles. The anxieties felt by the Soviet people had been aggravated by the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station with the reports of widespread contamination and mass evacuations. So, when our draft Treaty was published, not as an American plan nor as a Western plan, but as a global plan for peace, it was widely welcomed. Pravda revealed that it had received over 350,000 letter’s bout it, the great majority in favour.

Once the Politburo had decided that there was benefit in joining, it was straightforward to convince first the Communist Party, and then the Soviet public. The first indication of the new policy came when the generals were quietly relieved of their commands, and when Pravda started to carry articles explaining the Peace Treaty and commenting favourably on the progress being made by the rest of the world. The announcement by the Soviet leader to the Party Congress was couched in traditional terms:

Comrades. The Soviet Union has always been eager for peace. Even before the Great October Socialist Revolution, Lenin said, ‘An end to wars, peace among nations, the cessation of pillaging and violence—such is our ideal. Moreover he described the victory of the Revolution as the first triumph in “the struggle to abolish war.”

Lenin laid down that our aim was socialism in one country, and peaceful co-existence with other nations. Despite our peaceful policy we were attacked without warning in 1941 by the fascist imperialists. Twenty million of our people died and our home-lands were devastated, but in the end the heroic Red Army was triumphant.

Since then we have been provoked without cease and almost beyond endurance by the American war-mongers. They have installed over 300 military bases around the Soviet Union, and have threatened to destroy our cities with their nuclear rockets. At enormous cost we have been forced to build up our defences to deter any such attack. The Soviet Union and the other peace-loving countries of the Socialist community cannot be oblivious to the fact that Washington has declared a ‘crusade’ against socialism, and that they are conducting their foreign policy and deploying their missiles on this adventurist premise.

As long as different social systems exist in the world, a lasting peace can only be ensured if all States renounce armaments. The Soviet Union has always called for precisely such a solution. As long ago as February 1932, at the international conference on the reduction and limitation of armaments, Maxim Litvinov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, declared, ‘Only under complete disarmament can the same degree of security and equal conditions for all States be ensured. As regards control, it is obvious that it would be easier to expose a State which, in violation of an international convention, builds tanks, machine guns, cannons and bombers, than to detect an increase in the number of these weapons.

The World Peace Treaty follows the principles of general and complete disarmament which we submitted for consideration by the General Assembly at its fourteenth session in 1959. Again, in 1962, the Soviet Union tabled a draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. We proposed in particular the institution of an international organisation on disarmament, which would see that the commitments undertaken by all States were carried out.

The Treaty also follows the lines of the initiative launched by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 27th Congress in January 1986, with the aim of completely eliminating all nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by the end of the century. Now we can implement the proposals on these lines that Mr Gorbachev put forward at the Reykjavik summit.

We are pleased that the principles we have laid down are recognised in the World Peace Treaty, and that they have at last been accepted by the majority of nations. We now intend to lead the world in a crusade of peace against the capitalist war-mongers.

There is no need for anyone to lecture us on Marxism. Nor is there need to rewrite the words of Karl Marx. When Marx wrote his address to the National Labour Union of the United States, he referred to the power of the proletariat to fight the bourgeoisie’s war-orientated policies, noting ‘at last the working classes shall bestride the scene of history no longer as servile retainers, but as independent actors, conscious of our own responsibility and able to command peace where their would-be masters shout war.

That message to the people of the United States we now repeat. The Treaty will be an important step towards the future that Marx predicted: victory for the ordinary man and an eventual withering away of the Nation State. By signing the Treaty the Soviet people will leave the United States government isolated and condemned in the eyes of the world. They are the war-mongers; we are the peacemongers.

Many of our modern weapons, artillery, tanks, aircraft and ships will be made available to the Peace Force in due course. The Red Army will eventually be demobilised. A new Economic Plan is being worked out to ensure that their labour can be used to create new resources and new riches for all the people of the Soviet Union.

This announcement caused deep disarray in Western Europe. Several countries—Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway—decided to break with America and to sign the Treaty. Like Britain
they announced that they would remain temporarily within Nato, but that they would leave when the Treaty came into full effect.

In the United States the debate was intense and often violent, as peace demonstrators clashed with supporters of the newly formed "America for Ever" campaign. The Senate voted by a narrow majority against signing. The President caught the nationalistic mood in his now notorious Camp David television broadcast:

It may sound good for the world. It may sound good for the future of mankind. But we've got to look under the surface. Can we trust the Soviet Union to keep their side of the bargain? Ask yourselves: why is Moscow so keen to sign? If we promise to abandon our nuclear weapons can we be absolutely sure that they will do the same?

As President, I am Commander-in-Chief of all American forces. I do not relish taking my instructions from some god-damned foreign institution. Nor do the American people want to see our boys tangled in military operations outside our control. Even President Wilson, who dreamt up the League of Nations, pledged that our forces would never be put at the disposal of such a body.

We are a free people under the American Constitution. We have no wish to live under some non-American philosophy. As for Marx, we prefer Groucho to Karl. We intend no harm to the nations that have signed the Peace Treaty. We trust they mean no harm to us. We remain, however, deeply suspicious of the overbearing power of this new so-called World Peace Authority. We will retain our independence, and we will safeguard our strength. America for ever.

The Architects had discussed the possibility that one superpower, either America or Russia, might decide not to join. Such a situation, although obviously unsatisfactory, would not be disastrous for the plan. If all the rest of the world had combined its military forces, set up an effective peace-keeping machinery, and achieved a good deal of disarmament, the lonely superpower would soon have seen that it would be better to join than to stay sulking on the sidelines.

In fact, however, events moved much more dramatically than could have been predicted. In Iran the Communist party seized power, and civil war ensued between communists and Muslims. In April, Year minus I, the Communist government, as had happened some years earlier in Afghanistan, invited Soviet troops to enter the country to restore order. As Soviet forces advanced towards Tehran, United States troops landed in South-West Iran to protect the West's oil supply. Both the American and Soviet leaders warned that, if the other did not withdraw, conflict between the two armies would take place, and that it could involve the use of nuclear weapons.

As a result of progress in signing the Peace Treaty, the American military establishment had found themselves isolated, facing almost all the rest of the world, and accused of lacking desire for peace. They turned to defiance. The Pentagon announced that the United States was invincible and could defend herself against any threat from the communists or any of their "new found so-called peace allies." To prove it, the Pentagon released details of the new guidance systems for their missiles, which gave them "99 per cent confidence that we could destroy 99 per cent of Soviet, Chinese-or-if need be British - missiles on the ground." Moreover, it was revealed that the methods of tracking Soviet submarines by sonar buoys and by hunter killer submarines had been perfected so that "if the order were given we could within an hour destroy 99 per cent of Soviet missile-carrying submarines." Details were released of the secret undersea sound surveillance system code-named "Sosus," operated from the anti-submarine warfare headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. To demonstrate how efficient this system was, the Secretary of Defense rashly published maps showing the exact location of some forty-six Soviet missile-carrying submarines, in Baffin Bay off northern Canada, off the East Coast (with several within 50 miles of Boston, New York and Washington), the Gulf of Mexico and close to the coast of California.

This announcement, designed to strengthen American morale, had just the opposite effect. Two days later the Soviet Union, while protesting their desire for peace, and their desire to make the Peace Treaty a success, stated that they could not permit a situation to exist in which they could be made defenceless by a sudden nuclear attack. They were got prepared to give America the power to dominate the world, to "force the whole world to be the lackeys of the Washington war-mongers." A number of American command and guidance satellites were put out of action. Pravda revealed that all Soviet land and sea-based missile groups had been instructed to launch as soon as they received warning of an incoming attack. To match the American maps, the Kremlin released a precise list of the targets for their nuclear missiles. It included every major city in the United States. None was more than 15 minutes from devastation.

The Soviet leader again warned the United States to halt the
advance of their forces in Iran. His statement ended with what at the time appeared an irrelevant statement of friendship to Britain together with a warning that the unlit rock in mid-Atlantic called Rockall was a danger to shipping.

Twenty-four hours later Rockall was obliterated by a Soviet nuclear missile.

The result of this warning shot was a pathetic panic throughout the United States. While there was some mass exodus from American cities with some ugly incidents, and some desperate last minute attempts to dig fall-out shelters, the widespread view was that it would be better to die than to survive, better to be exposed to instant destruction than to suffer a lingering decay. On the top floors of every skyscraper large groups gathered to await their expected extermination. As in London at the time of the Great Plague in the seventeenth century, there was an atmosphere of "Eat, drink and be merry for tomorrow we die," but this time the catch phrase on every lip was, "Go high, go fast." Many stripped off their clothes in a ritual gesture to expose themselves more fully to absorption in the nuclear fire-ball and, as subsequent sordid accounts have related, fear was subsumed in love and lust all for all.

There was only one way to end the chaos. The President announced that the United States would sign the World Peace Treaty, and would be content to rely on the World Peace Authority to ensure the continuing independence of Iran. More immediately, to reduce tension, he had spoken on the hot-line to the Soviet leader and agreed that American troops would leave Iran. The Soviet Union had agreed to safeguard the supply of oil from the Middle East, to withdraw Soviet forces from Iran within twelve months, and also to withdraw their submarines outside a line 300 miles from the American coast. They had also agreed to consider changes to the Peace Treaty if these could be shown to be essential to protect American interests. In a nation-wide television broadcast, repeated on every channel twice an hour for two days, the President described this agreement as "a settlement with honour," a triumph for American diplomacy, a bargain reached as a result of a determination never to submit to blackmail, a reward for the strong resolution shown by the American people and a guarantee of permanent peace for all time.

After the crisis, life soon returned to normal. The decision to sign the Treaty — With some assurances from the Soviet leaders but without changes in the text — was in due course approved by the Senate. Within a few months almost all the remaining countries in the world had signed. Switzerland declined to join, as she had declined to join the United Nations, from an over pedantic view of neutrality. Brazil, Mexico and Mauritius stayed out on financial grounds, but accepted all the provisions relating to disarmament. Israel and Transvaal joined at a later stage.

Thus on January 1, the day that was to be declared Day 1 of World Year I in the new calendar, the Treaty came into full effect, covering almost the whole world, and the World Peace Authority came into existence.

Within the month of January over four million babies were born in the United States, more in a month than in a normal year. The "peace children," as they are called, symbolise the new era: conceived in despair, they were born into an age of peace.
Chapter Four

THE GREAT CHARTER

Although events carried the Treaty forward it would never have proved acceptable to so many governemnts in both East and West if it had not been based on sound and detailed research. When the Architects were at work debating, designing and drafting the Treaty - long before the dramatic events described in the last Chapter - the key to the way we approached the problem was our examination of the Baruch-Gromyko and McCloy-Zorin negotiations to bring nuclear weapons under international control.

Here I must pay tribute to the half dozen young men and women who formed our Research Group. One of the first papers they produced for us - it was presented to our third meeting, in April, World Year minus 5 - was an analysis of the main issues that had arisen during the 1946-62 negotiations. Although they subsequently produced more detailed papers, it was that one that had a crucial influence on our thinking. Because of its historical importance it is reproduced in full at the end of this book (pages 155-168).

The Research Group paper showed us that the tragic failure in 1946 to bring the newly invented atomic bomb under international control had been due in part to the tough brash negotiating stance adopted by Baruch, and in part to the suspicious unco-operative attitude adopted by the young Gromyko. It gave us hope that a more conciliatory approach might succeed.

The paper also showed that some of the issues that had fouled up the Baruch-Gromyko negotiations were no longer relevant. These included the Soviet fear that Baruch's proposals were designed to prevent the Soviet Union sharing the then American monopoly of nuclear knowledge; and the suspicions on both sides about timing-who was to put their gun down first.

Among the themes running through all the disarmament negotiations the most contentious was the question of verification, how to check that neither side was cheating. Here the Research Group analysed for us the issues involved and suggested the idea that an international corps of Peace Inspectors should be created, staffed entirely by women.

In the 1950's the disarmament negotiations had moved on to discuss general (that is to say, all countries) and complete (that is to say, all weapons) disarmament. That was a logical step. No one wanted to abolish nuclear weapons only to find that the result was more wars fought with other weapons. The chemical and biological weapons were almost as horrific as the nuclear ones.

Moreover if there was to be an international agreement to ban nuclear weapons there would need to be some international body with sufficient military power to see that the ban was obeyed. The only way this enforcement action could take place without the risk of starting a war would be if all nations were totally disarmed. Any police force finds it much easier to keep order if no group of citizens is permitted to possess private weapons.

The McCloy-Zorin agreement, with its remarkable acceptance of total disarmament by both the United States and the Soviet Union, recognised this logic. The reason it was not implemented was that, in the 1960's, there was not sufficient political will. The Research Group showed us why.

The most important feature of their analysis was their conclusion that the international control of nuclear weapons inevitably involved some measure of world government. Any international agency which was entrusted with the control of nuclear weapons, any agency which had a monopoly of weapons in an otherwise disarmed world, would be omnipotent. It would, in the last resort, have the power to rule the world, and would in effect be an embryo world government.

This was recognised at the time by a few far-sighted people, among them Albert Einstein and Winston Churchill. Harold Macmillan was another. In a speech in 1955, when he was the British Minister of Defence, he said: "On the whole question of disarmament the Government's purpose is simple, and our record is clear. Genuine disarmament must be based on two simple but vital principles. It must be comprehensive, and it must provide a
proper system of control. The control must provide effective international- or, if we like, supranational - authority invested in real power. Members (of Parliament) may say that this is elevating the United Nations, or whatever may be the authority, into something like world government. Be it so, it is none the worse for that. In the long run this is the only way out for mankind."

Nevertheless during the post war negotiations, as our Research Group paper showed, the question of whether the United Nations Security Council was capable of assuming this role was hardly discussed, and the possibility of setting up some new all-powerful institution was never envisaged. There was little discussion of what the constitution of the control body should be, or of how its power could be limited.

That was the challenge the Architects faced. If, as Kant proposed, we were to "forbid the means of war," if we were to bring nuclear weapons under international control, then inevitably the control body would have to be stronger than any nation. Inevitably it would have the power to rule the world.

If our proposals were to be acceptable to governments and to public opinion around the world, the power of the new body would need to be confined and defined. Just as any national government has its power defined in its constitution, so the World Peace Authority would need to operate under clearly defined rules.

These rules, we decided, should be laid down in the initial Treaty. The function of the Peace Authority should be solely to prevent war. Nothing else. So there would be no need for a world parliament to make new laws. The new body would need to be able to act quickly and decisively. We decided that it should consist of nineteen members who would be called "Trustees".

There would be no veto, and decisions would be taken by simple majority.

Membership would need to be carefully balanced. Account would need to be taken of the size of countries by population, but also of their power as measured either by their national income or their military might. Care would have to be taken to ensure that no single bloc—whether capitalist or communist, or rich or poor—was able to control a majority of votes.

Disarmament would need to cover both nuclear and conventional weapons, and also military manpower. Each nation would eventually be permitted only to keep a police force for the purpose of maintaining internal order.

We did not wish to find police forces being used in place of armies to attack neighbouring countries, and considered the possibility of placing a limit on the size of the police force that each nation would be permitted. We rejected this idea, however, taking the view that the essential point was not the number of men but their weapons. If police forces were only allowed small arms, water cannon and tear gas, they would present no threat to countries, protected by the Peace Force.

All weapons of war would be banned, except for those produced specifically for the Peace Force. To verify this ban, the Peace Inspectors would act solely as observers, and would be free to go anywhere and see everything. The all female composition of this corps would emphasise the essentially peaceful purpose of verification.

Enforcement of disarmament would be by the Peace Force. In addition to its main task of protecting any nation against attack, it would also need the power to seize any illicit weapons. This power would apply whether the weapons were held by government forces or by unofficial insurgent groups.

We realised that, in the first few years, until the Peace Force became stronger than national forces, it would not have the power to insist on disarmament; and nor would the larger nations, at first, have confidence in it. Here was the crux of our task: how in a hostile and fearful world to get disarmament started. It was, however, only a transitional problem. which would last a few years, until national forces had shrunk sufficiently for the Peace Force to achieve superiority. To solve it, we had to devise the complete programme of progressive disarmament, nation by nation, which is now nearly completed.

When we were working out the draft Peace Treaty, we were keen to present the main points in simple terms that everyone everywhere in the world could understand. If there was to be a move, even a small move, towards world government, then the people of the world needed to understand and support it. We therefore decided to draft the Treaty in three parts.

Part I sets out the broad terms of reference for the World Peace Authority. This is now usually referred to as "The Great Charter". Although it will be familiar to most readers, it may be useful to reproduce it (oil the next page): it is of course identical to the original typescript copy that we submitted to the United Nations.

Part II fills in all the details. It defines what is meant by all the
terms, defines the boundaries of each area, and spells out how the arrangements are to work. Since it runs to over a hundred pages, I do not intend to reproduce it here.

Part III sets out the programme for achieving disarmament, nation by nation, year by year. I explain, in Chapter 9, the thinking that lay behind this plan, much of it based on our analysis of the 1946-62 disarmament negotiations. It is not necessary to reproduce this part of the Treaty here, since it consists only of tediously long schedules of weapons and dates for each country in the world. By the end of next year, when total disarmament has been completed, Part III will be obsolete, and of no more than historical interest. Like the first stage of a space rocket, it was designed to be jettisoned when it had served its purpose of launching the World Peace Authority.

To avoid any additional complications, we decided to make no changes in the structure of the United Nations. Thus the General Assembly and all the specialised agencies continue to operate under the 1945 Charter. The Security Council still exists, and still meets occasionally to fulfil various formal procedures, but for all practical peacekeeping purposes it has been rendered redundant.

**WORLD PEACE TREATY**

**Part 1**

1. The people of the world, fearful that human civilisation is in danger of destruction by nuclear war, hereby establish an international organisation to be known as The World Peace Authority.

2. Its purpose is
   a) to enforce and maintain total disarmament by all nations
   b) to protect any nation against attack or outside interference
   c) to prevent all wars between nations.

3. The World Peace Authority shall not take any action other than necessary to fulfil its purpose. It shall not intervene in any matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

   The World Peace Authority is permitted to maintain

   sufficient, but no more than sufficient, military forces to enable it to carry out its purpose.

5. Inspectors appointed by The World Peace Authority shall be allowed free access to any place, and freedom of communication at all times.

6. The costs of maintaining the World Peace Authority and its armed forces shall be met by contributions from each member nation strictly in proportion to its national income.

7. The Authority shall consist of 19 trustees appointed by the Governments or people of these areas:

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<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Trustees</th>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
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<td>WESTERN EUROPE</td>
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<td>LATIN AMERICA</td>
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<td>OTHER NATIONS (GROUP A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER NATIONS (GROUP B)</td>
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8. The Governments of the countries of each area shall decide how their trustees are to be selected. Trustees shall swear on oath to act with total impartiality and with sole allegiance to the World Peace Authority. Trustees shall serve for 4 years, and, once appointed, shall not be removed from office (except by a vote of more than 75 per cent of the United Nations General Assembly). Voting will be by simple majority.

9. Every member nation hereby agrees to enact and to keep in force legislation to make the production, sale or possession of any weapon of war (except as authorised by the World Peace Authority) a crime against humanity.

10. This treaty shall not be changed for 25 years, and thereafter only if amendments are agreed by at least fifteen trustees, including all the trustees from the United States and the Soviet Union.
Chapter Five

FALSE EXPECTATIONS

If one is to understand the reasons that lie behind the text of the Peace Treaty, it is necessary to recall the expectations - both the fears and the hopes - that were expressed about the idea of an all-powerful world military force. It was the need to assure these fears that accounts for many of the provisions in the Treaty. It was the need to restrain the over-optimistic hopes, in order to achieve agreement, that explains the severe limitations placed on action by the World Peace Authority.

I start with the fears. Although today they have largely been forgotten, it is little more than ten years since many people were opposed to the idea of creating a supra-national body which would have power to control the world. Indeed, so great were the fears that they nearly prevented the signing of the Treaty.

One fear which was widely expressed before the Great Peace was that the World Peace Authority might fall under the control of one power bloc or another. The Soviets were frightened that, like the United Nations in its early days, the new institution might be dominated by the West, which might then use its omnipotent strength to crush the communist system. The Americans were afraid that the Soviet Union and China might combine with the poorer nations of the world to force the United States to part with its wealth or technical knowledge, or to impose a socialist doctrine on the world.

The Architects took good care to design the Peace Treaty to minimise this risk. We had in mind the proposal put forward by Gromyko in 1961 during the McCloy-Zorin negotiations, largely ignored at that time. This was that the control of the international disarmament agency should be split into three parts, as in a troika, the type of Russian carriage drawn by three horses. One horse would be the communist countries, one horse the capitalist countries and one horse the neutral countries.

A control council would have its own organs in all countries participating in the treaty, these organs being composed of staff recruited on an international basis. The Soviet Government considers that the control council, which will be responsible for the practical administration of the entire control system, should consist of representatives of socialist countries, representatives of States belonging to Western military and political alliances, and representatives of neutral States. The Soviet Union makes this proposal with a view to ensuring that the control organization, instead of becoming a weapon in the hands of any group of States, should be a reliable and truly impartial control body.

This principle was incorporated in the Peace Treaty with provision that each bloc had the same voting strength. The communist countries - the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe, together with North Korea, Vietnam and the other smaller communist countries in Group A had six votes out of nineteen: The capitalist countries - the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the Group B countries - also had six votes out of nine. The Third World, as it was then called - the poorer countries of India, Africa and Latin America - were also allocated six votes. The remaining vote was that of the Middle East.

Some countries have criticised the allocation of votes as arbitrary and unfair. Yes, to a certain extent it is true that our allocation was arbitrary. That was the only way we could do it; we had to take a rough and ready decision and the nations of the world then had to decide whether to take it or leave it. If it had been done by a process of negotiation it would have taken forever.

But it was not unfair. It was based on a rough balance of population, income and military expenditure. The chart on the next page reproduces the facts that our Research Group drew up for us showing these criteria for each of the Areas. At one of our meetings Yang suggested that we should go the whole way to world democracy, but as soon as we looked at the figures we realised that this was not practicable. If the trustees had been elected solely on the basis of population, 5 would have come from China, 4 from India, 2 from Africa, but only 1 from the United States, and 1 from the Soviet Union.

In democracy, for not sticking to the principle of one person one
vote, they accepted that we were not in the business of producing that sort of idealistic but unrealistic utopia.

THE AREAS

**DEFINED FOR THE ELECTION OF TRUSTEES**

Criteria used by the Architects

◊ : population

◊ : national income

◊ : military expenditure

USSR (2 trustees)

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊$r$$

U.S.A. (2 trustees)

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊$\$

CHINA (2 trustees)

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊$\$

WESTERN EUROPE (2 trustees)

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊$r$$

INDIAN CONTINENT (2 trustees)

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊$\$

AFRICA (2 trustees)

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊$r$$

LATIN AMERICA

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊$\$

SOUTH EAST ASIA

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊◊$r$$

JAPAN

◊◊◊◊$\$

MIDDLE EAST

◊◊◊◊◊◊$\$

EASTERN EUROPE

◊◊◊◊◊$\$

GROUP A

◊◊◊◊$\$

GROUP B

◊◊◊◊$\$

Scale◊: 2.5 million people

◊: US.$150 billion GNP

◊: US.$10 billion military expenditure.

Nor was it practicable to lay down how each Area should select their Trustee or Trustees. The Treaty leaves this to the nations of each area to decide. In the case of the Soviet Union and China, the Trustees are chosen directly by the governments of those countries. The United States, Western Europe, and also the neutral countries in Group B - Austria, Finland, Yugoslavia, Canada, Australia and New Zealand - decided to allow their people to choose their Trustees by direct democratic election. In the other Areas the countries take it in turn to appoint a Trustee, a system previously in use for the Security Council.

The experience of the past nine-years has shown that this system has worked, if not perfectly, at least reasonably well. Once appointed, Trustees have taken seriously their oath of allegiance and impartiality. The fact that they cannot be recalled, or sacked, during their four year term of office gives them a reasonable degree of independence. With perhaps a few exceptions, they have considered each issue on its merits. Where the views of East and West have tended to polarise, the other trustees have acted as
arbiters. Various commentators have noted, however, that polarisation is tending to happen less often: the old animosities of the cold war are being left behind in a new common determination to preserve peace.

The system whereby a different Trustee acts as Chairman every three months, although now sometimes criticised for lack of continuity, has had a number of advantages. It has meant that within each year term of office sixteen out of the nineteen Trustees take a turn in the Chair and has thus avoided any one person coming to be regarded as the "King" or "Queen" of the world. In the early days it overcame the intense reluctance of the Soviet Union to trust any individual to act impartially.

There was one important difference between our proposals in the Treaty and the Soviet 1961 troika. They suggested that the vehicle should only be permitted to move forward if all three horses were pulling together, if all three blocs were unanimous. The Trustees work by majority Vote.

Another great fear, particularly in America, was that the World Peace Authority might be taken over by some mad or bad dictator; or that, as in so many nations where constitutional government had been overthrown, power might be seized by some military group determined to run the world their way. The Architects spent a great deal of time discussing this problem, and concluded that in theory there was no way in which absolute safeguards could be provided to prevent this happening. Anyone who held control of all the military forces in the world could do what they liked. Any constitution, any written rules, could in theory be torn up. This, we admitted, was a real and serious risk. It was a risk that had to be weighed in the balance against the risk of nuclear war.

We recognised, however, that although the risk was different in scale it was no different in nature from the ease or otherwise with which the constitution of a nation could be overthrown. It would be no easier for a mad dictator to seize control of the World Peace Authority than for him to gain control of the United States or the Soviet Union, or China or Britain. Nor would a military coup succeed on a world scale, any more than on a national scale, unless it had the support of the majority of the armed forces. The very size of the World Peace Authority, and its diversity, provide some reassurance: it is more difficult to seize control of a large nation than a small island; more difficult to seize control of a continent than a nation; still more difficult, we hoped, to hijack the world.

As Britain has found over hundreds of years, the best safeguard for any constitution is that it should be cherished. If a constitution is regarded with awe and pride and reverence then any attempt to breach it will not be supported by the military forces or by the public. Indeed it is my hope that this book, along with many others, by re-telling the history and achievements of the Authority, will all help to create a knowledge and a pride which will make it difficult for any evil group to breach the Treaty.

At present, although of course one can never be certain, there seems little risk of a military coup. This belief is reinforced by the tradition that has been established in the Peace Force, following a similar tradition in the various United Nations peace-keeping contingents, of keeping a strict separation of political and military matters. The political issues are referred to the Authority to decide; the officers of the force restrict their role to carrying out the orders given to them by the Authority. An additional safeguard against a military takeover is the continued existence and vitality of national governments. As Machiavelli pointed out in 1513, while it may be possible for a prince to seize control of a state temporarily because "there always exist malcontents and those who want change," it is extremely difficult to continue to exercise such usurped power where there is "a long-established order of nobles who are acknowledged by their own subjects if I should love by them. They have their own prerogatives," which the JSUuper cannot take from them "except at his own peril."

In the old days, the greatest reinforcement for national unity and patriotism was the external threat. Nothing welded people together so quickly as an enemy at the gate. Nowadays, with one world, there is no enemy to hate. But all the people on earth are now united by a common fear, the fear of THE DANGER. Everyone knows that if the Peace Treaty were to be broken THE DANGER would reappear. Every nation would be forced to rearm. Nuclear weapons and nuclear missiles would reappear within weeks. Once again the world would be in danger of total destruction. That is why the flag of the World Peace Authority, under the emblem of the armed dove, carries the words "To save the world."

Because the Peace Authority is confined only to preventing war, and does not interfere in any internal matters, there is still - thank goodness - a wide diversity in national cultures, customs and social systems. There is still plenty of room for people to have pride in their local village or town, in their country or state, and in their
nation. Now, however, to these local loyalties has been added a new patriotism, a common loyalty to the earth as a whole and to the cause of peace. It is a worthy cause: no less than love for the whole human race, faith in human reason and pride in human achievement.

To prevent the abuse of power, a number of other safeguards were included in the Treaty. One of these, so far unused, is the provision that all or any of the Trustees can be dismissed by the United Nations General Assembly (if there is more than a 75% majority for doing so). In this respect the General Assembly, which contains one representative from every nation, resembles the American Senate or the Soviet of Nationalities (each of which is composed of state or regional representatives). It can act as an ultimate check on the power of the Executive, and can prevent any individual Trustee getting too big for his boots.

Another safeguard is the provision which allows any nation that feels it has been treated unjustly to ask the International Court of Justice to rule whether the Authority has acted within the terms of the Peace Treaty. This, however, can only be done after the event: there is no way any nation can use legal wrangles to delay action to preserve peace. Nor should this procedure be confused with the legal procedures for determining the merits of any dispute between nations. As Professor Quincy Wright pointed out many years ago: "The difference between these two types of rules was recognized by the League of Nations and the United Nations in their insistence that the function of the international organization in preventing illegal resort to force is distinct from, and prior to, consideration of the merits of a particular controversy which threatens the peace. The immediate action necessary to preserve the peace and to prevent violence cannot be delayed by debate on whether the state threatening violence has real grievances. If such debate is permitted, the aggressor will have completed his conquest before action is taken."

Some critics alleged that the Peace Treaty would enable the Peace Authority to operate a police state, and that the Peace Inspectors would pry into everyone's private affairs. During the British House of Commons debate a quotation was read out from a bipartisan committee of the House: "Though your committee could imagine a system of police that might arrive at the object sought for; yet in a free country... such a system would of necessity be odious and repulsive. Among free people the very proposal would be rejected with abhorrence; it would be a policy which would make... all classes of society spies on each other."

The opponents of the Peace Treaty cheered loudly, only to be non-plussed when it was revealed that the committee had reported in 1818, and was commenting on Robert Peel's proposal to set up a police force in Britain!

Nevertheless the Architects were concerned that a body as large and as powerful as the Peace Authority might be tempted to throw its weight around and damage the interests of individual citizens. The sheer size of its bureaucracy might unintentionally lead to cases of personal hardship. We therefore included in the Treaty provision for the appointment of Tribunes to act as "ombudsmen" in adjudicating on personal cases. It is disappointing that Tribunes have so far only been appointed in Europe and Japan. Their work has been mainly concerned with compensation for the purchase of land for Peace Force bases, although a great many cases arose in connection with the action taken to sort out Northern Ireland.

If people in the West were afraid that the Peace Authority might be taken over by a military dictatorship, the communists had a different worry: that the Authority might use its power to support existing governments and oppose any revolutionary movements; and - that its duty to protect existing national boundaries might ossify the map of the world. There could be no real peace, our colleague Igor argued, where there was injustice and oppression, where power was held by an unrepresentative bourgeoisie. This was only a state of "frozen" violence, where those who were struggling to overthrow the system were the "true" fighters for peace. We convinced him however that the process of disarmament and the ending of the great military alliances would probably hasten change rather than prevent it. It was the jealous tyranny of the two alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, each fearful to yield an inch of territory or to confess a word of doctrinal compromise, that prevented political change.

There has been no shortage of change during the past decade. Iran now has a communist government. So have Greece, Nigeria and Venezuela. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Afghanistan has a new independent Muslim government. Tibet has reverted to its traditional isolated independence. Cuba's new regime is capitalist in all but name. It is true that, with the exception of Northern Ireland, there have been no changes in boundaries. But equally during any of the previous decades, there
were few instances where war or revolution altered national boundaries.

Despite Igor's fear that political change might proceed too slowly, most of the other Architects were more worried that the abolition of national military forces might allow political change to proceed too fast. The Soviet Union, for example, attached great importance to the Brezhnev doctrine, by which they claimed the ultimate right to resist any threat to socialism in Eastern Europe. We were concerned that they would never sign the Peace Treaty if it had involved any immediate weakening here. This is the explanation of the article in Part II expressly recognising that Soviet hegemony would continue for the transitional period until total disarmament was completed. There has been some recent press speculation that the Soviet leaders may baulk at the last fence, that although they have been prepared to go along with nuclear disarmament they will be reluctant next year to abandon their last military units. It is said that they fear that if some of the countries of Eastern Europe (or Eastern Central Europe as it should be called) were to decide to move in a capitalist direction it would have a serious effect on the Soviet economy and on the morale of the Soviet people. I doubt it. In the past the Soviet Union has been prepared to let Austria and Yugoslavia go their own way. The enormous financial savings that will come with the completion of the peace process will outweigh any loss of special trade rights with Eastern Europe. Moreover the policy makers in the Kremlin know that, now there is no risk of war, they no longer need buffer states to protect themselves against the risk of an invasion from Western Europe.

Before the Treaty was signed, a good deal of nonsense was written in the popular press in Europe about the possibility that wars between nations might be replaced by a world-wide civil war—either capitalist West against communist East, or rich North against poor South. It is not impossible; one could imagine some vital issue causing the Peace Force to split down the middle. But it has always been, and I trust will remain, extremely unlikely. In our new disarmed world there is now no risk of war starting through fear or miscalculation, or through the escalation of small local conflicts. The World Peace Authority is not imposing any policy (except abstinence from war) on any nation. There is nothing equivalent to the abolition of slavery which led to the American war. More important, the continued unity of the world is ensured by the enemy at the gate. THE DANGER is always there. Everyone knows that a civil war would merely turn into a desperate race by each faction to be the first to produce nuclear weapons.

The last in my list of fears that the Architects had to guard against was the fear that, if nations surrendered their sovereignty to the Peace Authority, the rules might subsequently be changed to their disadvantage. It was suggested that once an all-powerful body had been created it would not be able to resist the temptation to meddle in all sorts of matters: that if it wanted to rewrite its constitution no nation would have the power to prevent it. To reassure these fears we included the provision that the Peace Treaty was not to be altered for at least 25 years, and then only with the agreement of at least fifteen out of the nineteen Trustees. A final safeguard, to reassure the faint-hearted in Washington and in Moscow, was that no change to the Treaty could take place unless agreed by all four representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. The United Nations Charter contained a similar provision that the powers of the Security Council could only be changed with the unanimous agreement of the five permanent members. Only in this respect has the power of veto been carried forward into the Peace Treaty.

So much for the fears that have proved false. Next, the false hopes.

In recent years, many people have expressed hopes that the World Peace Authority would use its power for various benevolent purposes. The Authority has come under criticism for adopting too passive an attitude towards various issues not directly connected with its main task of keeping the peace. For example there was strong pressure on it to provide economic aid to relieve the terrible famine in India, to intervene when Japan resumed whaling, and to rescue the persecuted Baha’is. Nowadays, one frequently hears it said that, if the Peace Authority is in effect a world government, it should get on with the job of governing the world properly.

These criticisms, these hopes, have been firmly rejected by the Authority; any action other than peace-keeping would be contrary to the Peace Treaty. It is worth recalling why the terms of reference of the Authority were defined so narrowly.

The Architects recognised that the body we were proposing would, in due course, be omnipotent. We recognised that it would inevitably come under pressure to take action on various world-wide economic, environmental and social issues. The reasons we
decided that it should be strictly confined to peace-keeping and that
it should be debarred from any other action, however apparently benevolent, were stated in the Minutes of one of our meetings:

In discussion the following points were made. If the proposed new body were given power to intervene on economic or environmental issues, or issues concerning human rights, it would have power to interfere in almost every aspect of every nation’s affairs. It would not be practicable to define the exact policy of the new institution before it was set up. There would need to be some sort of World Parliament with power to legislate, and power to overrule national governments. Very few nations in the world today would agree to submit their future destiny to such an all-powerful, but unknown and untried institution.

The Soviet Union would - rightly-fear that a body with such wide power could be used by their opponents to undermine the whole communist system. If human rights were interpreted to mean freedom for private ownership and private enterprise then the communist system would be destroyed. The United States and Western Europe would - rightly-fear that a body with such wide power might override their democratic freedoms. They would fear that the relief of world poverty would soon mean virtual world equality. There is no way the people of the West would sign a Treaty which might result in their living standards being reduced to the level of Asian peasants. Similarly, many of the poorer countries would - rightly-fear that environmental protection could prevent their economic development and keep their people permanently tied to systems of primitive agriculture.

It was stressed that these would be the reaction and the fears, not just of governments, not just of politicians and a majority trying to preserve their own patch of power: they would be genuine fears among a large proportion of the population of each country. The politicians would play on these fears, and would undoubtedly succeed in stirring up massive opposition to the new concept.

It was therefore resolved that the draft constitution should confine the role of the new body strictly to disarmament and peace-keeping.

The wisdom of this decision was borne out by events. It was hard enough to get the Treaty agreed: if wider powers had been suggested, it would never have been signed at all.

Those who criticise the World Peace Authority for taking too passive a role should remember that in the period from the 1960’s through to the 1980’s any suggestion of world government tended to be dismissed with contempt. This state of affairs had come about partly because the various groups of enthusiasts had tended to overstate their case, seeing in world government a cure for all the problems of mankind. They tended to extol the theoretical virtue of united world without exploring the practical constraints of the real world; they saw all the good that could be done by a good world government but none of the harm that could be done by a bad one.

The result was that politicians had grown into the habit of regarding world government as a subject fit only for philosophers, cranks and starry-eyed idealists. That was understandable but unfortunate. It meant that the wider implications of creating an international peace force had never been properly discussed.

At that time there were a number of groups in existence whose purpose was to promote world government. The World Association of World Federalists brought together groups in fifteen countries and had its headquarters in Amsterdam. The World Policy Institute undertook education and lobbying, mainly in the United States. The British Parliamentary Group for World Government had been active since 1947, under the guidance of its dedicated Secretary, Patrick Armstrong.

Although these groups had their hearts in the right place, none of them had much influence. They all supported a wide view of world government. They all believed that its purpose should be to put the world to rights, and that there should be some form of world parliament to run the show. One early attempt to design such a system was made in 1945, when members of the University of Chicago suggested that: “The intellectual courage that split the atom should be called to unite the world.” They put together a team of legal scholars, social scientists and political philosophers and after two years produced a draft constitution for a world government with full governmental powers. It made little impact. Philip Isley of Denver was the driving spirit behind the summoning of a World Constitutional Assembly in Switzerland in 1968, and again in Sri Lanka in 1978/79. A draft constitution was produced which it was proposed should be available for ratification and implementation by governments and peoples, and a provisional World Parliament was summoned at Brighton, England, in 1982. The world showed little interest.

Parliamentarians for Global Action, founded in 1981 attracted more support, but its aims were wide and all-embracing. Its membership included over 600 Members of Parliament in thirty countries, including Australia, Britain, Canada, France, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand and the United States.

Another enthusiast was Elliot Roosevelt, son of the former President. In his book “The Conservators,” published in 1983, he suggested that, just as thirteen colonies once united as thirteen
states to ratify the United States Constitution, now nearly two hundred nations must agree to ratify a constitution to create a world government that would control all armed forces and weapons of destruction, leaving only police forces within the member nations. Language barriers must be decisively eliminated. Famine and disease must be attacked on a global basis, with disaster teams to provide emergency services anywhere in the world stricken by a natural calamity. A coordinated world plan must first be set in motion to show mankind how to live in peace among his own kind, before putting him among the stars." 

A good many of the fourteen specific proposals put forward by Elliot Roosevelt were similar to our own proposals in the Treaty. The Architects felt however that he, like the other enthusiasts, was too ambitious, too idealistic. They all started from the assumption that a world government would resemble a national government, and that it would be responsible for a similar range of functions. They all paid too little attention to the practical difficulties of getting other countries to agree. It was indeed significant that most of the proposals for world federation had been produced by Americans: according to our colleague, Ed, they had all "been brainwashed by Thomas Jefferson." No American could fail to be influenced by those magnificent words of the Declaration of Independence, signed 4th July, 1776, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness;" nor by the equally mellifluous preamble to the constitution of the United States adopted in 1787, "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution"

"I t was evident, that the rest of the world would have accepted amalgamation under a world federal government modelled on the United States."

Because the Americans had played a large part in drawing up the United Nations Charter, it reflected some of the same idealism, especially in relation to human rights. Article 1 referred to the aim of achieving international co-operation "in encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all." This hope was elaborated by the General Assembly in 1948 when it adopted a declaration of human rights: the right of life, liberty and security; freedom from slavery and servitude; freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; the right to a fair trial and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal; and the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. Other civil and political rights supported by the United Nations included freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence; freedom of movement; the right to marry and to found a family; the right to own property; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; the right of association and of assembly.

Attractive as these ideals were to liberal opinion in the West, their merits were not so evident to governments in other parts of the world. Under the weak and ineffectual United Nations, however, every nation could vote for them with equanimity, confident that they would never be enforced.

The Architects realised that things would be very different with the World Peace Authority. It would have the power, if it wished, to force national governments to implement all these rights. We foresaw the pressures that have arisen to take action to protect basic rights for every citizen of the world, to bring about universal freedom and justice. That would have involved gross interference in the internal affairs of the various countries concerned, and would have been totally unacceptable to them. If we had included that in the Treaty, the Treaty would never have been signed.

Indeed this was an extra reason why we decided not to reform the Security Council, but to start again with a new body. The new body was not committed to implementing every resolution that had been passed in bygone years by the United Nations; its role was limited solely to the one thing that everyone in the world could agree on - the need to prevent nuclear extermination.

Another hope that is often expressed these days is that the World Peace Authority will use its power to protect the environment. A strong case can be made for international action to prevent pollution, to preserve animal species, and to safeguard the ability of the earth to support life. A poignant example arose in Year 4, when Japan resumed large scale whale catches. World opinion was
outraged. People were already extremely concerned that many animal species were becoming extinct, and the Japanese decision became the target of demonstrations in many countries. It was argued that the sea was international and that the World Peace Authority, with its powerful naval forces, should protect the natural life of the seas as part of the heritage of all mankind.

Yet, because such action was not within the Peace Treaty, and would have been contrary to Article 3, the Peace Authority took no action. Since this has resulted in much criticism, it is essential to realise why action was prohibited.

When the Architects were devising the Treaty, we considered the environmental issues carefully. We studied a number of reports on future environmental developments, including those of the Club of Rome, a group of scientists who first focused attention on this subject on a world-wide basis, and the "Global 2000 Report to the President," published in 1982 jointly by the American Council on Environmental Quality and by the Department of State. This latter report forecast that world population would rise from around 4 billion in 1975 to 10 billion after fifty years, and to 30 billion after a century or so. It also estimated that "between half a million and 2 million species-15 to 20 per cent of all species on earth- could be extinguished by 2000, mainly because of loss of wild habitat."

We were also aware that there were many experts who considered these forecasts unduly alarming. While strongly in favour of voluntary co-operation between nations on these matters, we were not convinced that there was an urgent need or desire for centralised control. If environmental protection had been included in the draft Treaty, the Treaty would never have been signed. Proud independent nations were only prepared to give up a small part of their sovereignty, and that only through fear, not through altruism.

Indeed, one reason we included Article 10 (which provided that the Treaty could not be amended for 25 years) was as much to reassure those, and there were many in all countries, who feared that once an omnipotent force was created there would be great pressure to use it for all kinds of apparently well-meaning action, as to guard against malevolent changes. The nations had to be reassured that if they agreed to disband their military forces, to hand over some part of their national sovereignty, they were not a ng the selves subservient t fut re_swin s of world opinion. If we have tried to create a world mst tuuon with power to control the environment w-ouild have been too ambitious and too alarming. It has not proved necessary. The improvement in international relations which followed the Peace Treaty has enabled a large number of voluntary agreements to be reached between nations to prevent pollution, to save wildlife and to protect the natural environment.

Nowadays, with the tragic and alarming spread of AIDS, the population forecasts have been drastically revised. Fortunately the new vaccines seem to be solving the AIDS epidemic, but the lower birthrate in almost every country will continue to reduce the population. Experts differ in their explanations of this phenomenon. Some say that it is because, with the coming of peace, nations no longer need to pursue policies to keep up their populations in order to provide military manpower, "cannon fodder" as it used to be called. Some say that it is because, with the end of war, families no longer have such an instinctive urge to reproduce. Some say it is merely the result of greater prosperity, and greater knowledge of contraceptive methods. Whatever the reason, parents all over the world seem to be following the example of China and limiting themselves to one child. While it will take time for this to make an impact on the size of the world population, in due course if the trend continues we can expect to see a halving of the population, and then a halving again in each successive generation. This I believe will make for a better world - less crowded, less polluted, less dangerous. A better world because it will be possible for human beings to live in peaceful co-existence with nature. A better world too, because people will have more space, more individuality, more room to develop their characters.

The relief of world poverty has also proved to be the subject of much false expectation. It is a sore point with many of the poorer countries who regularly protest that the World Peace Authority should be using its power to persuade, if necessary to force, the richer countries to help them.

It is not true that the Architects neglected this problem. I recall Osvaldo reading out to us a paragraph from the report produced in 1980 by a group of world statesmen under the chairmanship of the former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt:

The North including Eastern Europe has a quarter of the world's population and four-fifths of its income; the South including China has three billion people - three-quarters of the world's population but living on one-fifth of the world's income. In the North, the average person can...
expect to live for more than seventy years; he or she will rarely be hungry, and will be educated at least up to secondary level. In the countries of the Sc prostitutions the great majority of people have a life expectancy of closer to fifty years; in the poorest countries one out of every four children dies before the age of five; one-fifth or more of all the people in the South suffer from hunger and malnutrition; fifty per cent have no chance to become literate.6

How, Osvaldo asked us, could we tolerate such a situation continuing? How would we ignore the fact that the poor countries owed the rich ones over $800 billion, and that they were being crippled by interest payments? How could we expect to achieve peace when there was so much cause for resentment? He implored us to include in the Treaty some action to make a more equal world. We were not unsympathetic, we were not hard-hearted, but we could see no way, if this aim were included, in which it could be limited. There would be no logical place to stop before reaching virtual equality.

And there was not a hope of getting the richer nations, the United States, the European countries, or the Soviet Union, to sign a blank cheque to hand over their wealth to the world's poor. If we were to succeed in getting the Treaty signed it had to be confined to one subject only—peace.

Here I must digress to talk about the finances of the World Peace Authority. The Architects were determined that it should have a sound financial base: the United Nations had been rendered ineffective because some nations, when they disagreed with its policies, refused to subscribe towards the costs of international peace-keeping. With the new body, we decided, there must be no financial veto.

We started by thinking that the Peace Authority should be given power to impose its own taxation on every person in the world. This would have had the advantage of making the Authority completely independent of national governments. Moreover, if everyone in the world felt they were paying something towards the Authority, they might appreciate the benefits more. It might have helped strengthen the feeling that everyone was a citizen of the world.

The disadvantages, we felt, were greater. It would have meant Peace Authority tax collectors in every town—not very good public relations. Many people in the world were too poor to be able to pay anything at all. Moreover it would have been an unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of each country: there was no reason why national governments should not be left to decide how the money was to be raised.

We therefore decided that the cost of running the Peace Authority would be met by compulsory contributions from each government. The contributions would be exactly in proportion to the total income (the gross national product) of each country. Thus the rich countries would pay more and the poor countries less, but all would pay a fair share at the same rate. This simple rule, we felt, had the best chance of proving acceptable to all countries. If the poor countries felt that even this was too great a burden, it was up to them to persuade the rich countries to give them more aid.

No nation has yet refused to pay its contribution. If that did happen, it would become liable under an Article in Part II of the Treaty to the imposition of economic sanctions. The Authority is permitted to impose a levy on the imports and exports of the unco-operative nation, and raise the necessary money that way.

The only exception to the equal percentage contribution from every country is the formula related to progress in achieving disarmament which we laid down in the Treaty for the first ten years. I describe this in chapter 9.

The scale of financial contributions became particularly poignant during the Indian famine, when the Indian Government asked to be excused from the contribution of one per cent of their national income due each year to the World Peace Authority. If this request had been granted, it would only have meant a tiny increase in the contributions due from every other country. Yet it could have been the beginning of a move to load all the cost of the Peace Authority on to the richer countries; from there it would have been an easy step to argue that the Peace Authority should compulsorily redistribute income from rich to poor nations. This was deliberately ruled out by the Peace Treaty: the contribution from each country was to be strictly proportional to its national income. Thus the Indian request had to be turned down.

Despite the criticism that this incident generated, it must be pointed out that the poorer countries have benefited substantially as a consequence of the Peace Treaty. They have benefited both through the savings in military expenditure they have achieved themselves, and through the voluntary decision of most of the richer countries to use part of their saving in defence expenditure to increase their overseas aid programmes. India, for example, in the 1980s was spending $6 billion a year on defence, over 3 per cent of her national income. Now she only spends 1 per cent, $2 billion,
and has been able to use all the rest, plus extensive additional aid, for economic development. So-with more money and a population that is beginning to decline - there is at least good hope that the famine will not occur again.

When we first produced the Treaty, some critics said it would never succeed because our plan envisaged that the nuclear superpowers would be the last to disarm. Why would the rest of the world, where there were so many intense local conflicts, be prepared to lead the way? That might have become a valid objection if the Peace Force had not been able to prove its military efficiency and impartiality at an early stage. It was in fact only after its success in stopping the Middle East war in Year 2 that the majority of nations accepted total disarmament.

Similarly the critics used to argue that most third world countries were more worried about the immediate problem of poverty than about the risk of nuclear war. We considered this argument carefully but did not accept it, for two reasons. First, it was apparent that our proposals would be attractive to the third world because they would bring substantial savings in defence expenditure. At that time the developing countries were spending over $150 billion on defence, over 5 per cent of their national income. Now they only spend $30 billion - the standard one per cent of national income.

The second reason why we felt confident that the poorer countries would welcome our proposals was that it had by then become apparent that a world war fought with nuclear weapons would not be confined in its devastation to the United States and the Soviet Union. It had long been recognised that radioactive fallout would kill millions all around the world. In 1980, a report on Nuclear Weapons by the Secretary-General to the United Nations, based on a study by an international group of experts, drew attention to another danger: "The sudden collapse of many of the world's leading trading nations as well as of established mechanisms for international transactions would lead to profound disorganization in world affairs and leave most other nations, even if physically intact, in desperate circumstances. Widespread famines could occur, both in poor developing countries and in industrialized nations. Those starving to death might eventually outnumber the direct fatalities in the belligerent countries." Even more alarming was the suggestion, in the mid 1980's, by some scientists that a major nuclear exchange would send up vast clouds of smoke and dust, obscuring the sun and creating a nuclear winter so severe that few crops would survive. While other scientists challenged these findings (as I discuss in more detail on page 145), there was general agreement, reinforced by the practical experience of Chernobyl, that a major nuclear war would have: catastrophic effects on every country in both the northern and southern hemispheres. No part of the world was safe.

These grim warnings, together with a desire to eliminate conventional wars between themselves, were quite enough to persuade most of the non-industrial countries to welcome our proposals - even without any specific provision for alleviating world poverty. Indeed it was the poorer countries which were first to sign the Treaty, and it was their determination that eventually pushed the reluctant nuclear superpowers into following their example.

At first there were many critics who said that, although our plans were logical and sensible they would never succeed without deep changes in human attitudes - away from fear towards more constructive, loving ways of working together. But what they had not realised was that the concept of the World Peace Authority provided a clear focus, an inspiration that enabled millions of people to act with courage and vision.

It was not that we were saying that all the other problems, poverty, terrorism, injustice, environmental deprivation, could be left to look after themselves. No. We recognised that no world security system could survive for long if these problems were not tackled. But by removing the basic cause of fear and distrust, the creation of the World Peace Authority has made possible many other healing initiatives reflecting a more positive and collaborative way of handling human affairs and the ecology of our planet.

So much so that some people are now beginning to say that nuclear war was not so important: that we were wrong to concentrate on that to the exclusion of everything else. But I have no doubt that we were right. It was the crucial issue. It is still the crucial issue. If a world nuclear war had occurred it would have made all the other problems immeasurably worse: it would have vastly aggravated world poverty; it would have destroyed much of the natural environment; it would have extinguished not only human rights for some but human life for all, or nearly all.

Those who now criticise the Peace Authority for doing too little forget that the nations, and the people of each nation, value their...
independence and have no wish to surrender any more than they need to a superior level of government. The world needs to proceed one step at a time. For this generation it is sufficient to abolish war. When, in Year 25, the Treaty comes up for review it will be for the next generation to decide whether to go further. They will have longer experience of how the world feels and how nations behave in conditions of universal peace. They will be able to judge how much trust they wish to put in the wisdom and impartiality of the Peace Authority, and whether or not they wish to travel further down the road towards world government.

Chapter Six

ACHIEVEMENT

It is perhaps inevitable that, after nine years of existence, the Peace Authority should be subject to criticism by some people, and by some countries, for doing too little. I have tried to explain in the previous chapter why its role is so constrained. To keep the criticisms in perspective it is important also to recognise how much has been achieved. Total worldwide disarmament is not due to be completed until the end of next year, but already in the past nine years there is a solid record of success.

The First Nine Years - A Summary

* THE DANGER has been averted. The world has been saved from nuclear destruction.
* All nuclear weapons have now been eliminated.
* Soviet and American military, naval and armed forces have been reduced to a quarter of their previous size. The military forces of all other nations have been disbanded.
* The Peace Inspectors, in their bright red uniforms, have become a regular and welcome sight throughout the world.
* The Peace Force has been built up into a well trained, well integrated military force. Since the end of World Year 4 it has been more powerful than the forces of any individual nation. With permanent bases now well established in every continent, it is highly mobile and equipped with the most modern weapons needed to resist any illegal attempt to resort to war.
With the rapid progress of world disarmament, the Peace Force has been able to dispense with many of the hideous-weapons of mass destruction that were inherited from the age of war. It has no biological weapons; no chemical weapons (except tear gas); no napalm; and no medium or long range missiles. All remaining naval submarines will go next year. The greatest achievement, however, has been the announcement earlier this year that the Force had dismantled, made safe and nullified all its remaining nuclear weapons.

Mobile commando units of the Peace Force have been in action 75 times to seize illicit weapons. In most cases, however, where illicit weapons have been discovered by the Peace Inspectors, they have been surrendered without resistance.

The "arms trade" has been ended. Establishments producing weapons of war now only operate under licence, and only to supply the Peace Force.

Peace Force troops are now patrolling over 2000 miles of international frontiers in accord with their duty to protect all nations against attack.

Military action has had to be taken by the Peace Force on a number of occasions. The overwhelming force that is now available, as a result of national disarmament, should in future enable the World Peace Authority to use its influence to prevent any further outbreak of conflict.

During the past four years there has been no war between nations anywhere in the world.

International acts of terrorism have been substantially reduced in number, and further reductions can be expected as weapons and explosives become harder to obtain.

Under the Peace Treaty the Authority is prohibited from intervening in the internal affairs of any country. It has therefore not been able to stop the tragic civil wars in Ecuador and in the Phillipines. Foreign intervention has, however, been prevented; and arms control has helped to limit the bloodshed. Order has been restored in Northern Ireland.

Disarmament has led to substantial savings on military expenditure. Already total world military spending has been halved, and in the next year or so it is likely to be halved again.

Although at first the disbanding of armed forces led, in most countries, to a rise in unemployment, this has now largely been absorbed by national development programmes and by shorter working hours. As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development said in its recent annual report: "Peace has ushered in an era of unprecedented prosperity for both rich and poor nations."
Chapter Seven

WORLD LAW AND WORLD ORDER

When the Architects decided to investigate the possibility of creating a world police force we had to consider how this would operate in the context of international law. Some of the main issues were defined for us in a paper submitted for our fifth meeting, and I reproduce the introduction to this document.

From the Research Group

LEGAL ISSUES

If a strong international peace-keeping force is to be set up, and if war is to be outlawed, a number of fundamental legal issues will need to be resolved.

1. Will the peace-keeping force act within clearly defined legal guidelines? Will those guidelines be laid down by Treaty or by some new international law-making body? If such a body had power to make, or amend, world law it would be in effect a World Parliament.
2. Will it be the duty of the new international body and its military forces to ensure that existing international law is observed? And if so how is international law to be defined?
3. In the absence of war, how are disputes between nations to be settled if they cannot be resolved amicably?
4. If there is to be a "law against war," ie against violence by one state against another state, and if this law is broken, will the peace-keeping force seek to arrest the persons responsible or will it be helpful to start with a short background note.

The concept of law inside nations is well established. The national police force acts within the law, and ensures that the law is obeyed using the minimum amount of force necessary. The law is laid down by the Government or Parliament of the country, and can only be changed by the proper constitutional processes. Thus all citizens can know the law, or at least the main parts that affect them, and can conduct their affairs in conformity with it. Offences against the law, and disputes between citizens, are settled by the courts. In some countries, of course, this ideal is not obtained. Yet even in the most repressive regimes the concept of the rule of law is recognised. Even where the police are given wide powers, their action is normally related to some sort of law. Thus it is accepted throughout the world that any modern society must have a basic framework of law.

The concept of international law is less well defined. Because there has never been a world government to pass "world laws," international law only consists of certain rules of conduct that all or most countries accept voluntarily. Some rules can be traced back to ancient China, India, Egypt, Greece and Rome, but during the past two or three centuries the main development of international law has been by Western jurists, partly because of the dominance of the European colonial empires, and more recently because of the leading role played by the United States and Western Europe in the United Nations.

During the nineteenth century, a series of international conferences agreed various aspects of international law including, for example, the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1864. This process culminated in the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, which established a Permanent Court of Arbitration, codified the procedures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and laid down certain rules for war. War was not forbidden but the rules sought to mitigate its consequences, for example by banning inhumane weapons and laying down rules for the treatment of the wounded. Article 25 of the convention agreed by twenty five nations at the Hague in 1907 prohibited: "The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are defended." In those days, before Coventry, Hamburg, Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world was more civilised.

The rules only dealt with how war was conducted. It was still considered legitimate for any country to go to war. This concept was abolished at any rate in theory, by the Covenant of the League of Nations, by the Kellogg-Briand Pact and by the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter laid down that the parties to any dispute likely to endanger international peace "shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, _enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicia.
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." If hostilities occurred, and if either side failed to accept a cease fire, that nation was defined as the aggressor. Other states were no longer legally free to be neutral; they had a duty to assist in preventing the aggression and in securing compensation for any damage caused. So it can be said that since 1919 there has been a world law against war. Yet the law has been ineffective because there has been no force - no "policeman" - to ensure that it is obeyed.

An International Court was established at the Hague by the League of Nations and this became, with minor changes in 1945, the International Court of Justice. At the same time the process of trying to define international law was carried forward by the League, and by the United Nations through the International Law Commission. Conventions on diplomatic relations, on consular relations, on the law of treaties and on some parts of the law of the sea have been approved, but the more recent attempt to draft a world law covering marine pollution, navigation rules, fishery management and under-sea mining has run into opposition from the United States and Britain.

Many other matters necessary for the conduct of business between nations are dealt with by regulations produced by international agencies such as the World Health Organisation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the Universal Postal Union, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or the International Labour Organisation. There are now over 300 intergovernmental organisations in existence.

The concept of international law administered by international courts has always appealed more to the West than to the East. The law has been devised by Western lawyers, and has been based on mainly capitalist and Christian traditions and values. It is not automatically accepted by those with other traditions, such as the Muslim or communist nations. These countries have tended to distrust the International Court of Justice, feeling that the judges are biased, both in number and in attitude, towards the West.

The Soviet Union has always preferred to work through treaties. In a treaty, the precise rights and obligations of each side are laid down, and there is less need to rely on lawyers or courts to interpret the law. Over 20,000 treaties have been recorded by the United Nations. Some of these are multilateral, being signed by several nations or perhaps open to all nations to sign; others are bilateral agreements between two nations.

The most ambitious attempt to apply the concept of international law to the prevention of war was that contained in the book "World Peace through World Law," published in 1958 by two American lawyers, Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn. This book had a marked influence on President Kennedy and on the disarmament negotiations of 1960-61. The principles on which their proposals were based were described by Grenville Clark in his introduction to the 1960 edition as follows:

First: It is futile to expect genuine peace until there is put into effect an effective system of enforceable world law in the limited field of war prevention. This implies: (a) the complete disarmament, under effective controls, of each and every nation, and (b) the simultaneous adoption on a world-wide basis of the measures and institutions which the experience of centuries has shown to be essential for the maintenance of law and order, namely, clearly stated law against violence, courts to interpret and apply that law, and police to enforce it.

Second: The world law against international violence must be explicitly stated by appropriate penalties, for the use of force by any nation against any other for any cause whatever, save only in self-defence, and must be applicable to all individuals as well as to all nations.

Third: World judicial tribunals to interpret and apply the world law against international violence must be established and maintained, and also organs of mediation and conciliation - so as to substitute peaceful means of adjudication and adjustment in place of violence, or the threat of it, as the means for dealing with all international disputes.

Fourth: A permanent world police force must be created and maintained which, while safeguarded with utmost care against misuse, would be fully adequate to forestall or suppress any violation of the world law against international violence.

The Research Group would, however, wish to point out that these proposals, although at first sight similar to our provisional propositions, did in fact prove too legalistic for the Soviet Union. They raised fears that there would need to be a law-making body which would inevitably become a world parliament; and that, with total disarmament, the "judicial tribunals" would gain the power to decide the future of the world. The Soviet international jurist Professor Oleg V. Bogdanov of the International Institute for Peace in Vienna explained: "One of the essential questions of international law is what legal foundations will be built to govern relations between states after disarmament. There are two trends: one is based on using universally recognized principles of international law and the peace-keeping machinery provided under the U.N. Charter; the other aims to replace this with 'world law' and the U.N. by a world government." Bogdanov identified the first trend as...
essentially Soviet, the second as Western. He condemned the proposals put forward by Clark and Sohn as merely a cover to repudiate the sovereign equality of states and the principle of non-interference in a country's domestic affairs. He saw their proposal to introduce compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court as indicating a "desire to use the Court as an instrument of imperialism, since the U.S. and its allies have a majority in the Court. The creation of any type of 'world state' or of a 'world law' under present conditions would be utopian and incompatible with the course of social development in our times.... This is why the idea of a 'supra-national' method of arranging relations between the disarmed states, as propagated by the imperialist doctrine of international law, is quite unacceptable."3

Much the same point has been made more recently by Professor Michael Havard, who has criticised the Clark and Sohn proposals, and indeed the philosophy of peace movements in general, as being "the product of one particular culture—a culture that has developed primarily among White Anglo-Saxon Protestants."4

I need not quote the rest of this memorandum from our Research Group. It was this first part that set the tone of our discussions.

One of the advantages the Architects had was that we consisted of people from different nationalities, different religions, different legal traditions—American, British, Russian, Indian, Chinese and so on—all working constructively together. So we were able to argue out these different points of view. While we had to take care to keep secret the existence of our group, we were able individually to discuss our ideas with various legal experts, including Professor Louis Sohn; and were able to draw on advice from the Law Council of Australia which had done some useful work on a draft Disarmament Treaty, combining, and bringing up to date, the draft Treaties produced by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962.5

It is not generally known that Clark and Sohn deserve the credit for being the first to suggest the name "World Peace Authority". They discussed in their book whether a new body with this name should be set up, but on balance decided it would be better to implement their proposals through reform of the United Nations. Professor Sohn, however, indicated to me that he had changed his mind: in view of developments since 1960 he agreed that it would be better to set up a new organisation.

It is right that they should receive the credit, because in many ways our proposals, now implemented through the Peace Treaty, follow their suggestions. But there are several important differences. Our colleagues, Igor and Yang, told us that their countries would still be inclined to take the same view as had been expressed by Professor Bogdanov, and to resist any over-legalistic framework. Certainly there could be no suggestion that international courts and international judges would become the governors of the world.

Whatever the merits of the arguments, we were not in the business of producing a theoretical edifice that might please the lawyers but which stood no chance of being implemented. If our plan was to find favour in Moscow, any reduction in national sovereignty had to be kept to the barest minimum. We had already decided against attempting to create any sort of world-parliament. This meant that there could be no law-making body: all the rules would need to be laid down in the Peace Treaty.

So, we asked ourselves, what rules needed to be included? If an omnipotent international Authority was set up, should it use its military forces to ensure that all countries kept to the existing rules of international law. Should it be the policeman of the world, whose job it would be to see that no country, perhaps even no citizen of the world, misbehaved? While this might help to reduce the causes of war, we felt that it would make the Authority far too likely to want to intervene in every aspect of international or national affairs. The experience of the United States, of the European Community, and of other federal constitutions had been that the central body was constantly tempted to interfere in state or local affairs. Any such wide role would have been unacceptable. We therefore decided that the sole task of the Peace Authority should be to enforce disarmament and to keep world peace.

Lawyers often distinguish between the need to keep order and the need to secure justice.6 In this case order had to come before justice. We were designing a peace force not a police force. Inevitably, with a new untried body, some of the rules have been a bit rough at the edges. That could not be helped. It was more urgent to find a way of preventing the destruction of the world than to fuss about the finer points of law.

The next major point the Architects had to decide in drawing up the draft World Peace Treaty was whether to include some reference to the International Court. If war was to be prohibited,
should all disputes be settled by law or by some form of judicial arbitration? During the debates which preceded the drafting of the United Nations Charter, a majority of states had favoured giving the Court compulsory jurisdiction over legal disputes between nations. But the Soviet Union had strongly objected and so had the United States. More recently, in 1986, the United States had defied a ruling by the International Court that it should cease support for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua.

We too decided against compelling nations to take their disputes to the International Court and giving the World Peace Authority a responsibility to enforce decisions of the Court. Because the Authority would have so much more power than the United Nations, that could have meant that the judges would have been placed in a position of omnipotence which proud nations would have found hard to accept. Rather than risk the proposals for the World Peace Authority foundering on this rock, we concluded that recourse to the International Court should remain voluntary.

No doubt in due course international law and justice will grow and be accepted more widely. In the meantime, as has been evident during recent years, the nations of the world continue to transact their business on the basis of voluntary agreement and voluntary observance of International law and regulations and treaties. Where there have been disagreements, they have virtually all been settled, as they were before the World Peace Authority existed, by compromise, or by arbitration or by voluntary recourse to the International Court. Indeed the prevention of war has encouraged the peaceful settlement of disputes. In the old days it was sometimes possible for one of the contenders to believe that they would profit more by war than by law. Now war can never pay.

The question that caused the Architects the most difficulty was how to frame the rules concerning disarmament and the prevention of war. Should there be a new "world law" to ban the possession of all offensive weapons and to prohibit any attack on another country? And should such a law apply to nations or to individual persons? Who should be punished for breaking the law?

When the League of Nations and the United Nations had attempted to make war illegal, they had only been con ered with relations between one country and another. If one country broke that law, the rest of the world was - in theory - committed to resisting the aggressor nation. In those days, that usually involved

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The Annexed Dove

mainly inflicted on the soldiers concerned. But in the age off ear the weapons of mass destruction meant that the punishment might be inflicted on thousands, or millions, of innocent civilians. It seemed morally wrong, when our aim was to abolish war, to suggest that the only way the Peace Authority could enforce its rule would be to make war against a whole nation. As Edmund Burke said two hundred years ago: "I do not know the method of drawing up an indictment against a whole people."7

Clearly the Peace Force would need to resist any act of invasion of another country's territory. But once that had been prevented, or preferably before it had started, should the law against war apply to individual persons, as proposed by Clark and Sohn? Should it be the duty of the Peace Force to apprehend only the people who were planning or commanding the aggression? A precedent for this had been set by the Nuremberg trials after the second world war, when the Nazi leaders were condemned to death or imprisonment for crimes against peace, defined by the Tribunal as the "planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression."

Where a Peace Inspector discovered illicit weapons, should it only be the person possessing those weapons who was arrested? The enthusiasts for world government naturally tended to take this view: it seemed obvious to them that any all-powerful world authority should compel all the citizens of the world to comply with the law against war.

Yet the idea that the Peace Force could arrest individual persons seemed to run totally counter to the principle - which we regarded as vital if the whole scheme was to be agreed - that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of any country. We wished to avoid any suggestion that the Peace Force might become a sort of all-powerful Gestapo, marching around and arresting anyone who incurred their displeasure. As Alva Myrdal had commented, some of the American pro-posals in the 1960's for the inspection of disarmament appeared to require "a world police state."8 An even more cogent objection was that no political leader was going to sign the Peace Treaty if he thought that he personally could be held responsible for any wrong-doing by his country.

The solution that we eventually hit upon - that all nations in signing the Peace Treaty should agree to pass their own legislation to make weapons of war illegal - is well known. What may be less well known is the origin of this formula. We picked it up from the Soviet proposals made in 1946 by Andrei Gromyko for the
international control of nuclear weapons. He suggested that all nations should undertake to pass legislation making the production or use of atomic weapons "a crime against humanity." Indeed soon after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan passed legislation on these lines to forbid any development of atomic weapons. We took Gromyko's suggestion, and applied it generally to all countries and to all weapons.

Within six months of the World Peace Treaty coming into effect, all nations had enacted their own laws prohibiting the unauthorised production, sale or possession of weapons. In the United States the legislation necessitated an amendment to the American constitution, which since 1791 had recognised "the right of people to keep and bear arms." This constitutional amendment was passed despite intensive lobbying by the National Rifle Association (and an incidental benefit has been the substantial reduction in the number of murders and homicides in the United States). During the past nine years almost every country has enforced its own anti-weapon laws strictly. When the Peace Inspectors find something wrong, for example a stock of illicit weapons, they report it immediately both to the Government of the country concerned and to the World Peace Authority. The Authority serves an order on the national Government requiring it to hand over the illicit weapons, or to bring to an end any illicit operation, within 24 hours. In nearly every case this has proved sufficient. If inspection reveals that the illicit act is continuing, because the Government is either unable or unwilling to stop it, then the Peace Force is ordered to undertake a raid to seize and destroy the illicit weapons, and to arrest those concerned.

An analysis of the 75 commando raids carried out by the Peace Force during the past nine years shows that they have all taken place in countries which have completed the disarmament process. The Trustees, although this has never been officially confirmed, have obviously felt that it is not advisable to attempt a raid into a country that still has its own armed forces, with all the difficulty of distinguishing between authorised and unauthorised weapons. Almost all raids have been to seize arms held by unofficial groups; although government connivance has been suspected in some cases, only in one instance, Albania, has a government admitted responsibility for attempting to maintain a secret store of weapons.

Much the hardest for the Peace Force have been the thirty eight cases where insurgents have had to be disarmed during the course of a civil war, and sadly it has been in such circumstances that the nine Peac Inspectors have lost their lives. The rule adopted has always been to leave both the government forces and the rebel forces with small arms only. In most cases it has been sufficient to confiscate the weapons of war without making any arrests. Only where it is clear that the weapons have been obtained or secreted in clear violation of the Peac Treaty have the criminals been detained. Although there have been some instances where leaders of insurgent groups have clearly incited their followers to obtain weapons, no one has yet been arrested on a charge of incitement, and thus so far no political leaders have bee put in the dock.

The problem of illicit weapons is obviously at its worst during, and soon after, a time of world wide disarmament. All over the globe there have been immense stocks of weapons of all sorts, and it is difficult to ensure that none of these fall into unauthorised hands. Once peace has been established for a few decades, once all weapons have been surrendered or, if hidden, have rusted away, and once the production of all new weapons is confined to the few factories licensed to supply the Peace Force, the whole issue of enforcing the "no weapon" law will become much easier.

Only weapons of war are illegal, and it is possible to make war without sophisticated weapons. A large body of men armed with sticks or stones or hunting knives or home-made petrol bombs might advance into a neighbouring country as indeed nearly happened with the Black March last year. The Architects did consider whether to require all nations to include in their national laws a prohibition of all war-like activity. We felt on balance that this was unnecessary, and difficult to define. If belligerent groups do gather it is the duty of the Peace Force to prevent them advancing across a border. If the assailants get hurt in the process, that is rough justice.

One additional task that was given to the Peace Force was to police the parts of the world which do not come within the jurisdiction of any nation, namely the high seas, and the air above them, and outer space. In the absence of any national navies or air forces, the Peace Force is now responsible for preventing piracy, or trade in drugs or slaves.

The new International Criminal Court is now available to try persons accused of these crimes, and also persons arrested by the Peace Force. At the time of writing some 80 cases have been heard, several of them resulting in long sentences of imprisonment in the
new confinement area set up by the Peace Force into an international police force to prevent terrorism. I am convinced, however, that the problem of international terrorism - assassination, bomb attacks, hijacking, the taking of hostages - has not been solved. It may well be that when the time for reform comes in Year 25 all the nations will wish to move nearer to the rule of international law. Perhaps, but less likely, there will be a desire to convert the Peace Force into an international police force to prevent terrorism. I am convinced, however, that if we had attempted to go further in that direction in the Treaty, it would have been rejected by both Moscow and Peking.

Two hundred years ago Immanuel Kant drew attention to lack of law in international relations:

The attachment of savages to their lawless liberty, the fact that they would rather be at hopeless variance with one another than submit themselves to a legal authority constituted by themselves, that they therefore prefer their senseless freedom to a reason-governed liberty, is regarded by us with profound contempt as barbarism and uncivilisation and the brutal degradation of humanity. So one would think that civilised races, each formed into a state by itself, must come out of such an abandoned condition as soon as they possibly can. On the contrary, however, every state thinks rather that its majesty (the "majesty" of a people is an absurd expression) lies just in the very fact that it is subject to no external legal authority; and the glory of the ruler consists in this, that, without his requiring to expose himself to danger, thousands stand at his command ready to let themselves be sacrificed for a matter of no concern to them.

Now at last, as Kant urged, all states are subject to an external legal authority. There is, however, as yet only one "world law", as defined in the Peace Treaty, the law against war.

Chapter Eight

THE DANGER

Now that there are no nuclear weapons anywhere on earth it is all too easy to forget the DANGER which faced mankind. Yet it is vital that each generation should be reminded, not just so that we can express our relief and thankfulness and joy at still being alive, but so that we continue to treasure and respect the constitution of the World Peace Authority.

THE DANGER arose because the United Nations failed to act as an effective force for peace, and because the negotiations from 1946-62 failed to bring nuclear weapons under international control. The result was the arms race, in which East and West competed not only to produce more weapons but weapons which were more technically efficient, accurate and destructive.

By the late 1980s the United States and the Soviet Union together had about 50,000 nuclear warheads. On average the explosive power of each one of these weapons was more than two hundred times the power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

Even the comparatively few British missiles with nuclear warheads were sufficient to destroy all the main cities in the Soviet Union and kill about a quarter of the total Soviet population. The French force de frappe could do the same. But America and the Soviet Union each had a hundred times more nuclear fire power than Britain or France.

Not surprisingly, the knowledge of this terrible destructive power made political and military leaders frightened and distrustful.

There were plenty of reasons for the Soviet people to distrust the
West. Their country had been savagely invaded from Western Europe once in the nineteenth century—by Napoleon—and twice in the twentieth century. It was not forgotten that after the Russian revolution the United States, Britain, France and Japan sent troops and arms to support the White counter-revolutionaries. Western politicians, particularly those in America, never hesitated to criticise the communist system and to express their hope that it would fail. As seen from Moscow, the United States had created a ring of military alliances and military bases which encircled and threatened the Soviet Union.

People in the West had equally good reasons for distrust. They knew that Marxist theory predicted that capitalism would collapse and would be replaced by communism. They suspected that the Soviet Union wished to see communist regimes established in more and more countries. Although Stalin had defeated Trotsky's plan to ferment world-wide revolution, and had proclaimed as his aim "socialism in one country," this had never seemed to ring quite true in Western ears. After the second world war, the Soviet insistence on keeping the countries of Eastern Europe within its sphere of interest—which from Moscow looked like keeping a safety zone against another attack from Western Europe—looked to the West like the traditional-outward push of Russian imperialism. So also Soviet support for communist regimes in Afghanistan, Cuba and Vietnam, and for communist parties elsewhere, appeared to confirm the view that the Soviet aim was ultimate world domination.

This distrust was reinforced by the clash of economic theories. Whereas today communism and capitalism seem just two alternative Ways of running a country, each with advantages and each with disadvantages, in the age of fear each appeared wicked and sinister.

The communists feared that because capitalist companies were always trying to maximise their profits they were constantly searching for new markets. This, it was suggested, led capitalist governments to pursue an aggressive and imperialist foreign policy. The arms manufacturers were particularly detestable: their profits and their jobs depended on selling to their own governments, or to other countries, ever more expensive and deadly weapons. The theory was confirmed by the facts: by the 1980s the international arms trade amounted to over $35 billion a year.

The Americans had a naive belief that it was their duty to persuade the Soviet people to change their system of government. To them it seemed that the communist economic system depended on unacceptable restrictions on personal freedom. They could not realise that throughout Russian history the subservience of the individual to the state had been taken for granted; to them it appeared a gross infringement of human dignity. It was thus only natural to attempt to broadcast to the Soviet people to encourage them to seek their freedom, and only natural to support the Soviet dissidents. This confirmed the Soviet leaders in their belief that the West was set on undermining their system of government.

So distrust and fear grew cumulatively. Most politicians and military leaders in the age of fear had had their formative young years during the second world war. Nowadays we can see that this war took place because the League of Nations was too weak, because there was no effective international peace-keeping force, and because too many countries preferred appeasement to collective action. But that was not how it was seen in the age of fear. It was then widely believed that the war was caused by the lack of military preparations by each country; that this unpreparedness encouraged Nazi aggression and led in 1940 to the defeat of Britain, and in 1941 almost to the defeat of the Soviet Union. So the leaders of each side were determined not to be caught unprepared again. They were easily persuaded when their military chiefs pressed for more and "better" weapons. Often the military experts genuinely feared that the other side had an advantage, or might be about to gain one. They saw it as their duty to keep their country strong, and if possible to keep it ahead in the arms race. From time to time they felt it necessary to persuade the public to accept the cost and danger of new weapons, and felt that was best done by emphasising, perhaps exaggerating, the menace of the "enemy" forces. Thus the arms race accelerated and fear and suspicion were magnified.

While the Architects were at work in Chatham House our Research Group came across a number of quotations that showed that our fear that the arms race might lead to war was not a new thought. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote, "we see men united by artificial bonds, but united to destroy each other; and all the horrors of war take birth from the precautions they have taken in order to prevent them." Lord Salisbury, the British prime Minister, in a speech in 1897, saw the piling up of arms and
yearly improvement in the "instmments of death" culminating in a 'terrible effort of mutual destruction which will be fatal for Christian civilisation" (and interestingly he went on to suggest that the only way disaster could be avoided would be eventually by bringing the powers together "to be welded in some international constitution").

Similarly Sir Edward Grey (later Lord Grey), British Foreign Secretary for_1 1905 to 1916, attributed the first world war to the same cause:

Great armaments lead inevitably to war. The increase of armaments ... produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginations of all sorts, till each government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its country not to take every precaution, while every government regards the precautions of every other government as evidence of hostile intent.

In the age of fear his words were even more true; the growth of armaments was far more menacing, the "evil imaginations" far worse. THE DANGER was that fear would turn to panic, that distrust and suspicion and hate would explode in a third world war. Let it never be forgotten that in those dreadful days it might have been possible for a war to start just by accident. A high ranking officer might have gone mad; a series of electrical circuits might all have malfunctioned simultaneously; a technician might have mistaken blips on a radar screen caused by a flock of geese for incoming missiles; some one might have pressed the wrong buttons through simple human error. A series of accidents in the 1980's - Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, the shooting down of the Korean airliner KLO07, the Challenger tragedy - showed just how fallible technology was. According to the Pentagon there had been 33 serious accidents involving American nuclear weapons, and probably a similar number had occurred in the Soviet Union. Although all the military experts claimed that it would be difficult for a war to start by mistake, and although agreements signed in 1971 between the United States and the Soviet Union provided for various safeguards and. for a "hot-line" to help defuse any crisis, public anxiety persisted.

Ed reminded the Architect of one incident in which he had been personally involved. On 9 November, 1979 he was on duty at NORAD - the North American Aerospace Defence headquarters -built inside Cheyenne Mountain in the Rockies - when they received an attack warning of incoming Soviet missiles launched from a submarine. He and his colleagues had five minutes to react before the missiles were due to hit their targets. It was not until six minutes had passed that it became clear that the alert had been caused because a war game tape had somehow been inserted into the computer in error. "It was just one of those times," he told us with wry humour, "when you need three hands. We all had out fingers in our ears waiting for the bang, so no-one had a hand spare to press the button to take out Moscow!"

Yet an accident was a less likely cause of war than was miscalculation at a time of crisis. That was the conclusion reached by Professor Daniel Frei of the University of Zurich, who undertook on behalf of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research a detailed study of the ways war might begin:

It is quite conceivable that an acute international crisis may act as a catalyst to trigger a nuclear war not in fact intended by the Governments concerned. What is being envisaged here is not accidental nuclear war, but rather nuclear war based on false assumptions, i.e. on misjudgement or miscalculations by the persons legitimately authorised to decide on the use of nuclear weapons. Sub-standard performance by decision-makers in crisis situations is particularly common: more than two decades of crisis research have provided ample evidence of all kinds of individual and organisational failures, such as misperceptions, erratic behaviour under stress, the improper handling of information, the escalation of hostilities by mirror-image mechanisms, the hazards of "group-thinking", the failure to implement decisions due to their overwhelming complexity, confusion due to organisational bottlenecks and the inflexibility of standard operating procedures. This creates many opportunities for the adoption of fatally wrong decisions.

Imagine a technical accident happening at such a time of crisis and confusion: the result would have been a terminal vindication of Murphy's Law that if something can go wrong it will go wrong, and at the most embarrassing moment.

Miscalculation had been a frequent cause of wars in the past. Miscalculation was made in judging the commitment, the strength or the determination of the other side; threats or promises were made which could not be fulfilled without war. Armies were moved and could not be withdrawn without loss of face. History is littered with military errors. Napoleon miscalculated when he invaded Russia. So did Hitler. The Japanese miscalculated when they attacked
Pearl Harbour. The British and French miscalculated when they launched the Suez operation. So did the Argentinians when they seized the Falkland Islands. It had happened so often before; if the Peace Treaty had not been signed, it seemed inevitable that sooner or later it must “happen again.

The world had come close to nuclear war in October 1962 as a result of the Cuban missile crisis. Fortunately on that occasion cool thinking prevailed. That was not the only fright. There were nineteen occasions between 1946 and 1973 when the United States Government threatened the use of strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union threatened nuclear war only three times in that period: during the Suez crisis in 1956, during the Berlin crisis in 1961 and during the border dispute with China in 1969. President Carter again considered using nuclear weapons in August 1980 when he thought the Soviet Union were about to move into Iran. That happened again in the next Iran crisis, (or as it is now often called the Rockall crisis) in World Year minus 1. Indeed the United States would probably not have signed the Peace Treaty if the world had not found itself on the brink of extinction.

In those days a crisis could blow up so quickly. The speed of communication meant that there might only have been a few hours between normality and extermination. We knew that one day we might go to bed in peace, wake to find a crisis, hear at lunchtime that war had begun, and by nightfall be reduced to radioactive cinders.

There were other developments during the age of fear which increased public anxiety. For example, during the late 1970’s, the idea gained ground in America that it was possible to fight a limited nuclear war - a war confined perhaps to Europe, or confined to small size weapons only. Yet any nuclear war would probably have escalated within minutes. Even tactical nuclear weapons were so powerful that communications would have been disrupted. Military commanders might well have been killed. Chaos, confusion and panic would have reigned. There was a high probability that any war between the superpowers would have led to an all-out nuclear exchange.

Another cause of anxiety was when it looked possible that either the United States or the Soviet Union might develop an antiballistic-missile system; capable of destroying incoming missiles.

In theory, of course, had it been possible to devise a perfect defence against missiles and nuclear weapons, and had such a defence been available to every nation, then all would have been well. The danger would have come if one side alone looked like finding a system which would guarantee its safety. It would then have been in a position to attack or threaten the other without (much) fear of retaliation. The other side might have been tempted to make a pre-emptive strike, as the United States considered making against Cuba in 1962, and as Israel actually did in June 1981 when they suspected that Iraq was developing the ability to threaten them with nuclear weapons. Because a defence against missiles would have upset the balance of terror, and because it would have been hugely expensive, America and the Soviet Union agreed in the 1972 Salt 1 Treaty not to proceed with this development. That agreement was, however, put in doubt by the Strategic Defense Initiative, nicknamed the “Star Wars project”, announced by President Reagan in March 1983. American scientists were encouraged to develop a system of laser weapons carried on satellites, to destroy Soviet missiles in outer space. Research on that project was abandoned in Year 2, but not before billions of dollars had been spent on it.

Laser weapons in space sounded like science fiction. Fortunately our little project, the World Peace Treaty, which the New York Journal also described as “science fiction”, proved simpler to implement! And the total cost of our project - the cost of setting the Architects and our small Research Group to work - was only a tiny, tiny fraction of the cost of the “Star Wars” project.

THE DANGER was made worse by the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, although signed by 124 nations, had not proved entirely effective. India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil had all refused to sign. Another dozen countries had the technical ability to make nuclear weapons, if they had wished to do so. It would not have taken them more than a few months, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, although it could inspect and report, had no power to stop them. If any of these countries had become involved in serious conflict, and had used a nuclear weapon, it might have triggered the final holocaust.

When the Architects were first appointed, the Secretary General of the United Nations reminded us of the words of his predecessor in 1960:

There are perhaps some who wish to draw comfort from calculations that it
may be difficult to kill outright every man, woman, and child on each even a nuclear war. But such calculations are empty exercises. The danger of the annihilation of human civilisation should not be made the subject of theoretical arguments, but be used as a basis for creating a common awareness of the alarming situation the world is facing today and of the need for exercising the political will to search for acceptable solutions.

The lack of "political will to search for acceptable solutions" was one of the difficulties we faced. Indeed to understand the magnitude of the task that was involved in creating the World Peace Authority, it is necessary to recall the pessimism and despair that existed in those days. Whereas today we take the presence of Peace Inspectors and the existence of the Peace Force for granted, in the age of fear everyone took the possibility of nuclear extermination for granted!

Indeed most people preferred not to think too much about nuclear war. It was not a pleasant subject. If it happened then, within a few hours, everyone would probably be dead. That would be that. There did not seem much that ordinary people could do to prevent it. The technical arguments were so complicated that they seemed best left to the experts. If fate decreed another world war it was a destiny that could not be avoided. So for most people it made sense to put it out of their minds, not to waste time worrying, to get on with their daily lives, to do whatever tasks were within their ability, to enjoy themselves while they could, in fact to carry on as if the risk of nuclear extermination did not exist.

In their private thoughts some people took the feeling of fate still further. They knew the world was over-populated. They knew that when any animal species breeds too fast some natural disaster occurs to restore the balance of nature. Perhaps the human race was doomed to have its numbers cut back like lemmings or locusts. Perhaps it was doomed to extinction like the dinosaurs. Perhaps next time round evolution would produce a more intelligent being which did not have a mad urge to destroy itself. Because so many people had come to regard extermination as the inevitable fate, they had difficulty in comprehending that the Peace Treaty provided a simple escape route. Like condemned prisoners in a dark dungeon, they blinked in disbelief when suddenly released into the sunlight and told to go free.

The feeling of despair affected the politicians, both in the East and in the West, just as much as the general public. Indeed it was an area of the DANGER that it seemed to inhibit new political thinking.

This paralysis of thought caused by fear was demonstrated by the fact that, although the three main theories on how to prevent war - the nuclear deterrent, multilateral disarmament and unilateral disarmament - left much to be desired, there was at that time practically no discussion of the possibility of setting up a world peace force.

The theory of the nuclear deterrent, which took shape in the 1960's, was based on the prospect of "mutually assured destruction." Neither the Soviet Union nor America would dare attack the other, because they knew that if they did they would suffer a devastating counter-attack. For the lifetime of a whole generation, the populations of the United States, of Europe and of the Soviet Union lived in the shadow of death, held as hostages condemned to extermination if their leaders were to make one false move.

The deterrent only worked if it was believed by the other side. Certainly it prevented any threat of a nuclear attack, but there was considerable doubt about how credible it was in preventing conventional war. If the Red Army had advanced into Germany, would the Americans really have risked their own extermination by using nuclear weapons? Would the French have fired their missiles the moment one Soviet soldier crossed the French border? If the Red Army had crossed the English Channel, would the British Government really have given the order to fire their 16 Polaris missiles if they knew that the consequence would be the obliteration of the British Isles? The military experts claimed that this uncertainty was all part of the deterrent: if the other side were kept guessing they would be less inclined to launch an attack. It was undeniably true that fear of precipitating a nuclear exchange had made the superpowers more careful, and well established diplomatic procedures existed for attempting to defuse any potential confrontation. Nevertheless the uncertainty increased fear and provided scope for miscalculation: miscalculation and fear added to the risk of war.

Essential to the deterrent theory was that the United States or the Soviet Union should be able to launch a second strike. Even if one side launched a first nuclear attack the other side should have sufficient missiles protected in concrete silos, in aircraft or under the sea in submarines, to launch an equally powerful counter-attack. Only so long as this was so would there have been no
advantage in being the first to fire.

In the end it was the scientists who demolished the deterrent theory. For years they had been producing new and 'better' offensive weapons and neither East nor West dared call a halt to their research. Both sides spent vast sums on military research-five times as much as on medical research. But it was the improvements in the accuracy of missiles and in the skill of detecting and cracking submarines that finally upset the nuclear balance. By the early 1980's, the Americans had announced that at least half of the new MX missiles which they were developing were predicted to land within 100 metres of their target. Thus both sides realised that land-based missiles, even in concrete silos, would no longer be safe from attack. When the Americans announced that they were able to destroy Soviet submarines, the ability to launch a second strike was lost. Nuclear weapons became, not a deterrent to attack, but an invitation. When there was no chance of retaliation there was suddenly an overwhelming advantage in the first strike. He who fired first would win. He who hesitated would be utterly destroyed.

Now we can see that a strong international peace force is a far better deterrent to war than any number of rival nuclear missiles.

The paralysis of thought caused by fear led to excessive expectation of progress through disarmament negotiations. After the collapse in the early 1960's of the negotiations for complete and general disarmament, it became the fashion to aim for much smaller, less ambitious steps. It was hoped that even small steps might reduce some of the dangers and costs of the arms race, and that they might help to reduce tension and fear. With this went the theory of detente: that the best way to peace was through improving relations between East and West, through better personal contacts and understanding.

Some success was achieved, but not much. The 1963 Moscow treaty banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; but because it permitted underground tests the development and improvement of nuclear weapons continued unabated. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty slowed but did not stop the spread of nuclear weapons. In the 1970's, the SALT 1 and SALT 2 (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union slowed down, but did not stop, the arms race.

During the 1980's another whole series of disarmament negotiations took place: on long range missiles; on medium range missiles; on conventional forces; on biological and chemical weapons. Geneva, Stockholm, Vienna, and Helsinki were scenes of much coming and much going. Sometimes hopes of success rose, sometimes they fell. But even success did not mean disarmament, it only meant 'arms control', only a slowing down in the arms race, a pause for breath, for economic recovery, before resuming the race towards extermination.

In the whole forty years from 1946 to 1986 there was not a single agreement which led to an actual reduction in arms. During all the disarmament negotiations the superpowers continued to develop and deploy new and ever more destructive weapons.

We can now see that failure was inevitable.

All the disarmament negotiations made snail-pace progress because they started from fear and finished with fear. Attempts at arms limitation brought no guarantee of safety. Both sides still kept huge arsenals of nuclear weapons. Both sides continued to 'improve' their weapons in secret. Peace still depended on the balance of terror. If there was an occasional relaxation of tension it was reversed by the next international crisis. As Immanuel Kant predicted, there could be no real peace "if made with the secret reservation of material for future war. For then it would be a mere truce, a mere suspension of hostilities, not peace."77.

It was not until the Peace Force was established that nations had the confidence to disarm knowing that they would be safe from attack. Only with total disarmament has the world now achieved real peace, instead of "a mere suspension of hostilities."

Because the disarmament negotiations made such negligible progress, many people turned to the idea that it might be better for one country, any country, to limit or abolish its nuclear weapons without waiting for others to do the same. In the age of fear millions of people supported the peace movement to express their horror at the thought of nuclear war, their revulsion against all nuclear weapons, and their concern that the risks of war seemed to be increasing. The peace movement contained many strands. Some of its supporters were pacifists. Some wanted to get rid of all nuclear weapons but keep conventional weapons (perhaps forgetting how gruesome conventional war could be). Some wanted merely to freeze or reduce the number of nuclear weapons. And some were mainly concerned to get nuclear weapons out of Europe.

People of all political parties were worried; yet in the West the
peace movement became associated with left of centre politics. The left tended to sympathise more with communist ideals, and to take a more charitable view of Soviet motives. So they were less afraid that unilateral disarmament would lead to Soviet domination: even if it did they preferred to be "Red than dead". By contrast, those on the right tended to be more nationalistic and to set greater store by the preservation of free enterprise, capitalism and personal freedom. So the right accused the anti-nuclear movement of being under Soviet influence and of receiving support from Moscow. In the East the situation was reversed. Those who dared speak out against nuclear weapons were at risk of being considered agents of the capitalist powers. Once again fear and distrust prevented calm sensible discussion.

The Architects shared all the anxieties of the peace movement. We had great sympathy with their aim: indeed to abolish all nuclear weapons was our aim too. But we could see that they too suffered from the same paralysis of thought caused by fear. Although great emotion was displayed by millions of people in demonstrating against nuclear weapons, remarkably little thought was given to the preservation of free enterprise, capitalism and personal freedom. So the preservation of freedom. So the Architects were appointed, to devise a framework for relations through disarmament negotiation seemed to provide no assurance of lasting peace. And the case for unilateral disarmament by one country alone seemed to provide no guarantee for its future independence and security. All the negative arguments seemed to us much stronger. The peace protesters were correct in their criticism of the deterrent theory and in their fears of the increasing imminence of nuclear war. Those in favour of disarmament negotiations were right in deploiring the danger and expense of the arms race, and in emphasising the need for equal security. Those in favour of keeping nuclear weapons were correct in arguing that unilateral disarmament would leave nations open to foreign domination, and might thus actually increase the risk of war. They were all correct, and yet such was the paralysis of fear that, until we produced the draft Peace Treaty, no one could see that what was needed in a world of violence was, quite simply, a policeman to keep order.

Nowadays it seems amazing that in the age of fear immense expenditure was poured into military research and immense effort was put into devising "war games" to test every conceivable military eventuality. Yet, until the Architects were appointed, practically no effort had been expended on devising a framework for peace with security. There were no "peace games."

In her study of disarmament, Alvar Myrdal commented that it was tragic that the Baruch-Gromyko negotiations had failed because "the world community did not sit down to reason things out, from the outset, using sincere analyses and a will to construct instead of obstruct..." It was left to us.

When we came to examine the negotiations about international control of nuclear weapons we were amazed that these ideas had lain dormant for a quarter of a century. Yet we soon saw why. Baruch, Gromyko, McCloy and Zarin, had treated the control agency just as if it had been one more United Nations organisation. They had not faced the fact that an agency with power to control all nuclear weapons would have power to rule the world. Thus the subject of limited world government, of how to restrict the power of a world peace-keeping force, had never been properly discussed.
In the age of fear there was little enthusiasm for re-opening the issue. Pessimism prevailed. Grand concepts were out of favour. The enthusiasts for world government, by overstating their case, had forfeited credibility. When partial disarmament was so hard to achieve, the idea of total disarmament appeared unrealistic. When East and West were so bitterly opposed, it seemed unlikely that they could ever agree on anything important. Fear closed people’s eyes to the only rational solution.

Ordinary people tended to leave the discussion of defence matters to the experts. The details of nuclear weapons and of the various types of missiles were impossibly technical. The array of names and initials was enough to daunt anyone. Yet the experts did not always know best. The military men were trained for war and were indoctrinated to think of the other side as the enemy. They constantly pressed for more, not fewer, weapons. They and the arms manufacturers had a joint interest in producing ever more accurate and deadly weapons. The scientists working in defence institutions were trained to concentrate on their specialised area of research. They tended to be intrigued with their task of extending the frontiers of knowledge, and with the intellectual satisfaction of applying it in ever more efficient ways, so as to ensure that their country did not fall behind in the technological race.

We took a different view. The choice between creating the World Peace Authority, with all the risk that it might go wrong, and continuing with the risk of nuclear war, was a choice that ordinary people all over the world were capable of deciding. We were encouraged by an opinion poll in the early 1980’s which showed, perhaps not surprisingly, that 90 per cent of the American people wished to see "an end to the production, storage, and testing of all nuclear weapons by all countries on earth." The reaction to the draft Treaty, when it was published, confirmed our faith in the commonsense of the world public. The issues were debated in every home. People pondered the chances of survival of their children. They weighed the risks of war against the risks of world government. They knew that the doctrine of the deterrent meant that they were held as hostages for peace. They were quite capable of deciding whether they wished to live in free and independent nations with the risk of nuclear war: or whether they were prepared to venture into the unknown of creating an omnipotent international authority.

In making their decision people were, of course, guided by the experts, and we were fortunate that the Treaty fell on fertile ground. Many of the defence experts and scientists were beginning to have their private doubts about the ‘deterrent theory, and welcomed our proposals for a strong peace force as an alternative deterrent to aggression. The diplomats and politicians who had put their faith in disarmament naturally welcomed our proposals as a means of making much faster progress, and as providing a cast iron method of verification and enforcement. The leaders of the peace movement welcomed the chance to gain a much wider spectrum of support for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. Indeed it was this wide support from both left and right, from experts and from the general public, and of course from both East and West, which ultimately enabled all the doubts and hesitations to be overcome.

THE DANGER is past. Let us pray it never returns.
Chapter Nine

THE CRUX

In the warmth of mid-summer, it is hard to recall the cold winds of winter. Now that the world has almost completed the process of disarmament, it is hard to remember why it was so difficult to achieve. Now that the Peace Inspectors are seen everywhere, and now that the Peace Authority has undisputed power to compel any nation to surrender its weapons, the problem has vanished.

Yet when every nation was armed to the teeth, fearful and distrustful, how to get disarmament started? For the Architects this was the crux of our task. If we had not solved this conundrum, all else would have been in vain.

It was a classic Catch 22. No nation was prepared to start disarmament until they were confident that they were safe from attack. This security could only be provided by an effective international force. But an international force could only keep the peace effectively in a disarmed world!

The plan we proposed, which formed Part III of the Peace Treaty, was extremely complex. In order to place it in its historical setting, it may be helpful to describe how our thinking developed.

We quickly rejected the idea of building up a world military force first, and then proceeding with disarmament second. That would have meant creating a force stronger than any fully-armed nation or alliance, and would have been impossibly expensive. Conversely, there was clearly no hope of achieving extensive disarmament as the first step, and then building up a peace force later. Disarmament and the creation of the Peace Force had to go together, hand in hand.

As stocks of weapons were gradually reduced, some could be dismantled and destroyed, and others could be transferred to the Peace Force. As the numbers of men in national armed forces were reduced, some could be demobilised and return to civilian life, others would be recruited by the Peace Force. That had to be the method, but how could we get the process started when fear was huge and the Peace Force still only a tiny embryo?

The minutes of one of our meetings record that:

It was agreed that the dual process of disarmament and expansion of the peace-keeping force would need to be achieved quickly before the initial enthusiasm evaporated, and with luck before a serious international crisis appeared over the horizon. Five years seemed to be the maximum time that could be allowed before reaching the point when the Peace Force would be stronger than the remaining forces of any nation. Once that point was reached it should be downhill the rest of the way. Ten years would be sufficient to reach total disarmament. Although this seemed rapid, it was in fact less drastic than the plans presented by the Soviet Union in 1959 and again in 1962 when they proposed that all nations should undertake general and complete disarmament within four years.

It was recognised that for each country there would come a time - the crux point - at which it might be prepared to put its trust in the World Peace Authority. This crux point would occur when the Peace Authority was capable of deploying, in that country, a force which was at least as great as its own defence force. Preferably the Peace Authority would be able to deploy a force greater than the force of any potential aggressor. Once this point was reached, disarmament would proceed apace. The nations concerned would be reassured that they would be better defended than with their own forces. They would be keen to reduce the cost of maintaining their own forces. Moreover, if they put their trust in the Peace Authority, it could exert its greater power to press them forward.

The crux point would occur at different levels in different countries. A small country with a tiny army would be glad to join at the start. The defence - and moral authority - that would be provided by a Peace Force presence would be greater than its own strength. As each country transferred the responsibility for its own defence to the World Peace Authority, it could transfer all its weapons to the Peace Force. Its armed forces would be demobilised, but some soldiers, sailors and airmen would doubt be recruited by the Peace Force. Thus the Peace Force would steadily grow in size. As it grew, more nations would be prepared to put their trust in it...
physical transfer of weapons, such as warships, submarines, aircraft, tanks and artillery, from national forces to the Peace Force. Detailed plans were drawn up for each country listing the weapons that were to be transferred year by year.

We rejected, however, any idea that the command of existing armed forces should be transferred to the World Peace Authority. While this would have had the advantage of simplicity, it would have had all the disadvantages of the previous United Nations system of drawing contingents from different countries. That system was a shambles! In those days each contingent continued to obey its own national laws, and to reflect its own national attitudes. Some units thought peace-keeping meant being prepared to resist aggression by force, others that it meant acting as observers and being prepared to fire only in self-defence. Each national contingent continued to report to, and take orders from, its own Government as well as from its United Nations commander. We could not allow that muddle to continue. From the beginning we knew that the Peace Force must be directly recruited and truly multi-national. Every man and woman in it would need to owe direct allegiance and loyalty to the World Peace Authority.

It was, however, obviously going to be an immensely difficult task to weld all the new recruits from so many different nations into a credible military force. The task would be made more difficult still as a result of the step by step timing. We, the Architects, were fortunate in the quality of our military advisers. It was at their insistence that the two year warming-up period was written into the Treaty - the gap between the time the Treaty came into effect, having been signed by three-quarters of the world, and the time the World Peace Authority came into full being. This warming-up period, which in the event proved crucial to bringing in the United States and the Soviet Union, was essential to enable the military preparations to be made. A shadow command staff was set up so that on Day 1 they were able to assume control of the whole world-wide operation and carry it through with military efficiency.

Although there was no direct transfer of troops, the decision by the shadow command staff to organise the Peace Force on the basis of national regiments - "ethnic units" - to give them their official but ugly title - has largely overcome the linguistic and cultural difficulties. It has produced a healthy rivalry, which we saw again earlier this year in the ninth inter-ethnic tattoo.

Recruitment from each country, and from each part of the world, has been roughly balanced. In the early years, however, comparatively few officers and men were recruited from the United States or from the Soviet Union; partly because those countries joined late, after the initial plans had been drawn up; and partly to help ensure that the Peace Force was neutral in the East-West confrontation. This neutral composition of the peace-keeping force was in line with Soviet proposals made in the early 1960s.

What is not generally known, but can now be revealed, is that the Architects were worried about whether the new Peace Force troops would, if it came to a test, prove loyal to the World Peace Authority. If it was their own nation that had to be restrained from war, or compelled by force to hand over its weapons, which side would the troops from that nation take? This difficulty was overcome by extensive cross-posting, so that few regiments actually found themselves based in their own home countries. Considerable care was taken by the World Peace Authority with their public relations, to ensure that when units of the Peace Force arrived in a new country they were heralded as bringers of peace, as defenders against war, and not, as might have happened, as alien troops come to occupy the country.

Stage by stage disarmament - the reduction of weapons by each nation to agreed totals - also had a place in our plans. We could not, however, rely too heavily upon it. This method had been almost the only one discussed in all the disarmament negotiations during the age of fear, and as a result the whole subject had become embittered, and both sides embattled. Part III of the Treaty does contain detailed requirements for the progressive reduction in the numbers of missiles, nuclear warheads, conventional weapons and in the size of armed forces. In the event, however, these have not proved to be the main downward pressure on armaments. Instead they have performed a useful check on progress, and a useful reassurance as each check point is passed.

In our examination of the 1961-2 disarmament negotiations, we noted that one of the main areas of disagreement lay in the route by which total disarmament would be achieved. President Kennedy had wanted to proceed by three stages, with reductions in weapons, an extension of inspection and a strengthening of the United Nations forces at each stage. In Stage III "progressive controlled disarmament" and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no State would have the military power to challenge the progressively
strenthened United Nations peace force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.2

The Soviet Union, while agreeing this final objective, wished to get there by a different route: by freezing military budgets; by renouncing the use of nuclear weapons; by withdrawing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and American troops from Western Europe; by establishing nuclear free zones; and by introducing measures to reduce the risk of surprise attack.3

We saw no need to argue the toss between the American plan and the Soviet one. We incorporated elements of both into our proposals.

The idea of nuclear free zones was already well established. Back in 1957 the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, had suggested that no nuclear weapons should be allowed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany. Although this initiative did not succeed, various other parts of the world - most of Scandinavia, most of South America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and Antarctica - had by the mid-1980's been declared nuclear free zones. In 1983 the Soviet Union proposed that nuclear free zones should be established in the Baltic, and if central Europe on each side of the border between East and West. We took them at their word.

The concept of creeping disarmament had been suggested by Sir Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, at the Summit meeting in July 1955 and was subsequently elaborated by Professor Louis Sohn.4 It was, in effect an extension of the idea of nuclear free zones, and we decided that it should apply only to the Soviet Union and the United States. Each year, from World Year 6 onwards, one quarter of the land area of each superpower has had to be declared totally disarmed, with no nuclear or conventional weapons, and totally open to verification by the Peace Inspectors. Each country has been free to decide the boundaries of the nuclear free areas. This gradual rolling back of the nuclear frontier has eased the task of inspection, and has caused each of the superpowers to draw back their remaining weapons into the more distant zones. It has enabled the most sensitive defence establishments to be dealt with last. Only this year has the process been completed.

The reason why Part III of the World Peace Treaty appears so complicated is that it contains six different methods by which disarmament has been achieved:

- the cumulative transfer of defence responsibility to the Peace Force, country by country, year by year;
- the transfer of weapons to the Peace Force;
- the stage by stage reduction in weapons and troop levels;
- the extension of nuclear free zones;
- creeping disarmament;
- the financial formula.

Not only were all these different methods used, but of course the timing of each was different for each country. Thus, compared with the deliberate simplicity of Part I, now called the Great Charter, Part III became, I am afraid, a vast and almost unintelligible schedule of nations, weapons and dates.

Yet this very complexity had an advantage. It meant that less weight, less strain, was put on any one method. In particular the transfer of weapons has meant that less weight has had to be put on verification: once the Peace Force has got the weapons there is no need to check that they have been dismantled.

The schedule in Part III could only have been devised by an international group, such as ours, working as a team. It was far too complicated ever to have been produced through negotiations. Bilateral negotiation between Moscow and Washington could not have covered the whole world, and could not have produced the cumulative country-by-country method. Multilateral negotiations in some United Nations committee could never have come up with anything so detailed. Looking back, one can see that the only way it could have worked was the way it happened: with the schedule produced as a 'fait accompli', and nations left to decide whether to take it or leave it.

In retrospect also it is interesting that none of the first five methods of disarmament have proved so important as the sixth - the financial formula we deviseq. Shortage of money has meant that in most countries disarmament has actually proceeded faster than laid down in the schedule:-

In the Peace Treaty we left it to the World Peace Authority to fix the level of financial contributions required, subject only to the rule that all contributions must be strictly in proportion to the national income of each country. That was clearly right for the long term. But for the transitional period, the first ten years, we laid down a precise formula in order to prevent argument while the Peace Authority was in the making.
The formula was that in Year 1 each country would contribute 1 per cent of its national income (GNP). Those countries which achieved total disarmament within the first year and which handed over full defence responsibility to the World Peace Authority stayed at 1 per cent in subsequent years. For all other countries the level of contribution was raised to 1½ per cent in the second year, to 2 per cent in the third year, to 2½ per cent in the fourth year, to 3 per cent in the fifth year and so on. The key point was that as soon as any nation reached the state of total disarmament, its contribution was immediately reduced to the basic 1 per cent of national income.

This mathematical formula was suggested by our Chinese colleague, Yang, who told us that it was inspired by one of the five principles of good government laid down by Confucius, "to make more beneficial to the people the things from which they naturally derive benefit..." The beauty of the formula is that many countries have found it difficult to pay the increasing level of contributions as well as continuing to cover their own defence expenditure. There has therefore been a downward pressure on military spending, which has reinforced the disarmament arrangements. Before the Peace Treaty, the average level of defence expenditure for all countries in the world was around 5 per cent of national income. (This average concealed wide variations; for example the Soviet Union spent 11 per cent, the United States 6½ per cent, China 8 per cent, Western Europe 4 per cent, the Middle East 15 per cent, Latin America only 1½ per cent). There has been a strong public demand in many countries to complete the disarmament process quickly in order to make possible a double saving, a reduction in contributions and a reduction in defence spending, and consequently a substantial reduction in taxation. So now in Year 9 only the United States and the Soviet Union are paying the full contribution— which has reached 5 per cent. Every other country is totally disarmed, and has reverted to the basic 1 per cent.

The Architects were worried that some countries might not pay up. The peace-keeping operations of the United Nations had been severely curtailed in the 1960's because some countries disapproved and declined to contribute. By 1986, the United Nations was drifting into financial crisis again, with $240 million of assessed contributions not paid up because of various grumbles. To prevent a similar weakening of the Peace Authority, we required a deposit from all nations a year in advance. Indeed the first year's payment had to be made a year before the Peace Treaty came into full effect. Like holiday-makers booking a hotel, nations had to pay an advance deposit for peace. From January, Year 1, payments have been made on a monthly basis. For those countries not fully disarmed, the contribution has increased by a small amount each month, equivalent to ½ per cent a year. This gradual increase has avoided a sudden year-end jump in the level of subscription which might have caused some countries to opt out. Moreover, as I have mentioned earlier, we also gave the Peace Authority power, if necessary, to impose a levy on all trade with a country that refused to pay. Unlike the United Nations, the Authority now of course has the military power to insist on payment.

I should also mention, for the record, the problem of the small spenders. Some countries - Brazil, Mexico, Ghana, Costa Rica, Mauritius and a few small islands - used to spend less than 1 per cent of their national income on defence. It seemed illogical that they should be asked to pay more for the privilege of belonging to a world at peace. On the other hand, for reasons I have explained, we felt it essential to ensure that the contribution system was not used to redistribute income, and therefore we did not want any exceptions to the basic rule of proportional contributions. So in the Treaty we offered these countries a five year transition, after which they would have to pay their full share in the cost of preserving world peace. That, however, did not appeal to Brazil, Mexico and Mauritius and they have not yet signed. They have, however, all agreed to total disarmament, and provide free access for the Peace Inspectors.

One heart-searching decision that the Architects had to take was whether the World Peace Authority should be allowed to hold nuclear weapons.

There was a strong moral inclination to feel that if the purpose of the whole exercise was to end the fear of nuclear war, it would be wrong for the Peace Authority to have anything to do with nuclear weapons. We were well aware that the prospect of an omnipotent international body armed with nuclear weapons would make the whole concept appear more daunting and dictatorial, and that this might make it harder to attract support for the Peace Treaty. If the Peace Authority succeeded in its purpose of policing the world to eliminate all nuclear weapons, it would not need nuclear weapons itself. So we decided that the aim within the decade should be to have no nuclear weapons anywhere on earth.

In the short term, in the first ten years, we had to make sure that
the Peace Force was effective. What, we asked ourselves, would happen if half way through the disarmament process one of the superpowers turned nasty. What would happen if that recalcitrant superpower threatened all the Peace Force bases, even the World Peace Authority headquarters itself, with nuclear destruction? Some of us felt that such a threat would not be credible, that it would be possible for the Peace Authority to carry on regardless and to call the bluff. Most of us, however, came to the view that this would not do. If the disarmament process was to be carried through successfully, it was vital that every nation should have total confidence in the power of the Peace Force to protect it. That confidence could not be weakened by even the smallest suspicion that the Peace Authority might be liable to nuclear blackmail.

The Architects therefore drafted the Peace Treaty so as to allow the Peace Force to hold nuclear weapons transferred to it during the transitional period. The transfer, by reducing national nuclear stockpiles, helped in the disarmament process. Most of the transferred weapons were immediately dismantled and made safe. Some were kept temporarily but with a total prohibition on their first use.

The announcement this autumn that the Peace Force has now at last got rid of all its nuclear weapons fulfils the requirement that we wrote into the Treaty. As soon as all nations had dismantled or handed over all their nuclear weapons, and as soon as the Peace Inspectors had reported that to the best of their knowledge there were none anywhere else on earth, then the World Peace Authority was required to get rid of all their nuclear weapons.

Ten years or so ago some of the opponents of the Peace Treaty were suggesting that this would never happen; that the Peace Authority would go on collecting nuclear weapons with a kind of mad megalomaniac urge for power. Today such fears themselves seem the product of a war-fevered imagination. In a disarmed world there are now no enemies. There is no need for nuclear weapons.

What will happen in future, some sceptics have asked, if some country thirsty for conquest, or with its back against the wall, decides to manufacture nuclear weapons in secret. Suppose many computers hence the Peace Inspectors have become lax, and fail to detect Gthi breach of the Treaty. Would not the recalcitrant nation then be able to hold all the rest of the world to ransom? The fact that people still ask that sort of question shows that some of the attitudes prevalent during the age of fear still persist. No one would dream of asking what would happen if San Francisco decided to manufacture nuclear weapons and hold the rest of America to ransom! The threat, of course, whether by a nation or by a town, would not be credible. The means of delivery - missiles or war planes - are no longer available. The Peace Force, with its overwhelming power, could just move in, confiscate the illicit weapons, and arrest the warmongers.

In practice it would not be easy to manufacture nuclear weapons in secret, or to hide them. Although the plutonium and uranium of which they were mainly made lasts for thousands of years, one type of plutonium which they inevitably contained, 241 Pu, decays with the half-life of only 16 years. After that it starts to heat up, and the nuclear weapon becomes unusable unless the plutonium is reprocessed. All the plants, for example Windscale III Britain, Marcoule near Avignon, or Rocky Flats in Colorado, at which nuclear weapon material used to be regularly reprocessed, have now been closed.

There has been much debate recently about the problems of disposal of nuclear material, both from power stations and from the dismantled nuclear weapons. What has happened to the uranium and plutonium from the dismantled bombs is that it is being used as fuel in nuclear power stations. Much of it has already been burnt up. So there is really only one problem: the disposal of waste from the power stations. None of the existing methods of disposal are entirely satisfactory, but it would be a pity if the strength of public feeling on this issue were ever to obscure the achievement of having got rid of nuclear weapons. All the explosive power has now been eliminated. The risk of harm to the human race is now a million - perhaps a million million - times smaller than it was.

The main events of the past nine years are still fresh in everyone's minds. Most people are well aware of the progress that has been made year by year towards total disarmament. And the purpose of this book is not to record recent events but to attempt to set them in historical context, to explain how they came about. Nevertheless the story would not be complete without a brief description of the record. By setting out a summary, shorn of all the other happenings which have filled the headlines, the pattern and logic of disarmament emerge more clearly.
THE TIMETABLE OF DISARMAMENT

World Year One
Peace Treaty comes into full force on Day 1. World Peace Authority formally established.
Burma, Canada, India, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and Sweden agree to total disarmament, hand over of all weapons and transfer of defence responsibility to Peace Force within the first year.
Nuclear free zones declared in Africa (except Transvaal) and confirmed in Scandinavia, South America and Australia.
All chemical and biological weapons also banned from these zones.
Peace Inspectors gain unrestricted access to disarmed nations and to nuclear free zones.
Peace Inspectors' control posts set up in all Nato and Warsaw Pact countries.
All manufacture of new nuclear weapons, and all nuclear tests, banned.
No new missiles permitted.
The income of the World Peace Authority amounts to around $120 billion (1 per cent of world GNP). Two million recruits join the Peace Force.

World Year Two
Austria, Finland, and Bangladesh accept total disarmament, and transfer defence responsibility to the Peace Force.
Reduction in armed forces and weapons in Africa (except Transvaal) and in South America.
Central America, the Indian continent, South East Asia declared nuclear free zones. Chemical and biological weapons also banned.
Peace Inspectors admitted to all these areas. Total number of Peace Inspectors rises to 23,000.
Britain decides (ahead of schedule) to hand over all nuclear weapons to World Peace Authority, and admits Peace Inspectors.
Transfer of some warships, submarines, aircraft and tanks to Peace Force from all Nato and Warsaw Pact countries.

World Year Three
Africa (except Transvaal) and South America reach total disarmament. So also (ahead of schedule) do Australia, Philippines, Spain and Yugoslavia. Peace Force responsible for over 60 countries.
Middle East (following the war) made a nuclear, chemical and biological weapon-free zone; phased reduction in armed forces imposed.
Troop reductions to agreed levels by Nato, Warsaw Pact and China.

World Year Four
Total disarmament completed in Middle East, Greece and Turkey, and in South East Asia.
France and China hand over to the World Peace Authority a quarter of their stock of nuclear weapons.
West Germany, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland declared nuclear, chemical and biological weapon-free zones.
Transvaal signs Treaty, and admits Peace Inspectors.
Further extensive troop reductions and weapons transfer to the Peace Force by Nato, Warsaw Pact and China.
Income of World Peace Authority reaches peak of $250 billion. Total manpower of the Peace Force reaches 4 million.

World Year Five
United States and Soviet Union transfer a quarter of their stock of nuclear weapons, missiles and nuclear-armed submarines. France and China transfer a further quarter of their nuclear armaments.
Total disarmament completed in Central America, Pakistan, North and South Korea.
Peace Inspectors admitted by whole world except Soviet Union and the United States. Total number of Peace Inspectors exceeds 50,000;
All United States and Soviet troops withdrawn from Western and Eastern Europe.

World Year Six
China, Norway and Denmark complete total disarmament (ahead of schedule).
First quarter of land area of United States and Soviet Union
made total disarmament zones, and opened to Peace Inspectors.
Further quarter of nuclear weapons handed over by United States, Soviet Union and France.
Nuclear-free zone extended to all remaining countries of Eastern and Western Europe (except France).

World Year Seven
Total disarmament completed in Transvaal.
Second quarter of land area of United States and Soviet Union made total disarmament zones.
France completes hand over of nuclear weapons, joins nuclear-free zone. Further quarter of nuclear weapons handed over by United States and Soviet Union.

World Year Eight
United States and Soviet Union complete hand over of all nuclear weapons.
United States allows Peace Inspectors into all areas (ahead of schedule). Third quarter of Soviet Union opened to inspection.
Eastern and Western Europe complete total disarmament. Peace Force now responsible for whole world, except for United States and Soviet Union.

World Year Nine
Final quarter of land area of Soviet Union opened to Peace Inspectors. Peace Inspectors confirm no nuclear weapons in United States or Soviet Union.
World Peace Authority dismantles its remaining nuclear weapons.

The dramatic announcement, on Day 1 of Year 1, by Burma, Canada, India, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and Sweden, that they were proposing to achieve total disarmament and a complete hand over of their defence to the World Peace Authority within the year, came as a welcome surprise. They were not scheduled to reach this stage until Year 2. A few small nuclear weapons were handed over by India to the Peace Force in February, Year 1.

Pakistan agreed to hand over her small stock of nuclear weapons the following year.

The setting up of control posts from Year 1 in the United States, the Soviet Union and Eastern and Western Europe proved very valuable. Peace Inspectors based at these posts were able to operate seismic equipment to monitor compliance with the ban on underground tests. More important, they helped to get the two suspicious superpowers used to the idea of inspection. Indeed the Peace Inspectors based at the control posts were in practice allowed to travel widely. Each one, in her own way, become an Ambassador for the world Peace Authority. Each one, in her distinctive red uniform, has had a sense of purpose and a disciplined efficiency which has commanded immediate respect. For several years now a Peace Inspector has been invited to join the Soviet leaders in taking the salute at the annual Red Army parade in Red Square, Moscow. Others have appeared regularly on American television and at White House functions.

The Architects had included the proposal for the setting up of control posts because we knew that a similar proposal had been suggested in 1955 by the Soviet premier, Nikolai Bulganin. It was repeated by Andrei Gromyko in 1961: "The most practical steps which might be taken at an early date include the setting up of land control posts at railway junctions and major ports and on motor roads, the function of which would be to ensure that dangerous concentrations of armed forces and military equipment did not take place. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that the establishment of such land control posts might constitute an effective means of lessening the danger of surprise attack."5

The arrangement that the Peace Inspectors would also inspect nuclear installations to ensure compliance with the ban imposed in Year 1 on the manufacture of new nuclear weapons was not entirely satisfactory. It depended in the early years on the nations concerned - the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France and China - each providing a list of their installations. It left open a risk that a country could cheat by producing nuclear weapons at a secret plant. In practice it worked because neither side had any incentive to produce nuclear weapons: the stocks were already excessively large and disarmament was in sight.

In other countries the Peace Inspectors took over the duties of the International Atomic Energy Agency which had previously been inspecting all nuclear plant-s under the terms of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The requirement for phased reductions in military manpower in Years 3 and 4 was included in the schedule as a result of the Research Group analysis (pages 155-168) which showed that troop cuts were essential to alleviate European fears of invasion from the East, and Soviet fears of invasion by the Chinese hordes. Similar proposals had been put forward by the Warsaw Pact countries at the conclusion, of their summit meeting in Budapest in June 1986.\(^6\)

By the end of Year 4 the Peace Force, with over 4 million men and women in its armed forces and support staff, had become the most powerful military force in the world. In terms of combat troops it outnumbered all the Nato nations combined, and was also larger than the forces of the Warsaw Pact. In terms of equipment, however, it was streets ahead. With its income of $250 billion a year (25 per cent more than was spent by the United States) the Peace Force could afford to buy the best. The transfer of military equipment year by year meant that it could keep what it needed and scrap the rest. Thus the Peace Fleet and the Peace Air Force became far and away the most powerful in the world.

Against this advantage in numbers and fire power had to be set the responsibility of the Peace Force to police much of the world, and to provide protection for all the nations which had disarmed. Its forces tended to be spread widely. Yet with mobile forces, and with the voluntary arrangement which allowed it to requisition civil aircraft if necessary to fly in reinforcements, the Peace Force was able to deploy an overwhelming strength in any part of the world. In the Middle East war it showed its ability to fight for peace, and proved its impartiality. By Year 5 the two nuclear superpowers could trust it to protect them. We were past the crux.

From then on the process of disarmament was able to proceed smoothly and rapidly. One excellent decision by the World Peace Authority has been to make the destruction of weapons a public spectacle. This idea had not occurred to the Architects: we had merely followed the line taken in the 1946-62 negotiations that the disarmament inspectors might be allowed to witness the dismantling of weapons by each nation. The decision to invite all the people of the world to watch the process in person or on television has done much to strengthen public support for the Peace Authority.

The three giant Peace Plants at Berlin, Beirut and Singapore have been working non-stop since Day 1. At Beirut over 20 million files and sub-machine guns have passed along the conveyor belts, past the public viewing stands and into the furnaces - over 4 a minute day and night. At Berlin over a hundred thousand children have won the coveted right to push the "Bestruct Button" to crush a tank or armoured fighting vehicle. I recently visited the Singapore museum of warships, submarines and aircraft, and although I knew it had become a major tourist attraction, it amazed me that so many people are prepared to pay comparatively large sums to play on the war simulator machines, or to spend a week submerged in a submarine. But I suppose that the desire for adventure and danger is deeply rooted, and that it is better to play at war than to practise it in reality.

It was sad that on January 1, Year 6, the American public disposal of unwanted missiles ended in tragedy, with one unarmed missile going off-course, missing the target area in mid-Atlantic and falling on the Welsh town of Aberystwyth. Nevertheless the sight of hundreds of missiles actually being fired, even if only seen on television, and even if the knowledge that they had been disarmed, reminded everyone of THE DANGER that if it had not been for the Peace Treaty the firing might have been for real.

At the time of writing, in Year 9, total disarmament has been achieved for the whole world except that the United States and the Soviet Union still have some conventional forces. In the Treaty the final stages of disarmament are not due to be completed until the end of Year 10. I have already mentioned the speculation that the Soviet Union may decline to take the final step, for fear of losing control over Eastern Europe. On the other hand there seems a reasonable possibility that the current talks in Delhi will result in agreement to finish the process this year. Since the two superpowers are now paying 5 per cent of their national income in contributions to the World Peace Authority (5½ percent next year) plus their expenditure on their own remaining military forces, there is a big incentive to reach agreement. They, and their people, know that as soon as total disarmament has been confirmed their contribution will be cut to 1 per cent, like that of every other country.

When then of the future? As the United States and Soviet contributions are cut, the income of the World Peace Authority will be approximately halved. No announcement has yet been made about the contributions that will be levied after Year 10 (when the Peace Authority takes responsibility for fixing the level of subscription), but it is widely expected to remain at around 1 per

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\(^6\) The crux of the matter is the end of the year. Anybody who has read the papers will know that the United States is far from winning the war.
cent. The cut in contributions will necessitate a sharp reduction in the size of the Peace Force, but in a disarmed world, that makes sense.

Looking ahead, as world peace becomes normal, as the nations get used to living together without war, as the rule of the World Peace Authority is accepted without question, the size of the Peace Force can be still further reduced. So also can the size of the contributions - from each nation. That certainly was the hope and expectation of the Architects.

Chapter Ten

WAR AGAINST WAR

Many accounts of the events of the past nine years have been written, and undoubtedly many more will be written in future. There is no need here to describe all the occasions on which the Peace Force has been in action, nor to list the more numerous occasions when the deployment of Peace Force troops or ships has prevented war without a shot being fired. All I will do is to pick a few instances which illustrate the principles that the Architects had in mind when we drew up the plan for the Peace Treaty.

The biggest difference between our plan and the previous League of Nations and United Nations was that we envisaged creating an institution which would not hesitate to enforce its authority. Hence its name. The Authority was designed in the hope that it would have not only the power but also the will to impose order on the unruly world.

This purpose, I am glad to say, was fully shared by the first Trustees and by the military commanders. It was demonstrated beyond peradventure in the Middle East war of December, Year 2. The war started with an outbreak of conflict between Israel and the united Arab nations. This triggered an attack on Syria by Turkey (allegedly because Syria had installed Russian missiles pointing towards Turkey). The communist government of Iran promptly declared war on Turkey, and the Greeks saw an opportunity to attack the Turks in Cyprus. Libya threatened to launch long range missiles against Israel, and the Israelis replied with a threat to use missiles with nuclear warheads against Libya. With Washington preparing to go to the rescue of Israel and to help Turkey, and with Moscow offering assistance to Iran and Syria, the situation - if it
had not been for the World Peace Authority - could well have escalated into world wide nuclear war.

This was the first time the Peace Force was involved in a full scale war. Fortunately a number of Peace Force bases had already been established in the area-in Cyprus, Lebanon, Sinai and Kuwait. In the anticipation of trouble, much of the Peace Fleet had moved into the Mediterranean. A 50 mile exclusion zone was announced off the coasts of Israel and Syria. An American aircraft carrier which was crippled by a Peace Force submarine-ironically one that had recently been transferred from the U.S. Fleet.

The World Peace Authority requisitioned civil aircraft from all over the world and within a week had succeeded in deploying over half a million troops in the Middle East- the biggest such operation since the invasion of Normandy in the second World War. The Israelis obeyed the instruction to abandon the gains they had made and to retire within their own borders. A peace zone was declared around Israel, with no national forces permitted within 5 miles either side of the border. When Jordanian and Israeli forces advanced into the zone they were driven back by Peace Force units.

The brave attempt by a Peace Force parachute unit to seize control of the key Israeli nuclear weapons site was, however, repulsed with heavy losses. In these circumstances the Peace Authority felt it had no alternative but to deter the Israelis from using nuclear weapons by hinting at the possibility of nuclear retaliation. This went beyond the Architects' original intention, which was that the Peace Authority should only threaten to use nuclear weapons to deter a nuclear attack on itself. Nevertheless it was the first- and last- time the Authority has had to make such a threat.

The Turkish army refused to obey an instruction to retire to within their own borders. Their defeat near Aleppo by Swedish, Indian and Japanese regiments of the Peace Force was aided by the supremacy in the air which had quickly been established by the Peace Air Force. Meanwhile Peace Force troops in Cyprus had defeated the Greek forces there, and restored the previous partition line. Within a month peace was re-established in the whole Middle East.

The scale and intensity of the action taken by the Peace Force amazed many people around the world- and perhaps especially in the Middle East-who had not taken the force seriously and hailed not realised how different it was from the ineffectual United Nations. Yet peace had its price. Over 7,000 members of the Peace Force, and around 20,000 of the armed combatants, died in the fighting. The vast monument that has been built on the Golan Heights in memory of the members of the Peace Force who died in the Middle East now looks like becoming a place of pilgrimage for people from all parts of the globe. On one side the inscription reads: "We wage war for the sake of peace," a quotation from Aristotle.1 On the other side these words are carved: "No state or nation is worthy to take part in this sacred, August duty of rebuilding the world under the protection of ... an all-powerful world governing instrument to preserve freedom and to prevent war ... whose men and women are not prepared to give their lives if need be ... in the world cause. Winston Churchill."2

The loss of life was not in vain. The military victory in the Middle East provided an opportunity to insist that Israel should sign the Peace Treaty, and that all the nations in the area- Israel, the Arab nations, Turkey and Greece-should start disarming. The process was completed within two years. Until then the 10 mile wide peace zone was maintained around the borders of Israel. With total disarmament, the whole of the Middle East has become in effect a "peace zone". Nevertheless Peace Force troops continue to patrol the borders of Israel, and also the border between Syria and Turkey. Total disarmament has also made it possible to reunite Cyprus.

The victory in the Middle East was important in persuading other nations to start disarmament. Until then some nations had been cautious, uncertain whether the Peace Force could be trusted to protect them, unsure that it would be any more effective than the previous United Nations attempts at peace-keeping. But the war proved that the Peace Force was both strong and fair.

In the United States the public uproar which followed the attack on the aircraft carrier led the President to threaten to withhold contributions to the World Peace Authority. But the threat was never implemented, and the American mood changed a few months later when the Peace Navy was able to end, without loss of life, a terrorist hijack of an American cruise liner.

The "war against war" had another important effect. It created, or rather cemented, an esprit de corps among the soldiers, sailors and airmen of the Peace Force. At the time many of them were reported as saying that they felt that they were on a crusade for...
peace, that they knew that the war would be the test of whether the concept of world peace survived. Their discipline and dedication bore this out. Their success in the Middle East, and subsequently in other parts of the world, has created among the men and women from so many nationalities a united pride in their military prowess and in their professional impartiality.

One curious aspect of the war, as of other Peace Force operations, is that the personal identity of the Commander-in-Chief has never been revealed. I should explain the reason.

The Architects were worried about the problem of how to choose a Commander-in-Chief for the Peace Force, how to find a man with good military experience and judgment whom all the countries in the world would trust to act impartially. We were worried too about the risk of "Caesar worship", the tendency among soldiers to adulate their leader and the risk that he might thereby be encouraged to become a military dictator of the world. The Soviet Union had, in their 1962 draft Treaty, suggested a troika system with three equal commanders, one from the West, one from the East and one from the non-aligned nations. Decisions would only be taken when all three were in agreement. It seemed to us, however, that if the Peace Force was to be effective, if it was to take rapid and decisive action, then it was essential that at any one time one person must be in charge.

In the Peace Treaty, Part II, we therefore included Article 23 which states simply that "Command of the military forces shall rotate among a panel of senior officers from various countries as determined by the Authority." One of the first decisions of the Authority, in January, Year 1, was that each of the panel of senior military commanders should hold the supreme executive command for one month only, but that the identity and nationality of whoever was in charge at a particular time would remain secret. This system has not been perfect. There have been a number of cases where orders have been reversed, and there has been a suspicion that this was due to a change in command. There have been accusations of bias, and attempts to deduce who has been in charge when. It is not easy for the Commander to generate enthusiasm among his troops when he cannot appear, or speak to them, in person. Yet it is difficult to see what other system could be used, and several used Peace Force Commanders have spoken out in favour of continuing the system.

Once total disarmament is completed, the worst that can happen will be for one country to use its entire police force, equipped with small arms, to attack a neighbouring nation. Alternatively, or in addition, an attack might be launched by a large body of men armed only with rudimentary home-made weapons. The Peace Force will need to be maintained at a reasonable strength so that it can be sure of dealing with any such attack. That will probably be sufficient to deter any nation from attacking its neighbour. Indeed the main problem likely to face the Peace Force from now on is boredom!

A difficult issue that arose in the aftermath of the Middle East war was how to define the borders of Israel: indeed this was the cause of the war. Since its establishment in 1948 Israel had gradually pushed its frontiers outwards, and its Arab neighbours claimed that these occupied areas should be restored to them.

The general question of how to define disputed borders had been discussed by the Architects. We could see no solution other than to take the de facto borders as they existed when the Peace Treaty was published. If we had had to debate every disputed border, the Treaty would never have been signed. So we attached to the Treaty detailed maps showing all the frontiers as they then were. I must admit that the process was somewhat rough and ready, and in a few cases where borders were undefined we just drew a line on the map where we thought it ought to be. Because nations had to decide whether or not to sign the Treaty without scope for negotiation, our maps - somewhat to our surprise - have become the definitive world map. Where a dispute continues, it can of course be taken to the International Court of Justice, but only if both sides agree to do so.

Israel, now that its existence is no longer threatened, has given up the Golan Heights. It has not, however, been prepared to give up any of the other territory shown on the Treaty world map as within its de facto border, nor has it been prepared to go to the International Court. The World Peace Authority has made it clear that it has no intention of attempting to alter the boundaries; its task is solely to keep the peace.

It has been suggested that the existence of unjust boundaries is a cause of war, and that therefore in order to prevent war the World Peace Authority should sort them out. This is similar to the argument about "provocation" heard last year when Sudan restricted the flow of the Nile water to Egypt. In the old days Egypt
might have gone to war, and pleaded that it was justified in doing so. The argument made by Egypt was that if the World Peace Authority prevented war, it should also remove the grievance. The Authority, I am glad to say, firmly rejected this view, pointing out that there is nothing in the Peace Treaty about righting wrongs or about creating justice. The attitude of the Authority has been described by one of its critics as "tough, rough and unjust." But surely history shows that war was tougher, rougher and more unjust.

A more difficult issue has been how to deal with civil wars. The tragic loss of life in the recent civil wars in the Philippines and in Ecuador has led many people today to say that the World Peace Authority should intervene to restore order and prevent further bloodshed. Yet this is not permitted by the Treaty, and I should explain why.

This problem vexed the Architects, and we spent many weeks discussing it. We would have liked to enable the Peace Authority to prevent all war including civil war, and yet we also knew that it was essential to assure all nations that there would be no interference in their internal affairs. Many governments would have been reluctant to sign the Treaty if they had thought that there was a possibility that the Peace Force might be deployed in support of their rival opposition party. How could a civil war be defined? Would a few bomb attacks, and a public opinion poll showing majority support for the opposition, be sufficient? Moreover, the Soviet leaders would never have signed the Treaty if they had thought that it was in any way designed to enable the Peace Force to come to the aid of right wing governments facing uprisings by communist "national-liberation" movements...and the Americans were equally reluctant to envisage the possibility that the Peace Force might come to the aid of the left-wing government in Nicaragua. Nor would the Soviets have signed if there had been any possibility that the Authority might intervene when troubles occurred in socialist countries, such as those in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Poland in 1982. We felt that we had to concentrate on the main task, to prevent a world war. To save the world from destruction was more important than sticking to the principle of preventing all war. To succeed in getting the Treaty signed, the rule of no interference in the internal affairs of any nation had to be made supreme.

We recognised, however, that total disarmament would alter the balance in civil wars. It would mean that national governments would no longer have military forces to back up the police in suppressing civil disorder. Our decision to allow any nation freedom to recruit as large a police force as it wished has meant that many nations have expanded their police recruitment as their armies have been demobilised. Although there has been criticism that this part of the Treaty permits the creation of polite-states, it was, we felt, not unreasonable. It gives the balance of advantage to the existing government and so prevents unnecessary anarchy. Yet it does not fossilise the status quo: if a government is really unpopular and tyrannical it is unlikely that the police will remain loyal to it. If a country is deeply divided, even the largest police force may have difficulty in maintaining order. When a civil war does break out, the Peace Authority is not permitted to intervene on one side or the other. It does, however, have the duty of patrolling the borders to prevent outside intervention and to prevent civil wars turning into "proxy" wars between other neighbouring countries, or between the superpowers. Thus all overseas military aid is now banned (except that in Eastern Europe, as I have mentioned, a special clause in the Treaty has given temporary hegemony to the Soviet Union in accordance with the Brezhnev doctrine). The restrictions on the production and possession of weapons of war have helped to reduce the number of people killed in recent civil wars, although communal violence can still cause horrific massacres.

The only exception the architects made to the rule of no interference in internal affairs was to allow the World Peace Authority to intervene when it was invited to do so by the government of the nation concerned and by the insurgents. Even so, we were anxious to avoid the Authority getting bogged down for years in local police duties. In the Treaty we therefore wrote in a proviso that, where the Authority was invited to restore internal order, it was required to make whatever arrangements it could to remove the causes of conflict and to withdraw its forces within two years.

The formula has proved useful in Northern Ireland. By World Year 4, law and order had almost broken down there, with over a thousand dying in street fighting in Belfast alone. The British Army could no longer cope, especially as its size was due to be reduced under the disarmament plan. In July the British Government proposed that responsibility for the province should
be handed over to the World Peace Authority. The I.R.A., recognising that the outnumbered Catholics were losing the civil war, and seeing an opportunity at last to get the Britis.h out of Ireland, agreed. The 50,000 Peace Force troops sent in to restore order were welcomed by Protestants and Catholics alike. A plebiscite was held which, as expected, showed a two-to-one majority in favour of remaining part of the United Kingdom. But the Peace Authority had no intention of merely maintaining the existing unhappy situation. In some Catholic areas there was a majority for joining Southern Ireland. The border was therefore redrawn - along the River Bann, Lough Neagh and the Newry Canal - with the mainly Catholic areas to the West of this line becoming part of the Republic, and the mainly Protestant areas to the East remaining part of the United Kingdom. Anyone who wished to move home from one side of the new border to the other was given a generous grant, and although there were several hundred sectarian murders during the removal period this number was obviously less than would have occurred if the civil war had been allowed to continue. The Peace Force was able to withdraw within the two year time limit. The new boundary is easily policed and there has been little further trouble between the two communities.

This solution, which now seems deceptively simple, could never have been achieved by any British government, partly because of the enmity towards it that had grown over the centuries, and partly because British pride prevented any appearance of surrendering to terrorism.

The events that have occurred in Africa are equally instructive. Transvaal, the Boer state that represented the last lager of white supremacy in southern Africa, at first declined to sign the Peace Treaty, but the establishment in Year 1 of strong Peace Force bases in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and elsewhere around its borders, encouraged the rest of Africa to proceed to total disarmament.

When, in Year 4, Transvaal asked to sign the Treaty, many argued that the regime was illegitimate, that it should not be given any recognition, and that it should not be allowed to join the community of nations. There is nothing, however, in the Treaty about the standards of behaviour required of members (except, of course, that they forsake war), and nothing about keeping out nations of whom the rest of the world disapproves.

So the Afrikaaner state signed, and accepted total disarmament under the protection of the Peace Force. They even had the nerve to claim credit for the idea of the Treaty, since the South African Field-Marshall J. C. Smuts had played a leading part in creating and designing both the League of Nations and the United Nations. The issue which has caused the greatest controversy and protest was the action taken last year by the World Peace Authority to stop the "Black March" into Transvaal. So much has been said with so much passion about this incident that it is worth going back to first principles.

As I see it, there were three separate principles involved. First, was the attempt by around ten million unarmed people to walk into Transvaal an act of war which fell within the terms of the Peace Treaty? Second, should the World Peace Authority have used, or rather threatened to use, tanks, machine guns and military aircraft against unarmed men and women? Third, should the Peace Authority have come to the aid of Transvaal at all?

No one would deny that the treatment of the blacks in Transvaal was still an extreme provocation to the other African nations. The decision by all the African nations to make a peaceful demonstration by organising a march through the continent to the borders of Transvaal was perfectly legitimate. But, when large numbers threatened to cross the border and overwhelm the frontier posts, that was clearly defined in the Treaty as an act of war.

I must confess that, when we drafted Article 37 in Part II of the Treaty, which defines as an act of war any large scale movement of people into a country without permission or contrary to the immigration laws of that country, we did not have this sort of case in mind. We were concerned at that time to reassure the United States that if they gave up their military forces they would not be swamped by an influx of poor immigrants from Mexico and from the rest of Latin America with its (then) rapidly growing population. We were concerned equally to reassure the Soviet Union that if their military forces were disbanded they would not be overwhelmed by a surge of population from China or India. So Article 37 clearly states that if there is a threat of a mass movement across a border which cannot be stopped by the local immigration officials and by the national police force, that is to be taken by the World Peace Authority as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, and is to be prevented.

Although drafted with a different purpose in mind, the principle
was valid in the case of Transvaal. If any nation, large or small, puts its defence and security into the hands of the World Peace Authority, it must have the confidence that it will not be over-run by a mere weight of numbers.

Should the Peace Force have threatened to use weapons of war against peaceful unarmed men, women and children? The deployment from the Peace Force bases of large numbers of tanks, armed troop carriers, helicopter gunships and strike aircraft caused dismay around the world. Yet this massive show of strength caused the Black March to falter, and eventually to disperse with very few casualties. Although the Treaty stipulates the use of minimum force, I believe that any smaller deployment of force might well have led to more casualties. Incidentally, the firm decisive action taken on this occasion makes a striking contrast to the weak and ineffective action taken by the United Nations in response to the (much smaller) "Green-March" into the Western Sahara in 1975.

The third question is whether anything at all should have been done to protect Transvaal. Over the years the policy of apartheid has been denounced from all quarters: the General Assembly described it as a crime against humanity; the Security Council termed it abhorrent to the conscience of mankind; and it has been condemned by all the United Nations bodies concerned with human rights and racial discrimination. There were many who argued that the World Peace Authority should use this opportunity to do what the United Nations could never do, and force the Boers to change their ways. It was suggested that the Peace Force ought to line up with the Black Marchers, not against them. That, however, would have been clearly contrary to the Treaty.

The argument that Transvaal contains 3½ million whites and under 1 million blacks, and that the Pretoria government represents the democratic majority, is not relevant. Nor are any of the arguments about the original ownership of the land. The World Peace Authority is not concerned with right or wrong. The only relevant principle is that contained in the Great Charter, Article 2.6: that the purpose of the World Peace Authority is "to protect any nation against attack or outside interference."

In the case of the Black March, the Peace Authority was put in the invidious and unpopular position of having to defend the Boers, but the decisions it took then should be a reassurance to the rest of the world. As The News of London said:

The World Peace Authority cannot choose which bits of the Treaty to implement, and which to ignore. It cannot choose only to stop the wars of which it disapproves. It must fulfil its obligation to prevent all war, and to prevent any interference in the internal affairs of any nation, however misguided that nation may be. If the constitution of the proposed Peace Authority is not sufficiently robust to stand up to an emotive issue such as this, then there can be no confidence that it would survive in other instances. If the Peace Authority seemed likely to prove partial in this case, how could the Soviet-Union have confidence that it would prove impartial in allowing communism to continue? How could the United States feel confident that it would remain impervious to pleas that American wealth should be diverted to feed the starving masses? Only if the constitution is rock solid will the great nations be prepared to finish the process of disarmament.

In no way do we support apartheid. Yet the example of Transvaal illustrates that peace is indivisible. If the law of the world is "no war" it must apply equally to all nations. All must recognise that if they themselves are to be protected from attack, so must all other countries - whether they are thought good or bad. There can be no such thing as a just war. In a civilised country, murder is never justified however strong the provocation. In a civilised world, war can never be justified however good the cause.

The duty of the Peace Authority to maintain order regardless of the merits of the rival political arguments extends also to a duty to act impartially between one religious faith and another. So many wars - the Middle East war, the trouble in Northern Ireland and many thousands of wars in the past - have been caused or aggravated by the clash of religious beliefs. It has therefore been a source of strength to the Authority and to the Peace Force that they have had such strong backing from many of the world's religions.

At the beginning of this book I said that it was a miracle that the World Peace Authority ever came into existence. Some people would define a miracle as an exercise of divine power, others as a result of faith or some other unknown force. Certainly the creation of the Authority, and its subsequent success, owes a good deal to the strength of religious faith and support. To the extent that this was never foreseen it has been a true miracle.

When the Architects were designing the Peace Treaty, we did not spend much time discussing religion. I recall Lata talking about the traditional Hindu tolerance of a diversity of gods and beliefs. We were aware of the appeal made in 1985 by the Dalai Lama to world leaders "to dismantle and destroy all nuclear weapons."
And I recall that when we noted Kant's phrase about the need to forbid the means of war, Yang reminded us that Lao-Tse, the old philosopher of China, had said much the same, two thousand years earlier: "So far as arms are concerned, they are implements of ill-omen." When Tao reigns in the world, swift horses are curbed for hauling the dung-carts in the field. When Tao does not reign in the world, war horses are bred on the commons outside the cities.

The upsurge of religious enthusiasm for our proposals, led by the Buddhists, took us therefore by surprise. I was present at the United Nations when our draft Peace Treaty was debated, and it was a moment of high drama when the Prime Minister of Thailand, dressed in his yellow robe as a Buddhist monk, launched what was to become an almost world-wide act of faith and dedication. These were his words:

In supporting this Treaty we are following in the footsteps of the Buddha. Although he himself came from the warrior caste, one of his five es-sential commands was not to destroy life. To save all life we must stop all war.

It is right to be prepared if necessary to fight against war. The Buddha was once asked by an Army General: 'Does he declare that it is wrong to go to war for the protection of our homes, our wives, our children and our property?...' Does he maintain that all strife, including such warfare as is waged for a righteous cause, should be forbidden?' The Buddha replied: 'He who deserves punishment must be punished, and he who is worthy of favour must be favoured.'

Thus there is nothing contrary to our faith in the proposal for a military peace force. Although the Buddha taught the complete surrender of self he did not tell us to surrender to the powers of evil. Did he not say 'There must be struggle, for all life is a struggle of some kind. He who goeth to battle even though in a righteous cause must be prepared to be slain by his enemies; for that is the destiny of warriors. He who is victorious should remember the instability of earthly things. His success may be great, but the wheel of life may turn again and bring him down to the dust.'

For more than twenty five centuries the followers of Buddha have been teaching peace, moderation and magnanimity. Now is the time to bring that message to the whole world.

Although the Buddhists have played a leading role both in supporting the Peace Treaty and in the administration of the Authority, the Muslims have been divided. The Shiites, especially in Syria and Lebanon, have maintained their belief in the need to fight a holy war, a jihad, against all unbelievers. They deeply resented the intervention of the Peace Force in the Middle East war. Other Muslim peoples have adopted a more neutral stance. They see that the original vision of Islam was to unify the world, if necessary by force of arms, under one God. It may be the will of Allah for the Muslim nations to take the lead in creating a unified world. It was the tide of this belief in the predominantly Muslim southern parts of the Soviet Union that helped to sway the Kremlin's decision to sign the Treaty. It is evident also in the Pakistan regiment of the Peace Force, which has inscribed on its banner the words of the Prophet Mohammed, 'Fight for the cause of God against those who fight against you: but commit not the injustice of attacking them first.'

One unnecessary cause of resentment among the Muslims is the rumour that the Peace Treaty was secretly devised by members of the Baha'i faith. I can totally deny this. No Baha'i has had any part in devising the Treaty. Nor, surprisingly, did the 3 million Baha'is around the world play an active part in implementing the Treaty: their faith forbids them to take any part in political activity.

That the rumour spread is not surprising. A belief in world unity, world peace and world government has been a central feature of the Baha'i faith since first expounded in about 1850 by their founder, Mirza Husayn Ali, whom they call Baha'ullah, the Glory of God.

The well-being of mankind, its peace and security are unattainable unless and until its unity is firmly established. Such peace demandeth that the Great Powers should resolve for the sake of the tranquillity of the peoples of the earth, to be finally reconciled among themselves. Should any king take up arms against another, all should unitedly arise and prevent him. If this he done, the nations of the world will no longer require any armaments.

Orthodox Muslims, for whom Mohammed was the last and greatest of the prophets, regard the Baha'is as heretics for daring to suggest that their founder had divine inspiration. There is no need to take sides in this controversy to recognise that his words have now come true. It is ironic and sad that although the Baha'is are still persecuted in some Muslim countries the World Peace Authority, which in so many ways fulfils their vision, can do nothing to protect them. It has no power to safeguard human rights and is, of course, debared from interfering in the internal affairs of any...
Despite the reservations expressed last year by some Bishops about the World Peace Authority's decision to protect Transvaal from the Black March, the support of the Christian churches has undoubtedly been of immense importance. Indeed it was largely as a result of the influence of the Roman Catholic church that in Year minus 3 the government of Hungary made its surprise offer to sign the Peace Treaty, the offer that tipped the balance in the British Parliament, and that allowed the Treaty to proceed to implementation. Through faith, fiction was made fact.

The Pope's great pronouncement, the "Peacemakers encyclical," in Year minus 1, bound eight hundred million Roman Catholics to work for the implementation of the Peace Treaty. The words of Isaiah which the Pope quoted have proved a true prophecy: "They shall beat their swords into plough share-s, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

What is less recognised is that it was the Peace Treaty that has made possible the resurgence of Christian faith. By coming together in support of the Treaty, by organising the "Christian Crusade against War", the churches achieved a new unity and a new confidence. Back in the age of fear many Christians were struggling with their consciences and seeking guidance from the clergy about the proper attitude to nuclear weapons. The guidance they got was muddled and confused. The doctrine of the just war, enunciated by Saint Augustine and elaborated by Saint Thomas Aquinas, had to be stretched to the limit to cover nuclear war. Some of the best brains in the Church had to tie themselves into theological contortions to justify their patriotic desire to support the policy of the nuclear deterrent. Others of the clergy became convinced that all nuclear weapons were immoral, and reverted to the pacifism of the early Christians. In those dark days the churches were divided, dejected and unable to give a lead on the crucial moral issue of the age.

In the age of fear it looked as if the greatest religious war of all time would be that between the two secular ideologies, communism and capitalism. Each side believed in their cause with theological fervour. But happily disaster has been avoided. The very idea of converting people from one belief to another at gunpoint now seems as ludicrous as burning heretics at the stake. Like any holy wars of the past, the confrontation between East and

West was a clash of ideas which could never have been resolved by war.

Modern knowledge, the understanding that has come with television and with travel, and above all the ending of fear and suspicion and war, is leading to greater religious tolerance. Although some isolated cases of intolerance remain, such as the persecution of the Baha'is, the belief is spreading that if there is only one world, there can be only one God. Each view of God, as Lata told the Architects, represents a different face of the ultimate reality.
Chapter Eleven

THE THIRD READING

In attempting to place recent events in their historical perspective, I have tried to show why the Treaty was drawn up as it was, why the World Peace Authority was created with its present rules and restrictions. If we had been starting today, in a world without war, the structure would no doubt have been different. But, like Christopher Columbus, we had to set sail without knowing what lay at the end of our voyage. We had to start in the age offear, and find our way through the surging currents of suspicion and hate.

When the Architects presented the draft Treaty to the United Nations, we were unanimous. But on the way we all had our own full share of doubts and qualms. Might our voyage into the unknown find no land on the other side: might our proposals encourage the public to hope for a false utopia, and lessen the pressure for a more orthodox search for peace? Was our journey necessary at all: if the world survived for a further ten or twenty years would unforeseen political changes alter the whole character of superpower confrontation?

What is not generally known is that we did hold a special meeting - about three-quarters of the way through our work - at which we all expressed our doubts and worries. We referred to this meeting as our "Third Reading debate," after the practice of the British Parliament, when it has discussed and revised a draft Bill word by word in great detail, to hold a final debate to decide whether to pass the Bill as amended. One can take an idea and mould it and shape it is as good as it is capable of being made: but eventually one has to stand back and decide whether to proceed with it. So also in "Third Reading debate" we took the opportunity to stand back, look at the thing we were in the process of creating and assess whether the probable advantages outweighed the possible disadvantages. It was not that some of us were in favour of creating a World Peace Authority and others against: more that all of us had some reservations and hesitations.

The first issue we discussed was the economic effect of our plans, and I will quote from the paper produced by our experts:

From the Research Group

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

Some 45 million people are engaged directly or indirectly in military activities world-wide. This figure includes 25 million persons in regular armed forces; roughly 10 million in para-military forces; 4 million civilians employed in defence departments; an estimated 500,000 scientists and engineers engaged in research and development for military purposes; and at least 5 million workers directly engaged in the production of weapons and other specialised military equipment.

Some of these could expect to be employed, directly or indirectly, by the proposed Peace Authority, some would be employed in the enlarged national police forces, but on the basis of the tentative proposals agreed so far about 35 million people would need to find new jobs. The main economic concern must be that this would increase the level of unemployment. Already in the industrialised nations about 30 million people are unemployed.

In economic theory there should be no difficulty, in the long term, in creating sufficient new jobs. The saving in military expenditure will allow taxes to be cut and/or public expenditure to be increased. Both these create more spending and thus more employment. So, eventually, the number of new civil jobs created should equal the number of defence jobs lost.

Some part of the benefit will undoubtedly be taken in shorter working hours and more leisure. There will also be more money available for capital investment in new factories, in new plant and equipment, and in new infrastructure such as roads or communications. So the rate of economic growth should improve: it is significant that Japan, which has consistently spent least on defence, has outstripped other industrial nations on all the main indicators of industrial success.

In the short term there may be some transitional rise in unemployment. It would hardly make sense, however, to continue high-military expenditure solely to prevent temporary job losses: no more sense than
keeping people employed digging their own graves!

Nevertheless there have been instances in recent years where trade unions have lobbied governments to keep missiles in production so as to provide jobs. It would be unfortunate if public anxiety about jobs were to reduce support for the Peace Treaty. Detailed proposals for reducing transitional unemployment are given in a separate paper.

There is no reason why all the war-workers should not be redeployed on more worthwhile projects. A similar demobilisation and redeployment was achieved remarkably quickly and smoothly after the second world war, despite all the difficulties then arising from war-time destruction and dislocation. In Britain, for example, 8 million workers were redeployed from military production in the space of 18 months. A similar, but smaller, redeployment took place in the United States after the end of the Vietnam war.

There is plenty of work that needs to be done. In various parts of the world there are about 570 million people who are malnourished, 800 million who are illiterate and 1500 million who have little or no access to medical services.

The Brandt Commission, in their first report, showed how much could be done - even with comparatively small sums:

The military expenditure of only half a day would suffice to finance the whole malaria eradication programme of the World Health Organisation, and less, would be needed to conquer river blindness, which is still the scourge of millions.

A modern tank costs about one million dollars: that amount could improve storage facilities for 100,000 tons of rice and thus save 4000 tons or more annually: one person can live on just a pound of rice a day. The same sum of money could provide 1000 classrooms for 30,000 children.

For the price of one jet fighter one could set up about 40,000 village pharmacies.

One-half of one per cent of one year's world military expenditure would pay for all the farm equipment needed to increase food production and approach self-sufficiency in food-deficit low-income countries by 1990.1

It might be asked whether, if so much could be done with small savings, would enough projects be found to absorb all the savings that would be expected from total disarmament. Yet the scope for economic development and for improving living standards is immense. The problem will be to get the savings redistributed. Suggestions have been made that reductions in military expenditure should be linked directly to reuses in aid to the developing nations.

I need not quote more from this research paper which proceeded to make a number of economic forecasts, some of which have been reasonably accurate, others less so.

The idea of linking cuts in military spending to increases in overseas aid - "harnessing the horses of war to the dung cart of peace" as Yang somewhat infelicitously described it - would obviously have been attractive to the poorer countries. We decided, however, against it. It was not the poorer nations that we had to convince. If our plans were to succeed, we had to attract support from the politicians and people of the rich superpowers. To have compelled them to part with the money they saved from cutting military expenditure would have been unpopular and would also have increased fears that the World Peace Authority might subsequently use its omnipotent power to transfer wealth from rich to poor.

So instead we decided to leave every nation free to use the savings in whatever way they wanted. The savings have, of course, been very considerable. In the 1980's the nations of the world were together spending around $700 billion a year on their military forces. This was equivalent to over 5 per cent of their total national incomes. Now this is down to 2 per cent and soon, when the United States and the Soviet Union have completed their disarmament, the only military expenditure on earth will be by the World Peace Authority - probably around 1 per cent of world income - less than a quarter of its previous level.

The formula for financial contributions to the World Peace Authority has meant that the savings have come first to the nations which completed their disarmament first. Their contributions are now limited to 1 per cent of their national income. This has brought substantial benefit to many developing nations. For example, in the 1980's China was spending 8 per cent of her national income on defence, Egypt 7 per cent, Ethiopia 9 per cent, India 3 per cent, Malaysia 8½ per cent, Nigeria 2½ per cent, Pakistan 6 per cent, Peru 2½ per cent, Taiwan 7 per cent, Zambia 3 per cent, Zimbabwe 6½ per cent. None now pays more than 1 per cent.

In Europe the completion of total disarmament last year, and the consequent cut in the contributions to 1 per cent, has brought massive savings. Although at first there has been some rise in unemployment, it is forecast that this will soon be reversed. In all European countries there have been big tax cuts, and big increases in public expenditure on schools, hospitals, roads and social
services. Almost every European country has announced decisions to increase the level of overseas aid. In Britain the cut in income tax of Spin the pound made in the Budget last year was the direct result of reaching total disarmament.

There seems no reason to suppose that the same pattern will not be followed in the United States and in the Soviet Union. Indeed the New Economic Plan recently announced in Moscow shows in detail how the 3 million men who are being demobilised from the Red Army and other Soviet forces are being re-employed in agriculture and industry, in huge new capital projects and in the production of more consumer goods.

These developments are roughly what we expected when we held our "Third Reading debate", some twelve years ago. The more we looked at it the more we were convinced that our proposals would on balance bring massive economic benefits.

It was the constitutional aspects which caused us more serious worry.

We were proposing a voyage into the unknown: the first exploration of world government. We were asking all the nations, all the people on earth, to put their trust in an unknown, untried ship. Might it all go disastrously wrong?

Meeting as we did in Chatham House, we could not fail to heed the warning given by William Pitt in the House of Lords in 1770: "Unlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it" (a saying later cribbed by the historian, Lord Acton, and reproduced as: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men"). Our proposals would give the Trustees power to rule the world. Would some group of Trustees be corrupted, and use their immense power wrongly? Would some wicked group of men seize power and use it for their own evil purpose? Despite all the constitutional safeguards that we had devised there was no way we could be certain that this would not happen. Indeed, despite all the safeguards in the Treaty, it could still happen.

It was impossible for us to make any measurement of that risk, any more than it was possible to make any exact measurement of the risk that a major nuclear war might occur. All we could do was to take a broad commonsense view. At the end of our "Third Reading debate" we took an informal vote among ourselves on the question of which we felt was more likely - a nuclear war or a serious misuse of power by the World Peace Authority. We were evenly divided. Our collective view was that the two risks were roughly comparable, roughly of the same order of probability. The risk, if we went on as we were, that some time in the next 50 years there would be a nuclear war, seemed to us roughly the same as the risk that, if a World Peace Authority was set up, then some time in the following 50 years the world would suffer as a result of an abuse of its power.

Having concluded that the risks were roughly equal, we next asked ourselves what the consequences would be in each case if things did go wrong.

What might go wrong with the Peace Authority? It was conceivable that the Russians might seize control and seek to make the whole world communist. And equally conceivable that the Americans might seize control and make the whole world capitalist. That would be extremely unpleasant for those who did not wish to have their way of life altered but it would not be the end of the world, nor would the new regime last forever.

More likely, it seemed to us, was the possibility that the World Peace Authority would be tempted, for reasons of benevolence, to exceed the role granted to it in the Treaty. It might use its power to force rich countries to transfer wealth to the poorer countries; or to force the poorer countries to curtail their economic development in order to protect the earth's ecology. Rules and regulations might be introduced for apparently good reasons which would diminish personal freedom in the West or restrict the enterprise of capitalist companies; conversely the removal of restrictions on trade or on travel might start to create unemployment in the East, or allow the spread of pornography or drugs.

Still thinking of what might go wrong, we envisaged the possibility that some mad dictator might seize power. But what would he do with it? He might, like a bygone Roman emperor, accrue personal pomp and wealth; but he would not be tolerated long unless he also ruled the world. He might indulge in personal foibles such as ordering everyone in the world to take physical exercise before breakfast! At the very, very worst, but in view of twentieth century history we could not ignore it, some mad dictator might force eugenic experiments on the world, and condemn a whole ethnic group to the gas chambers.

Our greatest fear was that the Peace Authority might be taken over in a military coup; that some group of Generals from the Peace Force might succumb to a lust to rule the world, and use their
troops to oust the constitutionally appointed Trustees. They might then seek to maintain themselves in power by instituting a regime of terror and repression, by committing thousands to prison or to the firing squad, and by forcing the whole world to live in fear.

Although we devised many safeguards to make this less likely, we could never be certain. In those days there were more countries ruled by military governments than there were democracies. During the past nine years, for obvious reasons, the number of military regimes has declined markedly. But that should not make us relax our guard: the risk is still there.

Thus we recognised that there were huge dangers in creating a World Peace Authority.

Next we looked at the other side of the balance of horrors, the effect of a nuclear war. Many scientific studies were available. The most alarming were those that predicted that a world nuclear war would create a new ice age which few human beings would survive. Yet even before that thesis had been formulated, a study made in 1980 by an international group of experts at the request of the Secretary General of the United Nations had concluded: "Never before have States been in a position to destroy the very basis of the continued existence of other States or regions; never before has the destructive capacity of weapons been so immediate, complete and universal; never before has mankind been faced, as today, with the real danger of self-extinction." 2

Another study had been published by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in 1982. They invited a number of distinguished scientists from the United States and the Soviet Union, and from both Eastern and Western Europe, to calculate the effects of a medium sized nuclear war, one in which less than half the explosive power in the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals was used. The conclusions were grim:

Of an urban population of nearly 1.3 billion in the Northern Hemisphere, about 750 million would be killed outright and some 340 million seriously injured. Furthermore, of the 200 million initial "survivors" many would perish from the latent effects of radiation as well as infectious diseases like cholera, tuberculosis and dysentery. Caring for the vast numbers of injured would greatly hamper post-war recovery efforts.

By most conservative estimates the survivors of a nuclear war would number 5.4 to 12.8 million fatal casualties; 17 to 31 million people would be rendered sterile; and 6.4 to 16.3 million children would be born with e-tic defects during the su sequent 100 years.

The fission products from a nuclear war would cause widespread contamination of freshwater reservoirs, and that contamination would persist for a number of years. Rainwater would be a deadly poison in the period immediately following the war, and genetic damage to large numbers of survivors would be unavoidable.

Radioactive contamination of croplands would be widespread in the Northern Hemisphere. And delayed fallout, in areas not directly involved in the war, would raise radioactivity levels in food and human tissues to 20 times the levels reported during the weapons testing period of the 1960's. Agriculture would revert to a non-mechanised age and many Third World countries, dependent on enormous imports of food from the developed countries, would be severely affected. 3

If some people tended to disbelieve or disregard these forecasts, they were jolted out of their complacency by the practical demonstration, albeit on a comparatively tiny scale, provided by the radiation leak from the Chernobyl power station.

The forecasts of the nuclear winter were made by a group of scientists headed by Carl Sagan, Professor of Astronomy at Cornell University. 4 Any but the smallest nuclear war, they predicted, would start enormous fires in cities and forests. Nuclear explosions near the ground would hurl vast quantities of dust into the atmosphere. Within days a dark cloud of dust and smoke would cover a large part of the northern hemisphere. Almost all sunlight would be blacked out, causing the temperature of continental interiors to drop, probably by between 15°C and 30°C. This would be too cold for most plants to survive. Half the world would take on the climate of a Siberian winter. These conditions would last for months.

An international group of biologists concluded that:

In any large-scale nuclear exchange between the super-powers, global environmental changes sufficient to cause the extinction of a major fraction of the plant and animal species on the Earth are likely. In that event, the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens cannot be excluded. 5

Vladimir Alexandrov, of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, confirmed that Soviet scientists had reached similar conclusions: "A nuclear war of any scope," he said, "would mean either the disappearance of mankind or its degradation to a level below the primate status."

These doomsday predictions were, however, challenged by
The Armed Dove.

other scientists, in particular by Stanley L. Thompson and Stephen H. Schneider from the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colorado. They suggested that Sagan had failed to take into account various factors such as winds, rainfall, and the storage of heat in the oceans. When these factors were fed into their model the result was a much smaller reduction in temperature. They described it as more a nuclear "fall" than a nuclear winter, with therefore no risk of human extinction.

Yet all the scientists agreed that the effect of a nuclear war would be horrific. Some estimates of the direct immediate effects - death from blast, heat, radiation - were a few hundred million. Others, such as that made in 1983 by the World Health Organisation, were over two billion, roughly half the population of the world. On top of this had to be added the indirect effects of radiation, climatic changes, starvation and disease. One of the most thorough studies was that conducted by an international group of over 200 scientists (the SCOPE study) published in 1985. They conducted that, in addition to the direct effects, a nuclear war might cause "a potential loss of about one to a few billion humans from long-term consequences; . . . The total loss of human agricultural and societal support systems would result in the loss of almost all human agricultural and societal support systems would result in the loss of almost all humans on Earth, essentially equally among combatant and noncombatant countries alike.

We, the Architects, did not feel it necessary to attempt the resolve these differences of view between the scientists, but we did note the point put by Jonathan Schell in his book "The Fate of the Earth":

The mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than, that of any other risk, and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the frame of life; extinction would shatter the frame. Crepe not the defeat of some purpose, but an abyss in which all human purposes would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history.

Once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, a d neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species. Transfering this philosophic point to our context, it seemed to us that if the World Peace Authority went wrong, mankind would have the chance to try again: but if the attempt to avoid nuclear war through a balance of terror went wrong, mankind might never get another chance.

At the end of our "Third Reading debate" we took another vote. It was on the question of which we felt would be more harmful - an abuse of power by the World Peace Authority or a nuclear war. It was a choice of huge evils.

Our conclusion was unanimous: that a nuclear war would be far the worse.

As a result of our previous vote, we had agreed that the risks of the two events occurring were approximately equal. If the risks were equal, and if the consequences of a nuclear war were far worse than the consequences of an abuse of power, the conclusion was obvious. We felt justified in proceeding with our proposals. We were able to present the draft World Peace Treaty to the United Nations with a unanimous recommendation that, despite all the huge risks involved, it was the right way forward.

We did not, however, at that time have much hope that our proposals would be implemented. The prevailing distrust and fear and hate and pessimism were all so great that it seemed unlikely that our ambitious plan would be taken seriously. Marcel, who as well as being a romantic was also an optimist, offered us odds of ten to one, we were sure of ten to one, that the Treaty would never be signed by a sufficient number of nations. But Igor, with typical Russian gloom, outbid him with odds of a hundred to one. Several of us gave him £1, more to show confidence in our proposals than with any real hope of profit. We have not needed to claim our winnings. They were more than repaid in vodka and hospitality when Igor entertained us all to a re-union in Leningrad in January, Year 1.

Even if the odds against success were a hundred to one, even if they had been a million to one, we knew that we had to say was right, we knew it was our duty to say it, and we knew it was worth saying. There were a billion or more lives at stake.

What we had not reckoned with when we assessed the odds was -the religious dimension. Nor did we realise the support that was to
come from the young generation. Since the first Soviet "sputnik" in 1957 a whole new world generation had grown up. They took space travel for granted. They looked at our planet with the view of an astronaut. They realised that we all lived in one comparatively small, and very precious, world. They therefore found nothing strange or frightening in the proposal for a modest measure of world government.

They had lived all their lives with television, so that events and wars in other countries were part of their everyday experience. They knew they could pick up a telephone and speak to almost anyone anywhere on earth. Millions had travelled widely and had come to understand something of the way of life in foreign lands. No longer could they share the classic patriotic belief that everything in their own country was perfect, everything abroad inferior. No longer could they believe that their own nation was always right, and other nations always wrong. No longer could they march to war behind their national flag thinking that those they would be fighting would be evil or inferior people.

To those who had grown up in a nuclear age it seemed better to let other nations work out their own salvation than to try to convert them by force. The young instinctively agreed with Immanuel Kant: "No state shall violently interfere with the constitution and administration of another. For what can justify it in so doing? The scandal which is presented to the subjects of another state? The erring state can much more serve as a warning by exemplifying the great evils which a nation draws down on itself." 11

The new generation did not have the same deep-rooted horror of communism, or of capitalism, that had motivated their parents. They were more prepared to see different social systems co-exist. They realised, as did the founding fathers of the United States, that freedom for different states to experiment with different policies contributed to human knowledge and progress.

They had grown up not only in the space age, but in the age of fear. Throughout their whole lives they had lived under the threat of nuclear extermination. As young men and young women they had thought deeply, probably more deeply about nuclear philosophy than about religion. They had found the theory of living forever in a balance of terror profoundly unsatisfactory, even evil. They had had their hopes of progress in disarmament negotiations - repeatedly disappointed. Many had turned to the movement to express their desire for a better world, but found protest insufficient. The young were ready for a new inspiration.

They realised instinctively that the balance of disadvantage had changed. When the possibility of international control of nuclear weapons had previously been considered in the late 1940's and in the 1950's there was no fear that a nuclear war might exterminate mankind. Everyone in that generation knew from their own personal experience that it was possible to survive a world war, and one can understand why they showed no great enthusiasm for the plans produced by Baruch and Gromyko, by Mccloy and Zorin, no great enthusiasm for giving the United Nations a dominant role. By the time we produced our recommendations, things were different. The new generation had no wish to be the last generation in human history.

The Peace Treaty was a seedling planted in fertile ground. Our pessimism about the chance of success came about because we were too influenced by our own contemporaries, by the older generation. The politicians, the diplomats, the newspaper editors, all those who were initially so scathing and so sceptical about our proposals, had grown up during, or soon after, the second world war. Subconsciously they took war for granted. They had become indoctrinated with THE DANGER as a way of life.

The young however were bored with the empty rhetoric of the cold war, and critical of the apparent arrogance of the two nuclear superpowers. They wanted to be able to escape from the threat of extermination. They found it difficult to understand how the politicians could spend so much time planning for war, and so little time planning for peace; or how the scientists could devise machines to explore outer space but could not devise a method of preserving peace on earth.

Now, twelve years after the publication of the Peace Treaty, the tree we planted has grown to full strength. Now, without nuclear weapons and without war, the world is beginning to feel adifferent, happier, more gentle place. My new fear, which I have expressed several times in this book, is that the old fear will soon be forgotten. THE DANGER will soon seem like some far-fetched nightmare fading from our memories. Already the number of people turning out to vote in the elections for the Trustees of the World Peace Authority has shown a marked decline. Yet, although things have gone comparatively smoothly so far, we must never forget that all the risks remain. The risks that the Architects pondered over, and that loomed so large when each government was deciding whether
or not to sign the Treaty. The risk that power may corrupt, that the power of the Peace Authority may be abused, and the risk of nuclear extermination if the Treaty fails. Everything that has been achieved could be destroyed by apathy.

So what of the future? At the end of Year 25 the Treaty will be due for revision. I have mentioned some subjects which could usefully be included in the review: the powers of the Peace Authority to restore order if civil wars; a definition of the law covering Peace Force actions; and the prevention of international terrorism.

It has become fashionable these days to talk of "parallel treaties", that is to say treaties which would run alongside the World Peace Treaty and to some extent amplify or extend it. Some of the countries which were most reluctant to sign the original treaty now seem to be those pushing hardest for parallel treaties! Among recent suggestions have been a weather control treaty, a centre of the earth treaty, an ocean depths treaty, a pollution treaty, an AIDS control treaty, a civil rights treaty, and an international development treaty. There can be no harm in such treaties— it is up to each nation to decide whether or not it wishes to sign— but it would be a mistake, I believe, to assume that these parallel treaties will, or should, be enforced by the Peace Force. If it is asked to undertake tasks which are beyond its constitution, even with the support of the majority of nations, its ability to fulfil its proper task may be weakened. The correct time to discuss whether or not to extend the role of the Peace Authority is in year 25, and there is no need to be impatient.

That decision will be for the next generation. The "peace children" and their contemporaries will have grown up in an age of peace. Already one can begin to see that through their eyes the world will look even more different.

The concept of unfettered national sovereignty will seem a thing of the past. It will make no more sense to suggest that nations should be permitted to go to war than to suggest that any person should be allowed to murder any one whom they dislike. The Peace Force and the Peace Inspectors will, I trust, be accepted as normal, with no more fuss than is accorded to the ordinary policeman or sanitary inspector. The World Peace Authority will eventually be regarded in much the same way as the World Health Authority, its job being to stamp out a dangerous disease. (Not a bad analogy, come to think of it. Smallpox was eliminated as a result of vaccination with a mild form of disease. War has been eliminated by using a mild form of the virus called violence.)

The next generation will inherit a world without war. What they do with it will be their responsibility. They will have plenty of giant problems of their own to cope with. It seems to be man's destiny that no sooner is one problem solved than others arise. Yet I am content to think that our generation has succeeded in that desire that lives in every human heart— to pass on to our children, and to our grandchildren, a better world in which to live.

In coping with their new world the next generation will be able to plan ahead with confidence in the ultimate commonsense of mankind. When they look back, they will realise that the proposals the Architects prepared would never have been implemented if it had not been for the good sense of millions of people around the world. When we first produced the draft Treaty it seemed, as the New York Journal said, like "science fiction". Yet all the best science fiction stories are based on an assumption of only a slight change in scientific facts. They only require a slight change in circumstances to make them come true. All our plan required to make it come true was that the people of the world, and their governments, should want it to come true.

That they did so was a triumph not for us but for human reason. The human race is united at last in peace. Whatever the future may hold, let us treasure and preserve what has been achieved.
I. The McCloy-Zorin Agreement


Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced to the General Assembly on 30 March 1961.

Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace,

Reaffirming their adherence to all the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959.

Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means.

The United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other States to co-operate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles:

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure:

(a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and
(b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

3. To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) The disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military establishments, including bases, the cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses:
(b) The elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and the cessation of the production of such weapons;
(c) The elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.
(d) The abolition of organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, the cessation of military training, and the closing of all military training institutions;
(e) The discontinuance of military expenditures.

4. The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages, until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that
security is ensured equally for all.

6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

II. The Analysis

The memorandum submitted by the Research Group to the Architects for their third meeting, in April World Year minus 5.

From the Research Group

BRINGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

You asked us to provide an analysis of the 1946-62 negotiations in order to see what problems would exist today if the idea of international control of all nuclear weapons were to be revived. This paper is intended to provide a general overview: more detailed information on each point will be provided in subsequent papers.

The main issues that arose were as follows:

1. Knowledge.

At the time of the Baruch/Gromyko negotiations only the United States knew how to make nuclear weapons. It was always recognised among American scientists that the secret could not be kept. President Truman had spelt this out to Congress in October 1945: "Scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known."²

The Soviet leaders feared that the aim of the proposals put forward by Bernard Baruch for confining all development within a new Atomic Development Authority was to leave the Americans with the knowledge and ability to revert at any time to the manufacture of nuclear weapons while preventing the Soviet Union from gaining any practical experience of how to make them. As the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, said in a speech to the United Nations in October 1946, the Baruch plan "unfortunately suffers from a certain amount of egoism. It proceeds from the desire to secure for the United States of America. the monopolistic possession of the atomic bomb."³

Within a decade the Soviet Union had caught up in knowledge and technical ability, and nowadays college students can learn the basic facts about how to make nuclear weapons from any standard textbook. This issue was, therefore not relevant in the later negotiations from 1955 onwards and would no longer be relevant today.

2. Conventional forces.

This has been a longstanding point of disagreement. The West has
Now weapons, while giving the power to prevent the production of nuclear weapons, should come first, as disarmament proceeds.

4. Ownership

Bernard Baruch proposed that all aspects of atomic energy - from uranium mines to weapon production, research and development - should come under the ownership of the international control body. This was violently criticised by the Soviets, who naturally found it difficult to accept the idea of mines and factories within the Soviet Union being owned by an outside agency. They saw the proposal as merely designed to strengthen the American hold over nuclear technology. Eventually - but too late - the Americans realised that this stipulation was not essential, and by 1952 they had restated their position as only seeking international control, not ownership.

This point may recur if you suggest an international body to own and control all weapons. But for peaceful applications of nuclear energy, e.g. power stations, ownership will not be necessary: inspection will be sufficient.

5. Verification - in principle.

In any disarmament agreement some form of inspection is necessary to provide confidence that everything is proceeding according to the agreed plan and that no one is cheating. Arguments about methods of verification have played an important part in every disarmament negotiation since the second world war: so much so that the subject has almost become a science of its own. The basic problem is that while disarmament is only partial both sides inevitably remain fearful and suspicious, and neither are prepared to reveal all their military secrets.

When the international control of nuclear weapons was first discussed the Soviet Union objected to the idea of having alien observers prying into every aspect of their national affairs. This objection was not insurmountable. By September 1946 a joint Scientific and Technical Committee had reported that control was technically feasible, and a few months later the Soviet team had accepted the principle of international inspection of the mining of uranium and the production of atomic weapons - but only at certain declared plants.

In 1955 the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the placing of control posts on their territory, and indeed preferred this system to aerial inspection, the "Open Skies" proposal made by the United States.

One good example of verification which has worked is the Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959, which prohibits all military activity in the area.
The Treaty created a control system based on the right of aerial observation at any time, and inspection by national observers, who have freedom of access to all areas or installations of Antarctica and to all ships and aircraft at points of discharging on the continent.

The same principle was carried forward into the McCloy-Zorin negotiations. Both the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that a new international disarmament organisation should be set up, and that its inspectors ‘should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.” These words, however, papered over a large crack. The penultimate draft produced by John McCloy stated: “Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.”

The Soviet Union objected to this sentence, because as Andrei Gromyko explained: “While it advocates effective control over disarmament, the Soviet Union is emphatically opposed to control over armaments. Any control unrelated to disarmament measures would evolve into an international system of legalised spying.”

John McCloy reluctantly agreed to leave out the offending sentence, but the American position was re-emphasised by President Kennedy in an interview with the Editor of Izvestia: “The Soviet Union has stated that it will permit us, or the international body, to inspect those weapons which are destroyed but will not permit us to carry out an inspection to see what weapons remain. One side could destroy a hundred bombers but still have a thousand or two thousand bombers left. If you are really going to provide for orderly disarmament, it seems to me you have to inspect not only those weapons which have been destroyed, but also those weapons that remain. Otherwise we do not have any guarantee of security for either side. If we can agree to an effective inspection system so that each country can know that the other is living up to its agreement, then, in my opinion, we can move into general and complete disarmament.”

The insistence of the Soviet Union on maintaining secrecy should not be underestimated. It is deeply rooted and for many years was strongly reinforced by a sense of military weakness. There was also in the past a fear, increased by certain brash American statements, that the purpose of inspection and verification would be to “open up Soviet society” to capitalist influences. There is reason to hope that this attitude is changing. There is no longer any military inferiority, and in recent years the Soviet Union has allowed in large numbers of foreign tourists, apparent ill-effect...
Reykjavik summit.

Nevertheless to prevent the production of nuclear weapons will require much more extensive and more intensive inspection. The Research Group wish to point out that this only creates a problem in respect of the main nuclear weapon nations. Elsewhere in the world inspection is accepted and causes no hassle.

The International Atomic Energy Agency now sends its inspectors into 124 nations which have signed the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. According to the Director General of the Agency about 98 per cent of all nuclear facilities outside the nuclear weapon states are under IAEA safeguards.11 All nuclear power stations are inspected regularly to ensure that their fuel is not diverted to making weapons. In February 1985 the Soviet Union allowed IAEA inspectors into some of their civil nuclear plants. Following the Chernobyl disaster there was agreement between the Soviet Union and other industrial nations in Europe, together with America and Japan, that the powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be extended.

So, if a new international authority is to be set up, there seems good reason to believe that it could take over and extend the inspection functions of the IAEA. It would be essential, in order to overcome Soviet reluctance to allow "spies" into their country, to ensure that the inspectors came from neutral countries. In May 1982 the Netherlands suggested to the United Nations that an international disarmament organisation should be set up to monitor progress in reducing armaments.12 The following month Italy put forward proposals for a permanent verification body.13 Something on these lines is required: certainly there should be no suggestion that the superpowers are to inspect each other.

At this stage it is difficult to make any precise estimate of the number of inspectors that might be required. The IAEA has a total staff of under 2,000. Each year their 150 professional inspectors perform over 1,800 inspections at nearly 500 nuclear installations. Some years ago Sir Michael Wright, who was the British delegate to the disarmament and test ban conferences from 1959 to 1963, made a rough estimate that the number of inspectors needed "for world-wide verification of non-concealment of fissile material" would be "about 1,500 scientists and a total, with supporting staff, of about 10,000 including technicians, administrative staff and guards."14 He suggested that the numbers required to verify total disarmament would be considerably higher. It may be noted, however, that even if 100,000 inspectors are needed, might appear at first sight rather a large number, this would only be a fortieth of one per cent, one in four thousand, of the number of people at present engaged in military activities throughout the world.

The Research Group would like to suggest that only women should be employed as inspectors. This would emphasise the essentially peaceful purpose of verification, and would help to make the whole exercise more attractive and acceptable. These merits seem to us to outweigh the various doubts that have been mentioned, viz:

that women are weak and might be intimidated. But any inspectors operating unannounced and in isolation will be in a weak position. We would suggest that if women are used they should always operate in pairs, and in constant radio contact with their headquarters;

that women are less qualified. It is true that there are comparatively few women with scientific qualifications. In the United States only 5% of physicists are female, and the proportion is even lower outside the United States and the Soviet Union. Our preliminary calculations suggest, however, that there should be no real difficulty in recruiting a sufficient number with the appropriate qualifications and, given a few months, training many more. Many will in due course be released from work in military research establishments;

that women might be seduced by foreign diplomats or military officers. The Research Group has undertaken intensive research but can find no evidence that women are more (or less) susceptible than men;

that confining recruitment to women might be criticised as sexist.

No more so, we suggest, than the traditional choice of men as soldiers. Men may be better at war; women are better at peace.

7. Enforcement

We use this word instead of "control", which causes trouble in translation and is sometimes used to mean verification and sometimes to mean enforcement. By "verification" we mean watching to see whether a nation keeps the rules; by "enforcement" we mean taking action to stop a nation breaking the rules.

Without some method of enforcement any nation could at any time tear up an agreement to disarm, and start to rearm. Within a few weeks it could have produced nuclear weapons. The inspectors could inspect, they could send agonised and urgent messages, they could protest, but to avail. The only "action" other countries could take would be also to start rearming as fast as possible. The outcome of the renewed power struggle
would depend on which side could produce weapons quickest. The risk that this renewed arms race might happen at any time would keep everyone on edge; every nation would have an incentive to make secret preparations. The only way to make sure that a disarmament agreement is kept is to have an enforcement agency sufficiently powerful to be able to compel any country to desist from rearmament, sufficiently powerful if necessary to go in and seize illegal arms.

This issue arose in 1946. Bernard Baruch got off to a bad start by talking about "swift and sure punishment" of those who violated any agreement. Since a.1 that time the Soviet Union was the only nation that seemed likely to wish to develop atomic weapons, Moscow found it insulting to be treated like a naughty child (forgetting that a similar phrase had been used a year earlier by Molotov to describe how the United Nations should enforce peace). Baruch explained in his memoirs The Public Years his reasons for insisting on powers of enforcement. He was determined to prevent "any agreement on control of atomic energy from becoming another in the long line of history's empty declarations and gestures. The lesson of the League and the ... record of meaningless disarmament agreements and renunciations of war - were very much in my mind. If I had learned anything out of my experiences in international affairs, it was that world peace is impossible without the force to sustain it. Consequently, I insisted that any plan for the control of atomic energy contain provision for sanctions against those who violated the rules." 15

Baruch's stress on enforcement raised a fundamental issue, which was debated long and earnestly in the late 1940's. When each country kept its own military forces there was no way the United Nations or any other control authority could apply "punishment" without going to war. It was unrealistic to imagine that the United Nations would have enforced nuclear disarmament on the Soviet Union (or for that matter, on the United States), if to have done so would have risked starting a third world war.

There is a paradox here: there is no way that the international community can prevent war except by threatening war. The only way this paradox can be resolved is by giving the United Nations - or whatever the new enforcement body is called - overwhelming power so that it can exert its authority without needing to fight. This implies that every nation must get rid of all their conventional, as well as nuclear, weapons. It was the route sought in the 1950's and early 1960's. It is usually referred to as "general and complete disarmament": general because it applies to every nation, complete because it applies to every type of weapon.

8. General and complete disarmament.

This policy was advocated by Immanuel Kant in 1795:

"States, using armies shall be abolished in course of time. For they are always threatening other states with war by appearing to be in constant readiness to fight. They incite the various states to outstrip one another in the number of their soldiers, and to this number no limit can be set. Now, since owing to the .films devoted to this purpose, peace at last becomes even more oppressive than a short war, these standing armies are themselves the cause of wars and aggression, undertaken in order to get rid of this burden. To which we must add that the practice of hiring men to kill or to be killed seems to imply a use of them as mere machines and instruments in the hands of another (namely, the state) which cannot easily be reconciled with the right of humanity in our own person."

The advantages of total disarmament were expounded in similar terms by Andrei Gromyko in his statement to the United Nations in which he commented the McClor Zorin agreement: "The Soviet Government regards general and complete disarmament as a feasible task. What are the grounds/or this conclusion? First of all, the fact that the carrying out of such disarmament would preclude all possibility of any State or States enjoying a military advantage and guarantee equal conditions for all countries. When all states disarm, no State will possess the machinery of war, and no threat to the security of any State can then arise. General and complete disarmament would make it possible to do away with many of the obstacles which arose whenever there was talk of partial disarmament measures and when some States feared that the implementation of such measures might upset the balance of power at a particular stage and prove detrimental to their security. Whereas in the past many States regarded various disarmament plans with suspicion, perceiving in them the other side's intention to acquire some special advantage, such fears are removed by general and complete disarmament since everyone will gain and no one will lose by it."

Enforcement would still be necessary even in conditions of total disarmament. It would be, essential to have some international military force to see that the disarmament rules were kept, to seize illicit weapons, and to protect each country from attack. It might be said that in a disarmed world there would be no risk of attack, but this would be to ignore the possibility that war might be waged with simple weapons such as sticks or stones, or pitchforks or police revolvers. Moreover, as Sir Michael Wright pointed out, a peace-keeping force "must possess both an effective command structure and sufficiently powerful weapons to..."
deal with a state which concealed nuclear arms and threatened totally disannamed neighbours. Without an effective international peace-keeping force, general and complete disannaments even with the maximum of verification will not create a secure world.

In the post-war negotiations it was naturally assumed that the United Nations would act as the policeman. Thus, for example, the Mcloyd-Zorin agreement referred to a "an international peace force" which would "deter or suppress any threat or use of arms." Yet this agreement concealed a difference of view: the Americans envisaged the peace-keeping force being able to discipline any nation, large or small; the Soviet Union always insisted that the force should operate under the control of the Security Council and subject to the veto.

9. The Veto

Bernard Baruch started the debate somewhat brashly by asserting that "there must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. . . . To delay may be to die." The Soviet Union were reluctant to change the rules of the newly created United Nations, although by February 1947 Andrei Gromyko had accepted that an international control commission should be set up which would act "in appropriate cases" on the basis of majority decision.

There was, however, no real meeting place on this issue. When the veto was discussed again in 1961 the Soviet objections were spelt out in no uncertain terms by Gromyko: "The United States delegation placed primary emphasis on the need to create international armed forces, advancing proposals in this connection which were aimed at bringing about the establishment of such forces in evasion of the Security Council. It was also proposed that the strength of these forces should be increased as national armed forces were curtailed, and that provision should be made for the possibility of equipping the international armed forces with nuclear weapons. At the same time, the United States Government demanded that the unanimity rule provided for in the United Nations Charter be abolished so far as concerned decisions regarding the employment of the international forces, thus seeking to shatter the main principle underlying the United Nations Charter, a principle which the States chiefly responsible for the creation of the United Nations had regarded as the corner-stone of that organisation's activities. It is obvious that the creation of international armed forces on this basis could provide a weapon in the expansionist policy of some State or group of States."

These objections were justified since no suggestions had been put forward on how the power of the United Nations forces could be limited if they were not restricted by the veto, and the Soviets feared that an international agency would be used by the West to gang up against them (as happened in Finland in 1939 and Korea in 1950). Today there may be some grounds for hope that these fears may have begun to diminish.

Yet the change in the composition of the United Nations means that it is now the United States which is less willing to trust its future to an institution where it may easily find itself in a minority. So now it is they who will want to keep the veto.

The rest of the world would be justified in pointing out that the veto is a luxury enjoyed only by 5 nations. Over 150 other nations, by signing the United Nations Charter, have accepted that the Security Council can authorise world-wide military action against them. They have no veto and, in theory at least, have to do as they are told. They have already surrendered a small part of their sovereignty.

It should also be pointed out that in a disarmed world the veto would mean little. Once an international authority had a monopoly of military power it could, in theory, over-ride any veto and force any country to obey its instructions. That is a measure of the sovereignty that the superpowers would lose. The art will be to find new ways to limit the power of the international force.

The Research Group do not consider, that enforcement could be made effective if subject to veto. If, however, a recommendation is to be made that the control body/peace-keeping force should operate without this constraint, then other ways will need to be found to re-assure the superpowers that there would beno interference in their domestic affairs.

10. World Government

Any institution which acquired control of all nuclear weapons, or indeed any organisation which had a monopoly of weapons in an otherwise disarmed world, would in effect be an embryo world government. As Michael Mandelbaum, Professor of Government at Harvard, has written in his book The Nuclear Question: "A world in which no nation would take up arms, including nuclear arms, would have to be a world without imbecility... No state would finally renounce annihilation without being certain that all other states would make the same renunciation. And no state could be certain of all the others as long as the others retained their sovereign independence. For nuclear weapons to be abolished, sovereignty would have to be
World government was not discussed during the post-war disarmament talks. Partly this came about because the whole subject of control grew out of what were essentially technical diplomatic debates about disarmament. There was no great public pressure for world unity. Indeed, in so far as the diplomats must have realised that they were moving down the path towards a form of world government, they took care to keep quiet about it for fear of stirring up an adverse public reaction. It was the physicist Professor (later Lord) Blackett who most accurately described the true character of the Baruch plan as "world government in one weapon and one commodity."  

Another famous scientist, Albert Einstein, was outspoken in his support for an international security organisation. For example, when asked in a radio interview in July 1947 whether the idea of world government was hopelessly utopian, he replied, "Certainly the establishment of a government able to prevent international war will involve deep changes in nationalistic attitudes and prejudices. Such adjustments in traditional ways of thinking have usually taken place slowly and over a long period of years. But now the existence of atomic weapons and other methods of total destruction leaves us no choice but to accomplish immediately what might otherwise have taken centuries. . . A world government with powers adequate to guarantee security is not a remote ideal for the distant future. It is an immediate necessity, if our civilisation is to continue."  

Winston Churchill did not dodge the issue. In October 1950, in the course of a major speech in Copenhagen about European integration, Churchill stressed that the unity of Europe was not to be achieved at the expense of world unity: "The creation of a co-operative world order is the ultimate end towards which we must strive. Unless some effective world super-government can be set up and brought quickly to action the prospects of peace and human progress are dark and doubtful..."  

Similarly Harold Macmillan, when he was British Minister of Defence, clearly foresaw and accepted that disarmament plus a powerful peacekeeping force meant a measure of world government. So did Lord Louis Mountbatten when he was British Chief of the Defence Staff. In a memorandum for the United States and Western Staff he suggested that the West "laid... a... world authority around which to unite, and that "World disarmament and a... world authority would appear to be the right sort of aim."  

Despite these generalised expressions of support, the subject of world government was never properly discussed. No attempt was made to use methods of limiting the power of the proposed international control body, or of ensuring that it would be truly impartial.

The Soviet Union was not prepared to allow the United Nations to be converted, by accident or by stealth, into a form of world government. Their determination not to yield their independence was the final block to any hope of agreement on international control of nuclear weapons. At the conclusion of the Baruch--Gromyko negotiations on 29 March, 1948, we find Gromyko protesting that control of nuclear weapons should not be "used as a pretext for certain countries to interfere in the economic life of other States." The Soviet Union, he said in a final gibe at the ex-financier Baruch, was not prepared to place its economy under "U.S. financiers, industrialists and their subordinates."  

Again in 1961 Gromyko pointed out that: "While proposing the creation of international armed forces, the United States delegation completely disregarded the question of how such forces were to be administered and of the need to prevent their unlawful use."  

It was surprising that the Americans, who are so proud of all the checks and balances in their own constitution, so determined to limit the powers of the Federal Government and to preserve the rights of the 50 States, apparently did not appreciate that the same thing would be all the more necessary on a global scale.


Although not an issue as such, public opinion was a decisive factor in all the post-war negotiations.

When the American press reported in September 1945 that the President was contemplating "sharing the bomb" with the Soviets, it caused consternation in Congress. The American armed forces had no enthusiasm for giving up their atomic weapons, and nor did the American people. Indeed this was one reason why the somewhat obdurate but highly respected Bernard Baruch was chosen: a tough negotiator was needed who could be relied upon not to give too much away. Dean Acheson, later to become Secretary of State, had no doubt that Baruch was the wrong man for the job.  

American public opinion was also responsible for the decision to abort the 1955 negotiations just at the moment when it looked as if East and West could agree on a programme for total disarmament. As Alva Myrdal has recounted, "there was never any real backing by American public opinion for the ambitious General Disarmament plan. Eisenhower and his emissary Harold Stassen met with strong opposition at home, in the Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the United States Atomic Energy Commission. There was a general
unwillingness to extend the necessary trust to the Soviet Union..."9.

Again we suspect the reason why the need for checks and balances on the power of the control body was never discussed in 1961 was because it would have raised the whole subject of world government, for which there was no public enthusiasm. Throughout his term of office, President Kennedy was worried by the lack of public support for disannishment, and had to organise an extensive campaign of political persuasion even to get the Senate to ratify the test ban treaty.

Writing in 1963, the historian Professor Arnold Toynbee gave an explanation of why there was so little enthusiasm: "In Western history hitherto, the occasional attempts to impose peace through unity have, in fact, all been abortive. Hitler, Napoleon, Charles V, Otto I., Charlemagne: each in turn has been worsted. To find these assumptions translated into Western realities, we have to go back more than fifteen hundred years. Peace through unity was a reality in Western provinces of the Roman Empire before the Empire’s decline and fall in this fringe of its domain. But, for Westerners, their Roman past has, long since, become ‘ancient history’. It has become, for us, something so remote that we do not even feel any nostalgia for it - greatly though we yearn for unity and peace in our time."

More significantly Toynbee went on to suggest that in many other parts of the globe people were inclined to take for granted that there should be one government over all of the known world. "In the historical experience of the greater part of mankind, this state of affairs has been a comparatively recent reality. In China, India and Pakistan, there has been a world state within living memory. The world state in China that finally foundered in 1911 had by then been in existence, off and on, for more than twenty-one centuries."90

12. Summary
We have listed eleven reasons why the post-war negotiations to bring nuclear weapons under international control failed.

Three are no longer relevant and it seems that adequate solutions can be found to the remainder. This would involve total disannishment and the creation of a strong international military force. If anything so fundamental is to be considered, the question of world government: it will have to be faced squarely and bravely. The proposals must be devised in afomi which will appeal to public opinion in all countries.

NOTES

All extracts from papers submitted to the Architects, and all extracts from the Minutes of their meetings, are given in italics.

Statistics of military expenditure, population and gross national product are taken from the annual publication "World Military and Social Expenditures", edited by Ruth Leger Sivard (former chief of the economics division at the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), and published by World Priorities, Washington, D.C.


In the notes below, names in capitals indicate books listed in the bibliography on pages 174-176.

CHAPTER 1 Pages 4-17
5. As note 4 above.
7. Quoted in CHURCHILL, Volume VI, page 310 (emphasis added).
8. Speech at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 31 March 1949 (emphasis added).

CHAPTER 2 Pages 18-34
CHAPTER 3 Pages 35-49
2 United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, 11 June 1982.
3 Quoted in LEBEDEV, pages 5 and 90.
4 MYRDAL, page 68.
Mr. Gorbachev stated that he regarded the total elimination of nuclear weapons as "the central direction of our foreign policy for the coming years."

CHAPTER 9 Pages 106-122
1 See, for example, VERRIER, pages xiii-xxv.
3 Letter submitted to the United Nations, 26 September 1%1, (Document A/492).
4 SOHN, pages 121-133.
5 Letter submitted to the United Nations, 26 September 1961. The offer to accept control posts was repeated by the Warsaw Pact nations in June 1986.
6 Reported in the Times, 12 June 1986. The Warsaw Pact offer also included the creation of an international consultative committee with power to make on-site inspections.

CHAPTER 10 Pages 123-137
1 Politics IV, 14.
2 Speech on Receiving the Freedom of Westminster, 7 May 1946.
5 Quoted in Beyond Disarmament, a statement by the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United Kingdom, April 1983.
6 See, for example, BAILEY. Also the Church and the Bomb, Hodder and Stoughton, London 1982.

CHAPTER 11 Pages 138-151
7 Nuclear Winter Reappraised. Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider. Foreign Affairs. Summer 1986. See also the correspondence from Carl Sagan and others in Foreign Affairs, Fall 1986.
10 SCHELL, page 95.
11 KANT, pages 112-113.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS Pages 152-168
2 Special Message to Congress, 3 October 1945.
3 United Nations General Assembly, 29 October 1946.
4 SHEVCHENKO, page 164.
5 McCLOY, document III.
6 GROMYKO, paragraph 31.
7 Izvestia, 25 November 1961.
8 see ACHESON, page 152.
9 GROMYKO, paragraph 19.
10 See John Edmonds: Proliferation and Test Bans in HOWE, pages 69-93.
14 Michael WRIGHT, pages 48-49.
15 See ACHESON, page 155.
16 BARUCH, page 367.
17 KANT, page 110.
18 GROMYKO, paragraphs 16 and 17.
19 Michael WRIGHT, page x.
20 BARUCH, page 371.
21 GROMYKO, paragraph 44.
22 MANDELBAUM, pages 5--6.
24 Quoted in ROOSEVELT, page 344.
25 Speech in Copenhagen, 12 October 1950.
26 Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten, Collins 1985, page 593.
27 GROMYKO, paragraph 45.
28 ACHESON, page 1S4. See also MANDELBAUM, pages 2S-27.
29 MYRDAL, pages 82-83.
30 Change in a Disarmed World, in LARSON, pages 31-32.
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