​“No social, human, or spiritual fact is so important as the fact of technique in the modern world. And yet no subject is so little understood” (Ellul, 1964).
 
Despite professing the importance of ‘technology’ at a time before what we would come to understand of the word in 2021, Jacques Ellul’s 1964 claim bears even greater relevance now than when it was first written. As technology draws individuals ever closer, its impact is felt in an ever-wider range of public domains and industries. From overhauling manufacturing lines to monitoring and exploiting consumer behavior, technology is fast moving into every aspect of our lives. Individuals' experiences of life are now heavily mediated by technology and this dependence on our technical a priori (viewing the world around us through technology) has been fast redefining the ways in which we communicate with each other both at the individual, one-to-one level, and also at the macro, social level. Whilst leaders and governing bodies around the world aren’t strangers to leveraging the power of technology, it has only been within the last few years that the depth of its true potential has begun to be realised. This post will explore this by addressing the positive potential of technology within democratic processes, more specifically the use of new technology and AI that may be set to revolutionise the way leaders and policy makers communicate with their voters.
 
We understand that effective leadership requires consensus to be reached and for this to happen quickly, however, the consensus that is reached must also accurately reflect the views of the citizens being represented. Debating at the national level is often carried out through the use of opinion polls but these adversarial methods have drawbacks that can undermine the legitimacy of their results. The dichotomous ‘yes/no’, ‘for/against’ format of these votes arguably over simplifies complex matters to the extent that the conclusion that is reached is not always the best reflection of public opinion. Similarly, they can encapsulate the divided mood of nations and result in ongoing tension. Perhaps the clearest, most recent example of this is the 2016 British referendum on membership of the European Union. Not only was the result a small majority but the vote was criticised for being too complex of a question to be simplified down into one yes or no question. The fallout of the result and the process of leaving the EU perfectly illustrated how complex the matters being voted on are and how-in reality-this style of voting is perhaps not the most suitable mode of capturing public opinion.
 
A more suitable technological alternative can be found in Tony Czarnecki’s Consensual Debating, a combination of digitized structure content and POLIS digitised debates that enables easier communication of views at the macro level of society. Digitized structured content refers to the clear presentation of content online that enables individuals to easily access topics of debate and POLIS digitized debates are a real time system of debating that gathers and analyses views being expressed in order to gain a fast and accurate picture of the views of those being surveyed. POLIS systems use advanced statistics and machine learning to produce these outcomes and the combination of these two systems, in theory, results in well informed opinions being shared that can be concisely summarised and presented to policy makers-creating a clear and direct link between leaders and the electorate. This digital democracy would allow societies to do away with the dichotomies inherent to adversarial politics, using technology to ensure that the true intentions of the electorate are brought before their governing bodies.
 
Having already been deployed around the world at the national, local and business level, consensual debating is also being trialed at the European level in the Conference on the Future of Europe. A collaboration between the European parliament, the EU council and the European commission, the conference is centered around an online platform launched in 2021 that is intended to be a way for these bodies to listen directly to the view of Europeans. On this platform individuals can access information (digitized structured content) and forums (POLIS debates) on a select range of topics and share their views on the topics in question. Using AI software, these views are then collected, analysed and published on the website throughout the conference and fed into discussions at the European citizens’ panels and plenaries. Considered a trial for the upscaling of this digital democracy, the European parliament, the EU council and the European commission intend to pursue the recommendations made with the intention of reaching conclusions and providing guidance on the future of Europe by Spring 2022. Secretary of State for European Affairs of France, Ana Paula Zacarias described the platform as “a true genuine process of real engagement with our citizens”. The platform allows Europeans to comment and debate on the following topics: Climate change and the environment; Health; Economy, social justice and jobs; the EU in the world; Values and rights, rule of law, security; Digital transformation; European democracy; Migration; Education, culture, youth and sport and has a forum dedicated to other ideas. Since its launch (at the time of writing) the platform has had 23,421 participants, 6,704 ideas proposed, 12,330 comments 1,839 events and 34,687 endorsements, distributed over the 10 topics of discussion on the platform.
 
The application of this technology bears potential to effectively engage individuals in democratic processes but also to properly anchor representative organisations like the EU and national governments in the views of those individuals whose interest they claim to represent. This would address the two dimensions of legitimacy that Fritz Scharpf draws on in his 1999 commentary on governing Europe, input legitimacy and output legitimacy. These dimensions refer to the ability and desire of the electorate to engage with local government and also the extent to which these local governments represent the views of these individuals. Use of technology for the likes of the Conference for the Future of Europe also overcomes the limitations of physical proximity that might impact bodies like the EU who are trying to engage with a high number of people over large areas of land-beyond just one country. In enabling members and leaders of large constituencies to properly engage with one another, and if accepted and proved to be effective and reliable, these platforms could pave a path for greater use of e-democracy at the national level. In addition to this vertical engagement, these platforms would also allow for a sense of ‘horizontal’ engagement; meaning that individuals within governed states would also be able to engage with the views of others (that they may not otherwise be exposed to), potentially developing a greater sense of local/national identity and solidarity. The formality of these platforms would allow these individuals to feel truly engaged with their governments, instead of using decidedly informal social media platforms to share their views. In a world of increasing division, the ability to share political ideas and views in this way may foster a greater sense of local/national solidarity, especially if these ideas were actioned by governing bodies.
 
However, whilst these proposals are being actioned and gaining traction, there is considerable ground to be covered. Representatively, the platform being used by the Conference on the future of Europe is performing fairly poorly when one considers that there are 445m people within the Europe Union. 12,330 participants over 10 topics of discussion averages to just over 1000 people per topic, and the CoFE website does not indicate whether or not this number discriminates between comments made by the same individual on multiple topics. This suggests that whilst these platforms may have the potential to create a digital link between the electorate and governing bodies of the EU, this is currently still just potential and they have a long way to go before they might be considered truly representative. Additionally, whilst these solutions may be applicable to many developed countries; these platforms would not yet be suitable at the global level due to inequalities in access to devices that would enable participation. However, a 2016 estimate that 5bn people around the world now own a smartphone may be grounds for disregarding this query at some point in the near future. However, there is also the likelihood that these attempts at strengthening the democratic process could invite strong opposition from those questioning the security and legitimacy of these practices. A 2020 review of the use of AI in EU policy making indicated that AI should be used ‘with caution’ and only alongside human decision makers, as a result of the perceived illegitimacy of removing humans from these processes. This suggests that attempts to improve the legitimacy of the relationship between policy makers and the electorate will take time to be embraced by individuals.
 
However, it must be acknowledged that-whilst these ideas are not new-they have not been long in practice. As such, it must be recognised that over time the increased use of technology and AI may be adopted and embraced on a global scale, but that this is likely going to be a gradual process. The positive potential that is demonstrated by the consensual debating is staggering and the speed at which AI and machine learning is being developed will soon enhance this technology even further. Jacques Ellul was correct in highlighting the importance of technology but it could be argued that even in 2021 we are only just beginning to grasp the extent of its importance.
 
Conference on the future of Europe. Available at: https://futureu.europa.eu/processes
 
Czarnecki, T. Consensual debating for all levels of Government. Available at:
https://euro-agora.sustensis.co.uk/consensual-debating-for-all-levels-of-governance/
 
Ellul, J. (1964) The Technology Society. New York: Vintage Books.
 
Manin, B. (2017) Political Deliberation & the Adversarial Principle. Daedalus
(146) 3. The Prospects & Limits of Deliberative Democracy. pp. 39-50
 
POLIS digitised debating. Available at: https://compdemocracy.org/Polis/
 
Scharpf, FW. (1999) Governing in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 
Silver, L. (2019) Smartphone Ownership Is Growing Rapidly Around the World, but Not Always Equally. Pew Research Centre. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/05/smartphone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-around-the-world-but-not-always-equally/
Smith, J. O’Brien, T. Carr, H. Crowe, P. & Rice, M. (2020) Polis and the political process. Published by Demos. Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/app/uploads/2020/08/Polis-the-Political-Process-NEW.pdf
Starke, C. & Lünich, M. (2020) Artificial intelligence for political decision-making in the European Union: Effects on citizens’ perceptions of input, throughput, and output legitimacy. Data & Policy. (2)16. Available at: 10.1017/dap.2020.19
 

 How has the IGF worked? 

Origins

Originally proposed by the Working Group on Internet Governance, the Internet Governance Forum (‘IGF’) was formally called for during the second phase of the World Summit on the Information Society (‘WSIS-II’) held in Tunis. The resulting Tunis Agenda set out the mandate of the IGF, which was endorsed by the UN in April 2006 for a period of five years. This mandate has since been renewed twice, once for a further five-year period, and more recently in 2015 for a third period of ten years.
 
From its inception, the IGF was intended to be a multilateral, multi-stakeholder, democratic and transparent platform for discussion on internet governance issues. Its mandate included instructions to:

• Foster the sustainability, robustness, security, stability and development of the internet through discourse amongst bodies dealing with different cross-cutting international public policies that concerned the internet. It was also intended to be unique, discussing issues not falling within the scope of any existing body. 
• Work with appropriate intergovernmental organisations and other institutions on matters under their purview.
• Facilitate the exchange of information and best practices, and make full use of the expertise of the academic, scientific and technical communities to do this.
• Enhance stakeholder engagement in existing/future governance mechanisms, particularly those from developing countries.
• Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention of the relevant bodies and the general public, and make recommendations where appropriate.

 
Key features 
 
Multi-stakeholder approach 
 
There does appear to be broad agreement that the multi-stakeholder aspect, and the emphasis that is placed on the importance of this, has been one of the major strengths of the IGF. Some have indicated that the emphasis on multi-stakeholder discussion has resulted in better quality decisions.
 
Inclusivity and facilitation of discourse
 
Others have opined that the IGF has effectively built a community of expertise across various different stakeholder groups, developing an inclusive culture with a ‘common language’, enabling more effective discourse and involving those who might otherwise not have been involved. The IGF has also encouraged the emergence of national and regional IGFs (known as NRIs), which has helped to strengthen the global framework for developing countries participating in internet governance at both the national and international level. This has in turn helped facilitate discourse between disparate groups including governments, intergovernmental organisations, private companies, the technical community, and civil society organisations, on a range of topics, including: proposed regulatory frameworks, potential risks, global trends and best and worst practices that have been adopted, or are currently under discussion.
 
Impact
 
In a 2013 article, Dmitry Epstein claims there are “a growing number of examples where one can trace the influence of IGF processes”; he gives the example of the 2010 UN Economic and Social Council where the working group initially contained only government representatives. A quick response by civil society groups and other non-state actors ensured that representatives from multiple stakeholder groups were invited to actively participate in discussions and not simply just observe proceedings. He also points to the decision by a large group of governments to walk away from negotiations of International Telecommunication Regulations, with the formal explanation given by the US for their decision not to sign the treaty referencing the inconsistency ‘with a multi-stakeholder model of internet governance’ and stating that ‘provisions on internet governance’ should be included in the redefined scope of telecommunication regulation. 
 
Epstein argues that the bottom-up involvement of non-state actors in shaping agendas could not have evolved separately from the establishment of the IGF and the practices that were institutionalised through the IGF. He argues that “the IGF has an important symbolic meaning as an institutional framework that allows coexistence of competing political interests and values.”
 
The International Institute for Sustainable Development (‘IISD’) produced a review of the mandate of the IGF, where they stated that the IGF has developed a unique international policy dialogue function, “overcoming traditional reluctance to have public or private sector policy decisions openly discussed and debated at the international level”. With respect to the IISD’s own goal of promoting effective internet policy in pursuit of sustainable development, they say that “the IGF has been an extremely important arena for IISD’s work”. They list a number of indicators of progress where their work has influenced others through the mechanism of the IGF, claiming that “we would not have been able to advance our agenda without an arena like the IGF”.
 
The IISD report however does claim that they cannot be certain whether the IGF, and the discussions which take place within this forum, have had any impact on the quality of decision making in “more established internet governance forums”. This leads us to address some of the criticisms that the IGF has faced, and some of the drawbacks of its model.
 
Drawbacks
 
The main critique of the IGF appears to be that it does not have any binding effect on participants; this makes it difficult to say with certainty that they have directly influenced any decisions. Milton Mueller argues that the creation of the IGF was “widely understood to be the kind of agreement that could get the WSIS out of its impasses; it allowed the critics to continue raising their issues in an official forum, but as a non-binding discussion arena, could not do much harm to those interested in preserving the status quo”. Perhaps more concerning is that many governments do not send representatives to meetings where decisions are not taken. This may be why some have argued that the IGF has not been successful in bringing issues to the attention of relevant bodies and the general public, and why they have had a lack of success in making appropriate recommendations. Indeed it is difficult to point to any concrete changes or decisions and say with confidence that the IGF has directly influenced these.
 
David Souter, who has been an active participant in the IGF, and attended many of their meetings, has stated that the IGF isn’t as wide-ranging in its perspectives as it ought to be. He argues that there is a broadly shared consensus about how the internet should be governed, and those who hold competing views tend not to go to the meetings. Similarly, he claims it is not as diverse as it would like to be. He points to the cost of travel and accommodation as reasons why a number of large countries are often poorly represented. This however may be mitigated somewhat in the future with a move towards a more virtual format.
 
 
How could it be improved?
 
Better engagement with decision makers  
 
At the IGF meeting ‘Advancing the 10-Year Mandate of the IGF’, it was suggested they appoint a Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General for Internet Governance, to act as the “political face” of the IGF, protecting the IGF Secretariat from external pressure, and ensuring it can concentrate on performing operational tasks. Crucially perhaps the report recognises that “governments react to seniority levels, and some have felt that having this type of appointee to represent the IGF would attract more high-level engagement.” Oftentimes those with the power to directly influence government policy are absent from IGF meetings. This is one of the reasons the IGF has struggled to influence governments and those on the international stage in general. Indeed some noticed that the 2020 iteration of the IGF saw a decrease in high-level political pressure, with only one Head of State in attendance. A similarly low turnout from the private sector at CEO level was also noted. 
 
The UN Secretary General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation, published in June 2020, provides a number of suggestions to improve the IGF. One suggestion it makes is the establishment of a high-level segment and ministerial or parliamentarian track, helping to ensure more actionable outcomes. This would make participation in the IGF an opportunity to engage in discussion and information exchange regarding the preparation, adoption, and implementation of legislation on internet related public policy issues. The roadmap also suggests creating a strategic and empowered multi-stakeholder high-level body, building on the experience of the existing multi-stakeholder advisory group, which would address urgent issues, coordinate follow-up action on IGF discussions and relay proposed policy approaches and recommendations from the IGF to the appropriate normative and decision-making forums. 
 
If there was also a way to more closely align with the UN General Assembly (‘UNGA’) for example, whilst still maintaining independence and keeping itself free from political pressures, the IGF may have the opportunity to influence UNGA resolutions. Not only would this help achieve the suggestion set out in the Roadmap of enhancing the visibility of the IGF and improving reporting to other UN entities, but these soft law instruments can be extremely influential at both the regional and international level. The European Court of Human Rights for example has in the past explicitly attached importance to soft law provisions in spite of their non-binding nature.
 
More accessible/understandable 
 
Some feel that there are currently high-entry barriers for newcomers. The suggestions to improve the IGF in this regard include: capacity-building at the national and regional levels; specific workshops/webinars; involvement of internet governance schools and programmes; and enhancing general communications and outreach capacities.
 
 
Implications for Artificial Intelligence governance
 
Artificial Intelligence governance today
 
As things currently stand there are no hard law regulations concerning Artificial Intelligence (‘AI’). Many have argued, and will continue to argue, that global legal measures are needed, especially when considering the ease at which AI can permeate borders.
 
There are already a vast number of organisations and national and international sets of AI ethics and governance principles worldwide, and this number is rising all the time. According to the OECD, there are also around 600 AI policy initiatives from 60 countries, territories, and the EU. The fragmented picture this paints of how things stand with AI governance today is exacerbated by the fact that there is already conflict amongst certain countries about the optimal approach to any potential regulation. 
 
The dichotomy between the preferred US and European approaches illustrates this tension. 
The US approach appears to be to endorse a largely laissez-faire approach to AI regulation, and they encourage others to follow this. In early 2020, the White House put forward a set of regulatory principles which endorsed avoiding the overregulation of AI technologies in the private sector. They stated that they hoped “Europe and our allies should avoid heavy-handed innovation-killing models and instead consider a similar regulatory approach”.
 
The EU however, as evidenced in their recent proposals for enacting harmonised rules of AI, seems intent on implementing a stronger regulatory framework, much in the same way they have approached issues of data protection, most notably through the GDPR. Some have cautioned that this is likely to be a lengthy, iterative, and highly complex undertaking.
 
Could an Artificial Intelligence Governance Forum be a positive step forward?
 
It is not just governments who are concerning themselves with questions of AI regulation. According to a PWC report, in recent years universities, NGOs and large companies have begun developing high-level frameworks and guidelines for AI governance. One issue is that there is seemingly very little co-ordination in how these issues are approached. An Artificial Intelligence Governance Forum (‘AIGF’) could perhaps help in this respect. Much in the way the IGF has done, it could create a multi-stakeholder space for open discussion and dialogue, allowing input from multiple sources, including government, NGOs, businesses and the public. This could help to encourage an aligning of regulation, or at the very least help encourage more of a consensus amongst how best to approach this difficult issue. It could also help make progress on some of the most contentious issues, for example definitions, which will be a necessary first step towards any governance regime.
 
The AIGF as a soft law mechanism
 
One of the difficulties with the traditional legal and regulatory approach focusing on legislation is the length of time it can take to respond to such a fast-changing area. A group of academics from Arizona State University have proposed that soft law mechanisms may be a promising alternative approach, at least in the interim. Soft law is defined as a program that sets substantive expectations, but isn’t directly enforceable by government. It has a number of advantages as a governance strategy for AI: it is not beholden to jurisdiction, it can be developed, amended and adopted by any entity, allowing it to be flexible and adapt to changing circumstances and technological developments. 
 
This approach is not going to solve the issue, but it could be a valuable first step. If the end goal is a system of global legal regulation, an AIGF could help bridge the gap between discussion and action, bringing together different stakeholders and laying the foundation for a future move to legal regulation.
 
Conclusions
 
One of the major advantages any AIGF would have is that it can observe and learn from the experiences of the IGF. There is no doubt it would have its own difficulties and face critiques in the future, but perhaps it would not be setting off into the unknown quite in the way the IGF was when it was launched many years ago. Any suggested improvements to the current iteration of the IGF could arguably be examined with an eye to a future AIGF, to ensure it has the strongest possible starting structure from which it can evolve over time. To be truly effective as a soft law mechanism it would also likely have to have closer ties to, or greater influence within, the UN or other supranational bodies.
 
A recent KPMG report argues that given the pace of AI adoption globally, we could see a rush to regulate over the next 7-10 years and certainly there seems to be no doubt that we are moving towards AI regulation, likely on a global scale. An AIGF could provide a truly global space for discussion and collaboration between invested and affected parties, ultimately laying the foundation for successful future regulation.